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Psychoanalysis in the 21st Century

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Psychoanalysis in the 21st Century



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James Tyler Carpenter, Ph.D., ABCP

Psychoanalysis @ a Crossroads: The Whither, Why, and How of Ideology

"A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds."

-Ralph Waldo Emerson (1841) "Self-Reliance"—an Essay

"If Freud were alive today, he would not be a psychoanalyst."

-Unidentified New York area psychoanalytic psychiatrist sometime in the early to mid-1970s

"Real people have to be treated roughly if the universe is to be made safe for imaginary people."

-Wilfred Bion "A Memoir of the Future"

Arnie Richards' provocative and thoughtfully engaging article on the relationship of psychoanalysis to ideology is like a well selected koan for the earnest practitioner of zen (Merton, 1968) or a truly contemporary psychoanalytically informed practice (Basch, 1988; Carpenter, 1977, 2004; Eigen 2007; Ingram, 2006; Rizzutto, 1981; Robbins, 2018). It presents a real-time opportunity for the psychoanalytically influenced of all contemporary clinical and scientific persuasions to recursively bring their attention to the management of the vicissitudes of psychoanalytic thought and breath. Or, to borrow Malcolm Gladwell's felicitous phrase, and apply it to Dr. Richards' article and emergent journal, psychoanalysis is at a "tipping point" (2000).

Dr. Richards' conjoined threads of conceptual practice and training, provide not only an insider's view of the flesh and bones of psychoanalysis' historical to contemporary thought and training; but also, a way to draw together the self-evident derivatives that both join and distinguish the ways in which Freud and his followers' work stimulate(d) and engage(d) the succeeding lineage of healers and co-creators of that skein of civil society which serves as the reality we live and breathe by.

My job, as this issue's editor, is to invite the readers to review with me the broad ways in which Arnie's article invites the reader-practitioner to consider the topic in a way that touches the furthermost reaches of what psychoanalytic ideology once posited and today offers to integrate at every level of science and cultural-academic-medical practice.

To start with, the basics of definition and the history of training,

Definition of ideology (per Merriam-Webster)

1a: a manner or the content of thinking characteristic of an individual, group, or culture.

b: the integrated assertions, theories and aims that constitute a sociopolitical program.

c: a systematic body of concepts especially about human life or culture.

Defined in this way, the reader instantly understands, as Robert Frost observed about "poetry ... it proceeds on its own melting". Although psychoanalysis is an ideology in all three aspects of the dictionary definition, both the nature of language in general (McWhorter, 2003; Robbins, 2018; Winchester, 2009) and the history of psychoanalysis' emergence, morphology, and spread (Carpenter, 2004; Kalsched,1996; Rizzutto, 1981), a thoughtful reflection of both the definition and scope of psychoanalysis aptly demonstrates that in name and its myriad forms, it has also been used as a fetish, transitional object, heuristics, and a variable in modeling paradigm clash (Kuhn, 1996; Kahnemann, 2011; Leys, 2000, Lambert, 2004; Rizzutto,1981; Shamdasani, 1996).

In his paper, Dr. Richards introduces psychoanalysis as a misunderstood and blamed victim of its times, and their vicissitudes of managed clinical care, academic medical fashion, philosophical happenstance and causal modeling (Kern, 2004, Kuhn, 1996) in a post-Enlightenment era of reckoning (Hendriques, 2020; Muller, 1996), a hardening of its categories, and a clear and present victim of its manifold regimes of training.

Many streams of convergence are evident in its genetic and epigenetic, clinical and scientific variants: Psychoanalysis can integrate the extant clinical and scientific findings of other related disciplines by growing its constituent concepts such as unconscious process and psychic

determination or developmental psychopathology and situating them in criminology, developmental neuroscience (Shutt, Seidman, and Keshavan 2015), and forensic—correctional practice (Carpenter, 2003, Carpenter and Spruill, 2011; Smith, 2009) such as has already occurred by programmatic circumstances and the press of public health and political urgency, e.g., institutional racism, social justice, and reducing the economic and social burden of a carceral state (Prochaska, J.O., Norcross, J.C., and Saul, S.F., 2020).

Not unlike BF Skinner's rationale to hold formal scientific theorizing at bay until a broad and sufficient accumulation of hard science data had been accumulated, before erecting a more formal and shared superstructure, the hard science evidence and theory for the full range of Freud's ambitious undertaking can be tentatively laid out at every level for programmatic constructive replication, from ethology-evolutionary theory (Barrett, 2010; Moffet, 2020), cognitive-cerebral neuroscience (Kahneman, 2011; McGilchrist, 2011; Shutt, Seidman, and Keshavan, 2015), to more psychology based clinical outcome and personality derived theories and practice (Basch, 1988; Bowen, 11/2020, Eigen, 2007; Lambert, 2004; Prochaska, J.O., Norcross, J.C., and Saul, S.F., 2020; Solovay, MR, Shenton, ME, Gasperetti, C, Coleman, M, Kestnbaum, E, Carpenter, JT, Holzman, PS, 1986; Yellowlees, P., and Shore, J.H.; 2018).

In closing, as a supervisor once said to me, "Professional practice is not practicing what you learned in school, but using what you learned in school to practice" (Gerald Borofsky, Ph.D., personal communication approximately 1987). Like any aphoristic approach to a larger and complex topic, this bit of pragmatic philosophy is not concrete. Perhaps as Shakespeare had the ambitious Brutus recommend to his bro Cassius of his plans for the iconic (and Oedipal) Julius Caesar (Hodder, 2003),

"We at the height are ready to decline.
There is a tide in the affairs of men
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows and in miseries.
On such a full sea are we now afloat,
And we must take the current when it serves,
Or lose our ventures." (IV.ii.269–276)

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Ideology, and the Art and Science of Psychoanalysis

Arnold Richards

Psychoanalysis is nothing if not an exploratory endeavor. It thrives in an open environment. Psychoanalysis becomes ideology when exploration, testing, and challenge are suppressed. There is always a tension in psychoanalysis, therefore—sometimes creative, sometimes not—between tradition and innovation, between received wisdom and the openness to new revelations. The disciplines that accrue over years of accumulated experience should be valued; they provide a foundation for practice and for measures of technical competence, and it is important to transmit them carefully. They must not be watered down for reasons of expedience. On the other hand, once science loses the flexibility to innovate it stops being science, and art without originality soon petrifies into something that is no longer art at all.

Where is the line, then, between psychoanalysis as way of understanding, and as a practice, and psychoanalysis as ideology? Psychoanalytic theory begins to look like ideology when it is presented as unquestionable. Certainly, psychoanalysis comes close to ideology in practice when an analyst indoctrinates the patient with foreordained assumptions at the expense of mutual exploration. Yet if these foreordained assumptions have been imposed on the analyst by training, what choice does he or she have? To complicate matters further, "wild" analysis may equally be a source of indoctrination. Freud warned against both, but it has been my experience that there are analysts who believe so strongly in their own version of psychoanalytic truth—whether the conventional version or a "wild" one—that they demand agreement about it from their patients.

Melitta Sperling, for example, seems to have been so convinced that psychosomatic illnesses were caused by specific intrapsychic conflicts that she interpreted according to that conviction rather than the associations of her analysands. I remember her explanation to an ulcerative colitis patient of his bloody diarrhea: He was ingesting his mother and turning her into shit. Psychoanalysis stops being a method of investigation when the analyst is more interested in transmitting his or her own ideas (and

conflicts) than in exploring the analysand's experience.

But as the Sperling example clearly illustrates, the most orthodox training in the world cannot preclude this kind of thing. In addition, pressure for orthodoxy, by suppressing critical thinking, may, paradoxically, encourage "wild" excursions. If we want to be careful, responsible, and responsive analysts, we must turn a skeptical eye as much upon our own ideas as on those of others. At the same time we must keep vested interests from invisibly imposing their ideologies on us for the sake of their own perpetuation.

In its clinical practice psychoanalysis itself recognizes this, at least up to a point; that is why to convey explicitly religious or political ideology is a no-no in treatment. But conveying psychoanalytic ideology is an equal, if less frequently acknowledged, danger, because it diminishes the analyst's and the analysand's freedom to explore. Fleck and Mannheim and other students of the sociology of knowledge have made clear that multiple factors influence all established bodies of knowledge. But our awareness of this does not give us license. On the contrary, we need to work to be more aware of these factors in order to have a chance of minimizing their potential distortive impact.

When Freud spoke of psychoanalysis as an empirical science, he was pragmatic about it. He knew that sciences modify their hypotheses when they do not fit the data. Recognizing that our understanding would never be complete, he set an example of keeping close to the facts and being ready to correct or modify his theories. Brenner took the same approach, first elevating the structural model and then demolishing it. Self-psychology came out of Kohut's dissatisfaction with the ways theory accounted for narcissistic phenomena and practice treated them. My own belief is that science defines itself as the repeated formulation of new hypotheses in search of better explanations of phenomena. Whether the particulars of any specific hypothesis eventually prove right or wrong is not, ultimately, what matters. Rather, it is this searching quality, the stance of exploration, that is essential to the psychoanalytic attitude.

In 1964, Harry Slochower produced an intelligent and nuanced attempt to define psychoanalysis. He acknowledges Freud's scientific cast of mind—his training as a scientist and his passionate interest in "truth," his constant modification of his theories as new data challenged them, and his attention to predictive power—and ultimately comes to the conclusion that psychoanalysis is an applied science that "deals with a qualitatively different subject matter" than other fields of study, and therefore can not be held to their standards (p. 168).

Psychoanalysis is undeniably unlike other sciences in some crucial ways, including even the other so-called human sciences. Its subject is the unconscious, and its medium is the relationship between two human beings. Every analyst—analysand pair is unique, and so, in essential ways, is the aim, or meaning, of each analysis. Also, psychoanalysis is not a monolith. It is at once an understanding of development, an understanding of psychopathology, an understanding of how the mind works, and an understanding of the therapeutic process and cure. Each of these has its own types of theories, based on different assumptions with different forms and degrees of validity and different levels of abstraction (cf. Waelder).

Psychoanalysis has always been accepted to some degree as an art—perhaps especially as an art. "As a practice, psychoanalysis is more than a science, and primarily an art," Slochower (1964, p. 172) asserts. He continues, "Applied psychoanalysis, like art, cannot and should not be a pure science.... The decisive act in its approach is an act of the imagination. Its function is rather to serve as a link between science and art" (p. 174).

The view of analytic practice as art is analogous to, and shares much with, traditional views of the art of medicine. It takes into account the judgments and other imponderables that psychoanalysts and physicians consider in treating their patients. Both psychoanalysts and physicians look beyond theory and data to experience and intuition when they make treatment decisions. Slochower also points out that the strict bifurcation of science and art is, in fact, a modern construct.

Certainly its own inventor and founder made clear that psychoanalysis was a procedure—a treatment—before it was a science. Freud used the

¹"Human science is the study and interpretation of the experiences, activities, constructs, and artifacts associated with human beings" [emphasis added] (Human science, n.d.).

term first to refer to his therapeutic method; only later did it become the name he applied to the new study of unconscious mental processes. Bowlby (1979) distinguished later between the science of psychoanalytic psychology and the art of psychoanalytic practice. Loewald (1975) too believed that science and art are not as far apart from one another as Freud and his scientific age liked to assume; he saw art and science as closely related but different facets of the activity of the human mind. Psychoanalytic technique could be seen as the art of applying psychoanalytic knowledge and psychoanalytic method in a particular clinical case. The science of psychoanalysis aims to increase knowledge about how the mind works; the art of psychoanalysis, which is psychoanalytic treatment, aims to improve the patient's psychic health.

Loewald (1975) considered psychoanalytic technique an art also because the transference and transference neurosis can be viewed as drama—an action sequence that remains under the formative influence of the original action but is still a unique creation of the psychoanalytic process. He writes, "Viewed as a dramatic play the transference neurosis is a fantasy creation woven from memories and imaginative elaborations of present actuality, the present actuality being the psychoanalytic situation, the relationship of patient and analyst" (p. 279). According to Loewald, the transference is a fantasy, make-believe, an illusion, a play, which is first recognized conjointly. The analyst is the director of the play, and the analyst and analysand are the coauthors. And the patient casts the analyst in the roles of various coauthors.

Psychoanalysis as an ideology reflects the idea of psychoanalysis as a movement, which Freud and his early collaborators took seriously. Loewald (1975) puts it this way: "They had larger aims and vistas, namely to influence and change the outlook and behavior of a whole era in regard to the relationship and balance between rational and instinctual life and between fantasy and objective reality" (p. 291).

The difficulty, as I see it, lies in the fineness of the line between conviction and ideology. It is increasingly clear that we cross it at grave danger to ourselves and our field. The fruit of ideology is intolerance, and intolerance is killing us; we need to risk openness again, with others and among ourselves. Yet until we make careful note of where the line between theory and ideology lies, we are at constant risk of ending up on the wrong

side. What is at stake is our role as thinkers and healers, inspired by the radical independence of Freud's thought.

Ideology is never independent; it is the property of oligarchs. Science, art, and philosophy are capacious and welcoming houses; all kinds of thought have found shelter beneath their broad roofs. Ideology, however, is by definition exclusionary; it establishes acceptable ways of thinking and uses narrowly centralized power structures to enforce them. This is why it lends itself more readily to oligarchic rule than to democratic process. Oligarchy and ideology are two sides of a self-perpetuating coin. They are not healthy for democracy, and they are not healthy for psychoanalysis. It is time to step back and reclaim our citizenship in the larger intellectual world of curiosity, creativity, and freedom.

Introduction

Arnold Richards to Daniel Benveniste

Pr. Benveniste's reference to Konrad Lorenz's cranes is very felicitous. Although I met Lorenz when he came to Topeka as a Sloan visiting professor, I was familiar with his ducklings but not his cranes. We are like cranes but we also attack each other directly, for example, my attacks on self-psychology and relational psychoanalysis. There was also the attack on the NAAP regarding treatment frequency as essential to the definition of psychoanalysis, notwithstanding the fact that the NAAP saw transference and resistance as central, which according to Freud made them psychoanalysts. And to their credit, they were able to establish a license for psychoanalysis, something the establishment was never able to accomplish. Dr. Benveniste cites the papers of William Grossman, who was my most important mentor on psychoanalytic theory. Grossman was able to show the underlying structure of Freud's papers and the centrality of both constitution and experience. Applauding Dr. Benveniste's own contributions to psychoanalytic thought and history would require its own tome.



Musings on "Psychoanalysis in Crisis: The Danger of Ideology" by Arnold D. Richards

Daniel S. Benveniste

Arnold D. Richards has been sounding the alarm for decades, warning that psychoanalysis is in crisis. His focus has not been on the superiority of psychoanalytic theory or therapy and all the unjust external assaults it suffers. No, his focus has been on internal threats, self-inflicted damage, and self-sabotage. He directs his attention to those that are excluded, the theories that are left out, and those who wield the power to decide what and who to leave out. He approaches the problem from several converging angles: the scientific status of psychoanalysis, the history of the psychoanalytic thought collective, and the problems of power in psychoanalytic organizations.

The Scientific Status of Psychoanalysis

Is psychoanalysis a science? Richards considers the different scientific models with which psychoanalysis might identify, points out the arguments of those that say it is a science and the arguments of those that lean more in the direction of psychoanalysis as an art, and notes, "I don't think this problem is going to be resolved anytime soon."

I think the reason this is such an important issue is that in modern society saying psychoanalysis is a science is like saying psychoanalysis is real. Nonetheless, I don't think psychoanalysis is a science in the way popular culture uses that term. Furthermore, in my clinical work, I've never felt the need to call myself a scientist. In both my theoretical and clinical work I feel far more comfortable aligning myself with what Freud called a "psychoanalytic mode of thought."

William I. Grossman (1998) wrote a compelling article looking at *Totem* and *Taboo* (1913) along with two clinical papers of Freud's written at the same time: *The Dynamics of Transference* (SE 12, 1912/1958) and *Recommendations to Physicians Practicing Psychoanalysis* (SE 12, 1912/1958). He pointed out, "In the technical papers that appeared concurrently with his [Freud's] book, he applied to the clinical situation the

ideas on transference, narcissism, primitive mental mechanisms, and unconscious communication that he had explored in *Totem and Taboo*" (Grossman, 1998, p. 469). He was addressing specifically the stratification of psychic material being subjected to rearrangement or retranscription. Grossman noted, "According to this principle, the processes of defense lead to compromise formations and the progressive build up of complexity" (p. 471). Grossman noted that for Freud, "the disposition to neurosis was the result of the variable interplay of constitution and experience. The outcome of this interaction in turn interacted with further experience to produce neurosis, a new structure" (pp. 471–72). And then Grossman quoted Freud: "The neuroses themselves have turned out to be attempts to find individual solutions for the problems of compensating for unsatisfied wishes, while the institutions seek to provide social solutions for these same problems" (1913/1955, *SE* 13, p. 186).

In 'The claims of psycho-analysis to scientific interest' Freud wrote, "... the psychoanalytic mode of thought acts like a new instrument of research" (Freud, *SE* 13, 1913, p. 185). Wouldn't we do better in affirming and elaborating our psychoanalytic mode of thought than arguing whether psychoanalysis is a science or not? I'm okay calling psychoanalysis an instrument of research but feel no need to defend psychoanalysis as a "science." The fact that science can be defined in so many inclusive and exclusive ways distracts us from the psychoanalytic mode of thought and assures us that this problem is not, as Richards predicts, "going to be resolved anytime soon."

Any scientist can create a scientific experiment to evaluate psychoanalytic principles, conduct scientific outcome research, or define psychoanalysis as a social science, a historical science, a hermeneutic science, or as Siegfried Bernfeld did, as a science of traces. But we have a much more positive, affirmative, and less defensive conversation when we speak of a psychoanalytic mode of thought in search of analogous relations between early childhood trauma and adult personality, metaphorical relations between dreams and one's life story, "points of agreement" between individuals and cultures, the analysis of resistance in figures of speech, the analysis of transference in the structure of narrative, and so on.

Ideology in The Psychoanalytic Thought Collective

The history of the psychoanalytic thought collective is a history of

identity formation through positive assertions of what is embraced and negative assertions of what is repudiated and excluded. Konrad Lorenz (1963) described the dance of the cranes, in which a crane engages in intense threat and attack behavior in front of, but not directed toward, a partner crane. Lorenz explained that this dance sends an easily understood message that the attack is not directed against his partner but away from him, implying a comradely defense:

Now the crane turns again toward his friend and repeats this demonstration of his size and strength, only quickly to turn around once more and perform emphatically a fake attack on any substitute object, preferably a nearby crane which is not a friend, or even on a harmless goose or on a piece of wood or stone which he seizes with his beak and throws three or four times into the air. The whole procedure says as clearly as human words, "I am big and threatening, but not toward you—toward the other, the other, the other." (pp. 174–75)

We're cranes. We form attachments to each other by attacking substitute objects. I'm with mother against father. I'm with father against mother. I'm with my group against the other group. In Freud's *On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement* (1914) he defined what psychoanalysis was and clarified the boundaries so clearly that the positions of the revisionists (Adler, Jung, etc.) also came into focus.

Freud wrote, "It may thus be said that the theory of psycho-analysis is an attempt to account for two striking and unexpected facts of observation which emerge whenever an attempt is made to trace the symptoms of a neurotic back to their sources in his past life: *the facts of transference and of resistance*. Any line of investigation, which recognizes these two facts and takes them as the starting-point of its work has a right to call itself psycho-analysis, even though it arrives at results other than my own. But anyone who takes up other sides of the problem while avoiding these two hypotheses will hardly escape the charge of misappropriation of property by attempted impersonation, if he persists in calling himself a psycho-analyst." (p. 16)

Flash forward to 2021 and we have people calling themselves psychoanalysts who openly and proudly repudiate the transference in favor of a supposedly real and authentic relationship. Some discount the fact of resistance as proof of a failed relationship. Others repudiate infantile sexuality, the Oedipus complex, the repetition compulsion, the role of metaphor in psychoanalytic therapy, and the interpretation of dreams. I honestly don't know why anyone would want to call themselves a psychoanalyst if they repudiate the basic facts of observation in psychoanalysis.

Richards describes the history of the North American psychoanalytic thought collective in relation to the exclusion of non-medical analysts and the institutional power brokers who decide who will be certified and who will become training analysts. At the heart of his critique is 1) the question of valid qualifications for deciding who's to be let in and 2) the results of the current system. The lack of valid qualifications for deciding who's to be let in takes us right back to the scientific status of psychoanalysis because if there isn't a scientific basis for certification or promotion to training analyst, upon what basis are those decisions made? Theoretical preferences? Power relationships? Coercion? Conformity? And as for the results of the current system we have aging members, decreasing numbers of candidates, decreasing numbers of analysands, isolation from allied professions, and a skeptical public. That sounds like a crisis to me.

Problems of Power in Psychoanalytic Organizations

I am an outsider to the problems of power in psychoanalytic organizations as I am not an analyst (I'm a clinical psychologist), don't belong to a society, and never went to a psychoanalytic institute. So the only thing I can really comment on is based on my research into the early history of psychoanalysis in San Francisco where one of the major issues was whether to build (in 1942) a psychoanalytic institute oriented to a creative teaching and learning experience or a psychoanalytic institute oriented to the regulations of the APsaA. If it were to be a creative psychoanalytic institute, the spirit of psychoanalysis would be sure to thrive but the long-term stability of the institution would be in question. If it were to be a psychoanalytic institute oriented to the rigid and exclusionary regulations of the APsaA, in 1942, it would be more likely to survive but the creative potential of teaching and learning would be in question (Benveniste, 2006, pp. 195–233). That, of course, is what makes psychoanalytic education one of the impossible professions.

The answer to the dilemma is not this way or that but rather a lively

on-going debate for which Arnie Richards has provided much in the way of critiques for American psychoanalysis to consider.

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Introduction

James Tyler Carpenter to Burton Norman Seitler, Ph.D.

Dr. Seitler's reflections are like a lost and found afternoon in a dear friend's university office. It's all there...and no demand to take notes or be examined. Just take note and wonder at it all. Faculty cocktail party for a visiting fellow and peripatetic *tour de force*, Burt's thoughtful tour of the topic, and biographic references to Dr. Richard's impressive authority on the subject of the vicissitudes of professional belief in the empire of psychoanalysis, is fun for both the timid and curious, as well as the self-other proclaimed lion-hearted local scientist. Nothing is left out, or to chance that the reader might leave unaware. Ideology touches everything, as does psychoanalysis.



Do Analytic Institutes Eat Their Young? Psychoanalysis/Art, Physics, Psycho-Physics, and a Parable: A Response to Arnold Richards, M.D.

Burton Norman Seitler, Ph.D.

Arnold Richards, M.D. has been a sensitive psychiatrist/psychoanalyst, prolific writer, well-respected editor, and discerning publisher of psychoanalytic topics covering a wide range of issues. Recently, International Psychoanalytic Books published a collection of his papers (vol. 1–3). For decades, He has been an indefatigable champion on behalf of psychoanalysis. He has even taken issue with his own psychiatric establishment for excluding non-physicians from full membership in psychoanalytic institutes. While the latter issue was settled as a direct result of the class action lawsuit filed by Bryant Welch, J.D., Ph.D. in 1985, against the American Psychoanalytic Association, Dr. Richards has expressed concerns about other troubling psychoanalytic matters.

A recurrent theme running through a number of his previous papers—as well as the current one—itself a reiteration (with permission) of an article entitled, "Psychoanalysis in Crisis: Art, Science, or Ideology?" that he earlier wrote for *JASPER* (2017, vol. 1, issue 1)—has to do with several central questions: (1) Who defines what constitutes psychoanalytic treatment? (2) Is psychoanalysis a science or an art? and (3) Has psychoanalysis decomposed into an ideology or a religion? Any one of these questions could easily be an article all by itself. Yet, he successfully manages to integrate and respond to those complexities in an intelligible, coherent, and expositive essay. Central to his thinking on the subject is his profound concern about the survival of psychoanalysis. If we were ever able to locate his abiding devotion to psychoanalysis, we would not be surprised to find—embedded deep within his soul—a wish for truth.

To that end, he fears that the internecine warfare from fellow psychoanalysts that has characterized psychoanalysis practically from the start, will combine with external attacks from "the barbarians at the gate," hailing from Big Pharma, the insurance companies, and competing psychotherapy approaches, and that they ultimately will put asunder this psychoanalytic project that we all love.

Who Defines What Constitutes Psychoanalysis?

Questions regarding differential definitions of what constitutes psychoanalysis; who is a psychoanalyst; and whether there can (or should) ever be a "typical" psychoanalytic process are spotlighted. Alayarian (2018) focused on the nature of knowledge, belief, and their relationship to definitional issues and to each other. She contended:

...A belief is not knowledge if there is opportunity and willingness to test and falsify it. Science in contrast to belief can be wrong, and is constantly revised for improvement; it is knowledge at a particular time. This move away from infallibilism indicates all knowledge is belief. (p. 13)

Insofar as definitional issues are concerned, Frank Summers (2016, personal communication) indicated that s/he who defines the terms of the discourse wins the argument, thus underscoring the singular significance of who does the defining. And as we might expect, the way others define and portray our theories and clinical approaches, all too often resemble caricatures more than represent verisimilitude. Dr. Richards says this about psychoanalysis, "we love it, and we know its value." When Charles Brenner, MD was interviewed by Kim Kleinman, LCSW, regarding his feelings about the value of psychoanalysis, he thoughtfully affirmed, "it literally can be a matter of life and death."

But what are the "basic psychoanalytic facts" that should be drawn upon? Spence (1994) asserted that what goes on in the consulting room in the course of a psychoanalytic treatment session that can be put into words are the foundational building blocks constructing its material evidence. Spence includes in this structure the issues that a patient brings up, the words that the analyst uses, and those topics that analysts raise with their supervisors. The latter comprises a mix of observations, theoretical conceptualizations, free associations, word-of-mouth, and reality as sources of evidence. Spence does, however, differentiate clinical from contextual and from what he refers to as latent facts. The latter may not be directly observable during the session, and thus must be gleaned from other sources.

Is Psychoanalysis Science/Art?

Dr. Richards is not content with intra-psychic examinations per se. Without excluding drive theory, but rather, daring to go beyond it, he brings into the mix exogenous sociological, geopolitical, psychohistorical, economic, epistemological and educational influences. With considerable agility, he deftly moves from definitional issues to the long-argued question over whether psychoanalysis is a science or an art? My own belief is that information bearing upon and germane to this question of art *versus* science may have to be gleaned from a wide range of disciplines and sources, such as, the physical sciences, art, as well as philosophy.

Unfortunately, the very fact that this has become a binary representation, much like the arbitrary distinction between body and mind, unwittingly implies that we are required to align with one camp or the other, rather than seek a possible integration of these seemingly disparate constructs. Just as the artificial bifurcation of body and mind or the soma/ psyche division can be unified under the umbrella of holism, in which the whole organismic gestalt can be regarded as greater than the sum of its parts, by the same token, art and science can be appreciated as having both likenesses as well as differences. But here's the rub. If clinicians were to admit that their work with patients is an art form, it is anticipated that critics of psychoanalysis would seize upon this admission, make far-reaching generalizations and relegate it to a kind of unscientific netherworld, and thus render the whole of psychoanalysis as invalid. Such thinking is as over-simplified and overgeneralized as it is inaccurate. Psychoanalysis is not two-dimensional. It is highly complex with many nuanced meanings and textured ways of conceptualizing and practicing. Thus, as Dr. Richards asserts, it can be, and ought to be "many things to many people." Is it an art? Yes. Is it a science? Again, yes. Can art be studied scientifically? Yes.

Art and Physics

About this, Shlain (1991), neither a physicist, nor an artist has stated:

I have often been asked how a surgeon could hold forth on such weighty and diverse subjects. Surprisingly, my surgery has uniquely prepared me for the task, for a surgeon is both artist and scientist. The craft demands a finely honed sense of aesthetics: A maxim of the

profession is if an operation does not "look" beautiful it most likely will not function beautifully. Thus, surgeons rely heavily on their intuitive visual-spatial right-hemispheric mode. At the same time, our training is obviously scientific (p. 8).

Going further, it is interesting to point out that many aspects of Einstein's theories of relativity are contained within Freudian notions (and vice versa), although both Freud and Einstein clearly did not have each other in mind when they independently developed their ideas. Specifically speaking, Einstein explicitly conceptualized past and future as equivalent in their non-existence when "hitchhiking" aboard a beam of light. Similarly, space and time are reciprocal facets of reality. In a comparable vein, Freud believed that opposites lie side by side—in equivalency--in the primary process language of the unconscious. According to this view, past, present and future are all the same representation. Weyl (1963), a well-respected mathematician in his day, had this to add about objectivity, certainty, and subjectivity:

...the objective world simply *is*; it does not *happen*. Only to the *gaze* of my consciousness...does a section of this world come to life as a fleeting image in space which continuously changes in time. (p. 116)

What these individuals are referring to is a study of art, in consideration and in spite of its subjectivity. To this, Davies (1983) and earlier, Heisenberg (1958), added the following:

The common division of the world into subject and object, inner world and outer world, body and soul, is no longer adequate...(Davies, p. 112). Natural science does not simply describe and explain nature; it is part of the interplay between nature and ourselves (Heisenberg, p. 102).

Furthermore, the view of the new physics is that observer and the observed are interconnected in some fashion. In fact, physicists claim that the very act of one particle observing another affects the other (and vice versa). Imagine that, particles are affected by being observed. The use of the term "observed" hardly seems to be what we would expect from a so-called "hard science" like physics, which is given to methodical observations, precise definitions, and meticulous mathematical formulations. And yet, that is the exact terminology that is specifically chosen.

Also, despite a myriad of studies (Greene, 1999; Rosa, 2012; Frabboni, et al., 2012; Vedral, 2006; Svensson, 2013; Pfleegor & Mandel, 2011; and Rovelli, C. 1996), it remains unclear how this occurs, so much so that physicists have resorted to explaining this set of (what Freud refers to as "uncanny") phenomena by invoking the appellation, "spooky" physics. By this, it is meant that the inner province of subjective thought winds up being intimately conjoined to the external realm of objective facts. As we can see, this is not terribly different from what Ferenczi (and subsequently others) understood and has now come to be known as the Relational Turn.

Thus, the subjective and the objective, while ostensibly at opposite poles, paradoxically are intertwined. Niels Bohr recognized this and united seemingly opposite notions under the rubric of "complementarity." In his case, the two diametrically opposed hypothetical constructs associated with light were *both* particle and wave. According to this system, waves and particles (which he believed to be the components which make up light) are an integrated duality. Although they are different, they are complementary properties of a single unit. More will be said about this shortly. Therefore, why should it be far-fetched or any different for anyone to believe that Psychoanalysis too can be studied scientifically?

The main charge that has consistently been levelled at psychoanalysis is that it has no research to back up its claims. Nothing could be further from the truth. From its inception, psychoanalysis has been interested in research. Freud utilized the method of free association, while Jung developed a more structured word association approach. These were the first scientific tools of psychoanalysis, but they were certainly not the last. In all likelihood, because the methods of his time for properly studying psychoanalysis were quite limited, Freud put his Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895) on the back burner. Years later, he stated:

Science...is not a revelation; long after its beginnings, it still lacks the attributes of definiteness, immutability, and infallibility for which human thought so deeply longs. (p. 191)

Although Freud gave up his Scientific Project for his now famous case studies, he never entirely gave up the hope that one day psychoanalysis could be studied scientifically. His whole premise of psychic determinism is predicated on the firm belief that: one day innovative techniques and/ or technological advances could be developed that would enable us to progress to the point where more and more psychoanalytic assumptions could be tested and either verified or disconfirmed.

Since his time, a great body of research has been undertaken involving observational studies, the filmed reports and videotapes used by Mahler (1980), Ainsworth & Bell's "strange" situation, filmed documentation of Bergman's work with an autistic child (Skorczewski & Bergman, 2005), the use of split-screen photography (see Beebe's research, 2017), Tronick, et al's (1975) demonstration and effect of the "still face" study, longitudinal studies (see Vaillant 1995, 1980), as well as verbatim transcripts of individual cases over time (see Waldron, et al. 2011).

When D.O. Hebb put forth his theories in 1949 about how experience alters the structure of the brain, in his by-now classic treatise, *Organization of Behavior*, his theories were regarded as elegantly stated, but simultaneously, as pie-in-the-sky speculations, simply because it was thought that they were unprovable. However, with the advent of more sophisticated neurological instruments (like fMRIs, CAT Scans, and PET Scans), minute, often subtle, neurological changes could now be observed. So too, can many important (although not all) aspects of psychoanalysis be empirically verified.

While it is true that many aspects of psychoanalysis cannot be studied yet using traditional scientific techniques, there are many features intrinsic to psychoanalysis that can be—and have been—studied scientifically. For example, the Journal for the Advancement of Scientific Psychoanalytic Empirical Research (*JASPER*) recently published an article (Seitler, 2018) that listed over 300 rigorously researched psychoanalytic investigations. The following lists a broad swath of psychodynamic research areas (in alphabetical order) that were covered in that article: adolescence, adult psychotherapy approaches, affect regulation, alexithymia, alliance, assessment and measurement, attachment, attention deficit hyperactivity disorders, brain changes, castration anxiety, child analysis, consultation, countertransference, defense mechanisms, dreamwork, efficacy of psychoanalysis as compared with other psychotherapies, epistemological understandings, group psychotherapy, insight, mechanisms of change, memory, methodological studies, narcissism, neuroscience,

philosophy of science interpretations, process studies, resistance, self, separation anxiety, separation-individuation, supervision, techniques, termination, transference, unconscious, and so on. Articles on the above subjects represent a mere smattering of some of the excellent research on psychoanalytic subjects of interest that has been, and continues to be done. The following year, the National Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis (NAAP) honored that *JASPER* article by honoring it with the Gradiya award.

Not only can art be studied scientifically, but there are a host of other areas which ostensibly are not measurable at first blush, such as poetry, creative writing, music, or jokes, that can, indeed, be studied scientifically. Admittedly, there are some things that do not readily lend themselves to scientific study at this time. That fact does not solely apply to a young social science, like psychoanalysis; it is equally true of various aspects of older, so-called "hard sciences," like physics. Let me return to a discussion of light.

To wit, the quandary over the nature of light is a classic example of difficulty demonstrating whether light is a wave or a particle. Once again, by juxtaposing these two possibilities as binaries, only one answer is possible. Categorical binaries like the one above, limit us to one choice among many, often overlooking the prospect of two or more answers, rather than one. In this example, the prospect exists that light may be composed of both waves and particles.

Science is always limited by the extent of its theoretical and creative flexibility, as well as its technological capabilities and advances. But we should always be open to and prepared for the discovery of new possibilities, even if they require us to relinquish the golden calves of once highly cherished beliefs. Just as armies advance on their bellies, science is sustained by its advances in observation, measurement, and accurate interpretation. As Pasteur perceptively reminded us:

Dans les champs de l'observation le hasard me favorise que le espirits prepare.

Where observation is concerned, chance favors only the prepared mind (rep.1939, p.131).

It has been estimated that cones in the retina did not exist before 40,000 years ago (a relatively small amount of time archeologically). As a result, humans were unable to see color at that time. In other words, our (personal) technology was not sufficiently developed. However, merely because we were unable to see color, does that mean that color ceased to exist? Of course not. Furthermore, had there been no microscopes to verify germ theory, would bacteria fail to make themselves known? In short, just because we may not be able to measure a psychoanalytic concept at this time does not necessarily mean that our ideas about it are incorrect. It simply suggests that we cannot come to a definitive conclusion—yet.

Too often, even our own colleagues have invoked the long arm of "there is no evidence to support that idea" as preemptive dismissals, which barely (if at all) hide their thinly veiled derision, sometimes borne of competitiveness, possible envy, or a wish to attain or maintain power. That is not to say that we should support all notions willy nilly. Freud was clear about that when he warned us not to make interpretations prematurely. He admonished us that to do so, before all the facts of the case were in, constituted "über wilde psychoanalyse" or wild analysis (1905, p. 221–227; 1910a, p. 91–95; 1910b, p. 219–227). However, it is important to make the distinction between being unable to definitively demonstrate a particular phenomenon simply because our tools, techniques or level of sophistication are inadequate from clearly egregiously false ideas. A necessary distinction, by the way, but one that is not always easy to make.

Ahumada (1994) raised the issue whether science, itself, is empirical, since it often relies on the senses. That is, is it possible for experiences based on subjective interpretation of one's inner sensations to count as sources of evidence? Is this different from experience of the external world that has been typically regarded (perhaps incorrectly) as objective?

Psycho-Physics

Some of the psycho-physical studies of Wundt (1862), Weber (1834), and Fechner (1966/1860), come to mind. Wundt believed, (1862), much like Leibniz (who he held in high esteem), "nihil est quod non fuerit in sensu, nisi intellectu ipse" (nothing exists in the intellect which was not first in the senses, except the intellect itself). In an attempt to clarify this, Weber focused on measuring "just noticeable differences," that is, the smallest changes in a stimulus necessary to be noticed or perceived.

Fechner claimed that bodily facts and conscious facts, while not reducible to each other, are different sides of the same coin, known as reality. As a result of his collaboration with Weber, what has come to be known as the Weber-Fechner law, was developed. Simply stated: as the intensity of a sensation increases in arithmetical progression, the stimulus must similarly increase, but in geometrical progression. However, when the sensations are very strong, this elegant mathematical formulation did not pass muster. It remained for Stevens about 100 years later (1946) to point out that intensity is a function of perception and does not correspond to a geometric, but rather to an exponential progression.

We have come a long way since the early founding of those psychological laboratories. Yet, rather than integrate what research has produced, and grow from it, we act dismissively toward findings that are not specific to "our field" and our preconceptions. In the latter regard, we are precariously close to becoming what Richards refers to as an ideology or a religion. We have come to a place where we are too easily contemptuous of opinions that differ with whatever might be the "canon of the day." Dr. Richards has alerted us to the seriousness of this problem and has pointed out the grim consequences for the survival of psychoanalysis. The following is a parable that I hope will illuminate this issue further.

A Parable

One day, on high, the Lord G-d Almighty smiled upon His creation, the earth, and all that was on it. In an instant, He brought forth an enormous diamond, and with one fell swoop of His mighty hand, He pulverized the rock into countless smithereens of dust which He sprinkled down upon all parts of the earth. When the angels asked about this, the Lord smiled beneficently and replied, "The diamond that I smashed was the gemstone of Truth, which I wanted to give to humanity as a gift." The angels then wondered aloud, what would happen if some find one facet of the diamond and conclude that they have the entire truth?

And so it is in the lofty halls of psychoanalysis, that when we have one piece of the analytic puzzle, we often then develop an entire theory from that singular chunk. What is worse, we become incensed if others either do not worship our creation, or dare to craft a different one from our own. This raises a very serious question that goes to the very heart of psychoanalytic training.

Why is it that supposedly well-analyzed individuals sometimes stimulate in each other the most primitive urges when working together in, of all places, the *sanctum sanctorum* of intellectual, educational, personal, and professional learning, the psychoanalytic institute? Does it not seem ironic that the very place where people congregate to immerse themselves in an atmosphere of nurturance, holding, attunement, collegial support and learning are somehow not "good enough" containers of their own Oedipal conflicts, feelings of envy, narcissistic rage and sibling rivalry, to name a few? It seems rather puzzling to me, at least on the face of it. Is this phenomenon ubiquitous to all psychoanalytic institutes, and thus inevitable, or are there some things that we can take note of either to prevent the forces of dissension and destabilization from occurring or from holding sway in the analytic family?

To begin with, the notion of being completely analyzed is a delightful, yet idealized fiction, no matter how expert the analyst may be and no matter how conscientious, cooperative, and analyzable the patient. It was Lucia Tower (1956) who made these insightful comments:

No analyst has been presumed to have been so perfectly analyzed that he no longer has an unconscious, or is without susceptibility to the stirring up of instinctual impulses and defenses against them. (p. 224)

Therefore, we should not be surprised that even analysts have "blind spots." Moreover, the greater likelihood is that said "blind spots" can be expected to be located in pre-verbal, or even pre-symbolic areas, thus making them a source of resistance to traditional talk therapy, which would certainly account for the primitiveness of the urges and behaviors noted above.

As to the question of the Primal Horde, Oedipal conflicts, and whatnot, it is curious to me that the first mention by the Old Testament for example, of murder, occurs in conjunction with sibling rivalry, in which Cain slays Abel. Cain's punishment is to be exiled, to bear an identifying mark by which the whole world would know of his ignominious deed, and for him to be shunned. I find it fascinating that Cain would be shunned by "other people." If Adam and Eve were the *first* humans, this raises the inconvenient question of where these "other people" came from? Unless they came from Eve herself, we are left with a puzzle the likes of which

even Sherlock Holmes might be thunderstruck. Of course, if Eve was the (unmentioned) matriarch of the "other people" in question, might Cain have been invested in making his own seminal contribution to their existence? If that were so, Cain would represent both sibling *and* father. Remarkably, this is not so terribly different from the incestuous relationship (unwitting as it may have been) in the Sophoclean Oedipal trilogy.

So, even though there is no allusion to an attempt by either Abel or Cain to usurp the vaunted position of the father, Adam, one can make a case that the so-called "birthright" over which Abel was killed, was not property or material goods per se, but Mom. Even if that were so, it would not argue for the universality of either fratricide or parricide, since one of the two protagonists did not commit the act, nor did the next-in-line brother, Seth. Accordingly, the Oedipal may not be universal, and that pre-Oedipal conflicts, one of which may be sibling rivalry, may explain some of the cases of internecine warfare that we see in institutes. Thus, sibling rivalry may be at least as powerful, and certainly no less complex, as the Oedipal.

This is what Wakefield (2007) contends. Extrapolating from Bowlby's thinking about attachment, Wakefield challenges the Oedipal explanation offered by Freud of Little Hans's "phantasy of the two giraffes," in which Hans is said to have inchoate desires for sexual intercourse with his mother. Bowlby maintained that Freud's exclusive focus on the Oedipal explanation lead him away from other factors that may have also been involved, namely attachment issues. Based on a microanalysis of little Hans's phantasy, Wakefield asserts that an attachment account of this "phantasy" produces an interpretation with much greater explanatory power than the strictly Oedipal one. Wakefield's evidence suggests that Hans's giraffe phantasy is about the sibling rivalry triangle involving access and attachment to the caregiver. This is not necessarily in place of any Oedipal strivings, but it seems to occur along with the existence of any Oedipal urges. Thus, the issue of multiple factors, and multiple meanings of these factors may need to be given equal (or perhaps greater) regard as the up-to-now reflexive knee-jerk invocation of the Oedipal explanation for all things conflictual. And even if the Oedipal were deemed to be universal, should all Oedipal complexes be regarded as equal? This is one of the questions considered in great depth by my esteemed colleague, Dr. Howard Covitz, in his meticulously thought out

paper (2007) on the subject, and his extensively compiled book, written ten years earlier (1997), which raise the possibility of the existence of many types of Oedipals.

Anthropophagy, (or simply put, "eating their young")

And, to muck up the waters a bit more, the not so simplistic explanation to begin with—of Oedipal conflicts being behind the strife within some institutes—may not fully satisfy our appetite for deeper understanding. Thus a broader menu may have to be provided to sate our intellectual hunger, one that goes beyond (or more properly, which precedes) the Oedipal bill of fares.

Interestingly enough, information derived from a non-analytical source (perish forbid!) puts forth a similar point of view derived from examining the structure of, and the relationships that develop within organizations. In a detailed description of organizational behaviors, Lister (2001) observes that organizations generally tended to replicate the behaviors seen in families, particularly, although not exclusively, with respect to conflicts involving sibling rivalry, as well as battles with authority figures. She suggests that these behaviors are not only commonplace, but also are both typical and normal adaptations to the ongoing, ever changing dynamics inherent in organizations. Her explanation reduces the considerable data that she painstakingly gathered to pre-Oedipal themes involving sibling rivalry and subsequent Oedipal ones, linked to Oedipal conflicts with authority figures.

Still other potentially contributing factors need to be mentioned. One of these relates to narcissistic wounds and ensuing (out) rage. Developmentally, the very first narcissistic wound occurs at birth. Where before, everything was Eden-like; all needs were automatically met, there was no waiting to be fed, temperature was regulated, visual stimuli were toned down, and sounds were muffled, when, all of a sudden, a child is thrust out into the world and is bombarded by a sensory kaleidoscope of simultaneously impinging stimuli, which an external object (the mother) then must intuitively realize what is happening and figure out how to modulate such stimuli on behalf of the infant. More narcissistic wounds follow. The child as s/he matures, again through the mother's ministrations, must learn to delay gratification, tolerate ambiguity, and learn to communicate his or her needs verbally. If rage at being thwarted

occurs at a pre-verbal, or even further back, at a pre-symbolic level, its expression may take either an "acting out" appearance (e.g., crying jags or tantrums), or an "acting in" form such as, in somaticization. I regard the latter as "attacks" against the body.

McDougall (1989) says if inner conflicts are so great that they cannot be expressed in any other manner, or if they occur at a pre-symbolic or pre-verbal level—and verbal mitigation is unable to take place, they may then take their petition to *the court of last resort*, namely the body. In so doing, the body acts "crazy," thus sparing the rest of the self from disintegration into psychosis.

Is it possible then, that some of the irrationality that we sometimes see in the negative interactions within and between institutes may be related to similar forms of attacks against the body, in this case, the *body psychoanalytic*? This may not be so-far fetched when we consider that institutes may recreate, foster, and exacerbate the above themes due to their very incestuous nature and structure. But before getting to the conditions that may give rise to the incestuous climate of institutes and all their attendant problems, let me provide a very brief historical overview of some of the basic, although necessarily incomplete tenets of psychoanalytic training.

Around 1918, early psychoanalytic institutes adopted Nunberg's requirement that all would-be psychoanalysts be analyzed themselves. Later on (circa 1925), Eitingon proposed that analysts receive supervision as part of their institute studies (see Sandler, 1982). These requirements set psychoanalysis apart from all other psychotherapies in a way that remains one of its finest contributions. There are other developments that were not as salutary that resulted in divisiveness between practitioners, between various institutes, as well as within a number of psychoanalytic institutes. For one thing, the ways psychoanalysis was viewed and practiced in the United States, for example, was vastly different in attitude and spirit from the manner in which its European parents conducted it and themselves. The Americans largely subscribed to the medical model. To this day, residues to one degree or another, are seen in the increased emphasis on biopsychiatry and its current almost exclusive reliance on the use of medications. For another, the question of "lay analysis," which was not an issue in Europe, became a hot topic in the U.S. and lines were

etched in acid delineating "real" analysts from non-medically trained ones.

Thus, a pecking order soon became established between the two groups, ultimately creating a schism between medically trained and non-physician analysts. Shortly thereafter, a break occurred from the medical model and attempts by some of its own former adherents to achieve hegemony over the way psychoanalytic training should be run. This rift came from a certain sector of the medical analytic community itself, as a specific protest against its refusal to admit Theodore Reik, Ph.D. into a training program, simply because he was not a physician. According to this reasoning, the likes of Ms. Anna Freud, Mrs. Melanie Klein, or for that matter, Mr. Erik Erikson, as well as a host of other eminently qualified clinicians would have been found to be unacceptable and denied access to the vaunted and most exclusive inner circle of American psychoanalytic training.

The break resulted in the establishment of other training programs (i.e., non-medical model ones) like the Karen Horney Institute, the William Alanson White Institute, the National Psychological Association of Psychoanalysis (NPAP), which was founded by Reik, himself, and other training institutes. This is not to say that European analysts loved each other unconditionally, if at all. They too, had more than their share of problems, both with each other as well as the chaos unfolding around them of world events, which included World Wars, pestilence, the rise of communism, the Great Depression, nationalism, fascism, nazism, not to mention their own brand of internal exclusionary practices. According to Shapiro (1990):

In the early history of psychoanalysis, especially in the banishment or control of those who strayed too far from the core of psychoanalytic concepts, the attempt to maintain the continuity of the past into an uncertain future often conveyed the quality of a struggle to the death between past and future, master and disciple, parent and child. The early history of psychoanalysis is marked by bitter excommunications of once cherished disciples (Alfred Adler, Carl Jung, Otto Rank) and equally acrimonious close calls (Sandor Ferenczi, the Ernest Jones/ Melanie Klein alliance).

In the above regard, Bollas (1999) referred to the politicization of psychoanalysis as the tendency to develop "brands" of analysis. He likened this process to reducing psychoanalytic practice to the worship of certain body parts over others, which ultimately produces a part-object theory. Certain schools of thought seem to impose their viewpoint on their students, on pain of parental disapproval or excommunication from the Oedipal drama existing in the psychoanalytic institute. This produces splitting, fractionalization, fragmentation, and the development of splinter groups and cliques, all of which gravely threaten the life of scholarly, give-and-take, open debate and diversity. When this happens, previously active members often withdraw and the life force, which usually inspires creative thinking, ebbs. On the matter of part-object theory, Bollas adds the following comments:

Taking part of the overall theory of meaning...and founding either a school or body of thought around this particular part-object and then treating it as a sufficient ground of knowledge—more a form of intellectual cloning than it is a large development of theory; with supporters standing in for critical examination, sheer numbers ultimately determining the validity of the theory and its perpetrators. (p. 46)

Bollas and Richards are not lone voices in the wind expressing apprehension about the future of psychoanalysis. Kernberg (1996), for example, extensively studied the current educational model being offered at most American psychoanalytic institutes and has expressed a number of his own reservations. He asserts that unless we make significant modifications in our institute procedures, the transmission of psychoanalytic training to future generations, and with it the profession of psychoanalysis itself, may eventually cease to exist. He has observed a number of impediments to creative thinking that are inherent in many institutes. In his comprehensive analysis of the situation, he derived thirty conditions that could lead to the destruction of independent, divergent, and creative thinking in students' training to become psychoanalysts. Space is sufficient to list merely a few of them. Among these are:

...accentuation of the hierarchical relations among the psychoanalytic faculty...isolation of institutes...lack of full presentation of clinical work by senior members of the faculty...neglect of studies of controversies regarding psychoanalytic technique...effects of institutional conflict. (1996, p. 1033-1036)

In an earlier paper, Kernberg (1986) went even further with his admonitions, declaring that:

Psychoanalytic education today is all too often conducted in an atmosphere of indoctrination rather than of open scientific exploration (p. 799).... Candidates as well as graduates and even faculty are prone to study their teachers, often ignoring alternative psychoanalytic approaches.... They are usually even sheltered fromsharp disagreements within their own institute... Preventing candidates from learning about the difficulties and uncertainties of psychoanalytic practice and technique leads, under the best of circumstances to...the candidate's unrealistic idealization of psychoanalytic technique and of the senior members of the faculty. (pp. 800–801)

As was noted earlier, psychoanalytic institutes require candidates to be in their own analysis. More often than not, the analyst must be a member of the institute in which the student is a candidate. The same set of circumstances usually applies with respect to the choice of supervisors. That is, the supervisor is typically a training analyst at the very same institute that the student attends. The potential for inbreeding, in fact its likelihood, is unmistakable, the consequences of which are as numerous as they are profound.

Breach of confidentiality, for one thing, may be an "accidental" artifact of the structure of an analytic institute. But even an unwitting breech of confidentiality, is no small matter. And yet, if the current system is not changed, it may be virtually impossible to completely safeguard an analysand's privilege. For example, if an analyst is a member of a committee that discusses the progress of students and the analysand's name comes up, as it must as a matter of course, the analyst must recuse him or herself from the discussion (i.e., by leaving the room, etc...). In so doing, the analyst has implicitly disclosed that the student under discussion is that analyst's patient.

Also, what happens when an analyst of a particular student is the analysand's teacher? How does this effect the nature of the transference and/or countertransference? What resistances may arise, but go unmentioned in therapy? How are other students affected when they know (as

they always seem to) that a particular student is the analysand of the instructor? Are there jealousies; is there envy; sibling rivalry; competitiveness; feelings of favoritism? Since each of the other students is not the teacher's patient, and thus had not entered into a therapeutic covenant with the instructor nor has a relationship beyond the class that safeguards *his/her* status, how are these matters to be worked out? Even though we say about therapy that "everything is grist for the mill," there are enough things that are going on without additional variables being thrust into the mix, many of which could be avoided with a few simple procedural modifications.

For instance, what if an institute continued to require that its students be in analysis, but stipulated that it must be with an approved analyst who was *not* affiliated with the student's own institute? Of course, such a radical proposal could be expected to meet a sudden, rather unceremonious demise. The reasons for this are extensive. Briefly, they are: narcissistic injury, feelings of paranoia, competitiveness, basic distrust, or, more cynically, the fear of loss of income, etc. ...

Nonetheless, the implementation of such a seemingly radical procedural modification would drastically minimize a fair amount of the systemic Oedipal overtones associated with the way institutes are currently designed. Moreover, if such measures (and more) are not taken, institutes would be well advised to recognize the self-destructiveness of unprocessed, unresolved Oedipal conflicts and the presence of pre-Oedipal issues, such as sibling rivalry, that are often inherent in, and a systemic part of, most psychoanalytic institutes as they are presently constituted.

In conclusion, it is ironic that freestanding psychoanalytic institutes were developed historically so that psychoanalysis could be safe from political, economic, or other influences. This was so that analysts, and those in training to become analysts, could feel free to think their thoughts, express their ideas, and ultimately be creative in developing and refining their craft.

Now, more than ever, psychoanalysis needs to deeply consider the latent forces contributing to our divide—pre-Oedipal and Oedipal alike, to identify and to work through our differences. Although psychoanalysis has lasted this long despite numerous predictions and reports of our de-

mise, we must not take our longevity and ourselves too seriously, or our continued existence for granted.

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¹The second narcissistic wound is the child's realization the s/he is not the center of the universe; that others exist beside him or herself; and that the parents might love each other as much, or perhaps even more than him or herself.

Introduction

Arnold Richards to Joseph F. Meyer

Dr. Meyer has done us a service by presenting a very balanced view about the crisis psychoanalysis faces now. He has also done us a service by elaborating on what CBT has to offer the clinician. I have always had the sense that I use many CBT interventions in my clinical practice even though I may not acknowledge that to myself and to others. On the other hand, the clinicians who identify themselves as CBT practitioners also use psychoanalytic concepts.

Psychoanalysis has also done itself a disservice by excluding contributors who do not wave the psychoanalytic flag. I have in mind for example, Aaron Beck, who I believe had psychoanalytic training and then developed his own approach and was excluded from the Philadelphia Psychoanalytic Institute. I think what Dr. Meyers calls for is a measure of humility which I referred to in the paper I published in 2003.



James Tyler Carpenter to Joseph F. Meyer

Joseph Meyers, Ph.D., is one of the newer generation of clinicians who has been trained clinically in the post therapy wars era and came of age professionally when CBT was a therapy, not a gleam in Al Ellis and Aaron Beck's eye, or an evolutionary transitional offspring, derivative, and transitional object of ancient Greek philosophy, German idealism, Neo-Freudian feminism, and Self Psychology, experimental psychopathology, to name a few ways of thinking about it's psycho-historical character. Dr. Meyer's reflections are both a view from more recent academic bastions and the tough love mental hygiene of managed care. It is a quick and thoughtful exercise of the applicability of construct valid psychological concepts with general applicability and openness to philosophy as a pragmatic tool in a time of cholera and unstoppable change.



Psychoanalysis Partially Reincarnated? A Free Associative Reflection on Conflict and Compromise

Joseph F. Meyer, Ph.D.

Pr. Richards' timely article candidly shares his variegated reflections and thoughtful concerns surrounding the artistic and therapeutic human endeavor of psychoanalysis, which has remained under substantial, and often scathing, critical scrutiny (see Crews, 2017; Paris, 2019; and Skinner, 1956). I sincerely empathize with his professional angst and existential dismay, which blend into a poignant kaleidoscope of weighty questions and future uncertainties. That being said, if I claimed full identification with his sentiments, I would be misrepresenting my response, which is admittedly hindered by my own academic conditioning (or "upbringing," for a linguistic aesthetic tailored to this journal) within the cognitive behavioral paradigm.

At present, cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT, itself a summary term for a specific assemblage of psychosocial interventions; see Hazlett-Stevens & Craske, 2002) is arguably, at least in name, the most widely accepted and firmly established applied clinical psychological framework in contemporary mental healthcare (Gaudiano, 2008; Norcross, Karpiak, & Santoro, 2005). Over the course of my professional development, I was told by certain clinical supervisors, occasionally in language bordering on the sanctimonious, that I was "one of the lucky ones" to have been raised in this rigorous tradition. I was led to believe that my CBT training has inoculated (indoctrinated?) me against the cardinal sins and innumerable risible faux pas of our more primitively misguided psychoanalytic past. I was taught, in so many words, that the field of clinical psychology is now enjoying a new dawn of scientific enlightenment, which will heretofore prevail with its incontestable scripture of RCTs, dismantling designs, and meta-analyses handed down by unassailable professorial pontiffs in lofty ivory towers. In summary, hallelujah, for I must be among the saved!

Such academic parenting was problematic in the sense of narrowing my conceptual visual field, most especially during my formative clinical training years. But it was also a blessing in the sense of teaching me a highly useful set of interventions that can, and do, work much of the time when people struggling with mental illness consistently and independently practice those tools in their daily lives beyond the confines of the contemporary therapist's 50-minute hour. The CBT techniques I learned and continue to practice have been shown to assist with the alleviation of human suffering beyond the anecdotal. Specifically, CBT interventions are among the most heavily systematically researched (David, Cristea, & Hofmann, 2018) with repeatedly demonstrated efficacy (Hofmann et al., 2012) and effectiveness (e.g., Kodal et al., 2018; Lincoln et al., 2012). That being said, CBT is certainly not without its fair share of larger-scale shortcomings (e.g., dwindling effect sizes; see Johnsen & Friborg, 2015) and unpleasant negative side effects (Barlow, 2010; Schermuly-Haupt, Linden, & Rush, 2018).

Because Dr. Richards' article helped broaden my gaze beyond my own theoretical blinders, I hope to help return the favor, if only partially, by asking him to look beneath the linguistic vestments covering modern incarnations of psychotherapeutic theories and strategies. Is it possible that there may be more than meets the superficial eye? Although labels and manifest content have mutated across theoretical revisions, is it possible that some latent content lies dormant within the core professional beliefs and practices of modern-day CBT acolytes? Might contemplative Socratic aesthetics be at work coloring and shaping previous conceptual frameworks as opposed to innovating them from scratch?

From forced and free association to functional analysis. Functional analysis in CBT, which is frequently the initial therapeutic activity in tandem with goal formulation, involves a rigorous and reflective, yet in some ways uncensored (e.g., when documenting "automatic thoughts"), self-examination and person-centered psychological data collection process. Might this be viewed as a more Socratic reemergence of a hybrid of forced and free associative techniques?

From repression to avoidance, and other defense mechanisms. Can faint echoes of the psychoanalytic concept of repression be heard in the CBT clinician's incessantly repeated "emotional avoidance" mantra? And can elements of sublimation be found in CBT concepts like healthier forms of behavioral activation?

From unconscious conflicts to core beliefs and schemas. Is there any depth psychology lurking in the practice of the downward arrow technique of CBT, which purportedly cracks into one's innermost, and most often dysfunctional, "core beliefs" about the self, world, and future?

I will leave it to the reader to decide whether the abovementioned linkages seem credible or are better viewed as a product of my own conceptual overreach, perhaps reflective of my own wish fulfillment of an interdisciplinary rapprochement. If the former, perhaps Dr. Richards' concerns might find a modicum of relief in the prospect of conceptual theoretical reincarnation, albeit a fragmented one, and certainly not without its share of newly marked territories by dueling academic egos.

A sampling of self-reflective questions that come to mind after reading Dr. Richards' article include the following: Is Dr. Richards, in some respects, grieving a dying aesthetic, some of whose components are diffusely remanifesting elsewhere in subtle ways? To what extent do we habitually fall prey to perceiving our preferred theoretical orientation as a "monolith" (as Dr. Richards correctly points out psychoanalysis is *not*), thereby erroneously conceptualizing it as a unitary, unwavering Platonic essence³ inhabiting the clinical landscape? And if so, how might this facilitate projecting aspersions, praises, or even fear of crisis and loss onto emotionally-laden abstractions?

In a similar manner that André Green (1975) observed a complex series of historical shifts within the structure and scope of psychoanalytic theory and practice (e.g., from unconscious conflict to ego psychology, to object relations, and so forth), are we now witnessing a broader such shift across broader classes of psychotherapeutic symbolizations? And if so, are we lamenting the fading of more emotionally (and/or egoically) resonant, introjected clinical "objects" with a deep sense of personal loss and nostalgia? As practitioners from various traditions and backgrounds, will we be able to adopt Winnicott's nonintrusive strategy of tolerating the ambiguities, uncertainties, and discomforts of such ongoing changes across the theoretical and therapeutic landscape more broadly, as well as those manifesting more locally in the metaphorical "transitional space" of bidirectional communication between analyst and CBT clinician (as well as between practitioner and patient; see Green, 1975)?

In what ways do we inadvertently slip into a limbic us-versus-them mindset (typical of football teams and modern political parties) with reference to our favored therapeutic modalities such that any candid external scrutiny of a cherished assertion gets impulsively reframed as an ad hominem ego affront (de Dreu & van Knippenberg, 2005)? What are the long-term professional and interpersonal repercussions of such behaviors? To what extent can we embrace the "pleasures of pluralism" (Gould, 1997) of different approaches while tempering our appetite for variety and aesthetic richness with a healthy degree of humble deference to robust, consistently replicated research findings, even when such findings are inconveniently ego-rattling and feel anathema to our early academic conditioning? Are all components comprising favored theoretical and methodological frameworks in which we were intellectually raised and groomed equally indispensable and irreplaceable, especially given the byzantine economic realities of contemporary managed care? Or is there room for reasonable modification, and even pragmatic parsimony, where clinically sensible?

Perhaps a balanced approach lies in a cautious navigation between the Scylla of lockstep ideological introjection and the equally occupationally and cognitively hazardous Charybdis of freewheeling, "anything goes" psychotherapeutic relativism and constructivism. And perhaps along such a cognitively and emotionally balanced middle way also lies a responsibility to face difficult and nuanced questions about which intervention components work best for which psychological struggles, under which conditions, and for whom (Roth & Fonagy, 2005) as best as we are able to discern (fallible as such investigative endeavors will continue to be!), even if such components may not speak to us in as moving a manner as previous frameworks. What is most aesthetically pleasing may not always turn out to be the most practical and effective over time, although we may certainly craft new and stimulating aesthetics around (and find glimmers of previous aesthetics within) what holds therapeutic promise.

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Footnotes

¹I say "at least in name" here in full recognition that some clinicians may *claim* to practice CBT, but when pressed for details about what they *actually do* over the course of their services, may disclose practicing something a bit different (e.g., creative medleys of research-supported strategies spanning not only CBT but also acceptance and commitment, dialectical behavioral, interpersonal, and various other alphabet soup therapies, and in some ethically cringeworthy cases, casual conversation for hire masquerading as "psychotherapy").

²It should be acknowledged that the same is true for psychodynamic therapy (see, for example, Shedler, 2010).

³Statistical and psychometric applications in psychology are rife with such modern-day Platonic essences, although rarely recognized or discussed as such, in the form of "true scores" in classical test theory and "latent variables" in factor analysis (see Borsboom [2005] and Zachar [2014] for rigorous scholarly engagements with similar metaphysically thorny issues; see also Dennett [2017] for a philosophical deconstruction of essentialist presuppositions).



James Tyler Carpenter to Trevor Pederson

revor Pederson, Ph.D.: "To drag one's coat to it", as we used to say when making an important point in prison, Dr. Pederson's complex work can be profitably understood by all as the psychological equivalent of Legos for imaginative clinicians and philosopher engineers—a blueprint of working personality with a graphic novel sensibility. His penetrating and intelligent grasp of what presents as contemporary insight and applied research, is tempered by a younger man's grasp of the classic fundamentals. Taken as a whole, his erudite paper can be seen as a chapter in a field manual for the public sphere, suitable for either cultural street fighting at the social barricades; or, a Roberts Rules for civil discourse and progressive policy and change. The reader may play it as it lays.



The Singular Object of the Oedipal Stage and Earlier Component Objects

Trevor Pederson

he actual ego...which we describe as the system Pcpt.-Cs... is turned towards the external world, it is the medium for the perceptions arising thence, and during its functioning the phenomenon of consciousness arises in it. It is the sense-organ of the entire apparatus... We need scarcely look for a justification of the view that the ego is that portion of the id which was modified by the proximity and influence of the external world...the ego must observe the external world, must lay down an accurate picture of it in the memory-traces of its perceptions... The relation to time, which is so hard to describe, is also introduced into the ego by the perceptual system; it can scarcely be doubted that the mode of operation of that system is what provides the origin of the idea of time. (Freud, 1933, pp. 75–76)

In Freud's view, the ego is developed out of the id over many stages to form increasingly complex representations of the external world and the objects in it. The ego is not just reason or logic but that which allows for perceptions and consciousness in general (Freud, 1923a, 1938). Freud (1915b) holds a Kantian view that the external world and its objects are only perceived as "subjectively conditioned and must not be regarded as identical with what is perceived" (p. 171)¹. As expressed in the quotation above, he even holds that the ego must also form a subjective sense of space and time and they can also be taken to develop and become more complex along with our representations of objects (Freud 1920, p. 28). Freud's Kantianism appears to be something that perplexes most of his

¹One need not commit to Kant's phenomenal vs. noumenal distinction in taking this view. Hegel (1977) offers a version of transcendental idealism in which representations are "a difference that is not a difference." In short, although representations are not identical with what is perceived, the difference is simply perspectival and not indicating a metaphysical world beyond the illusion of this one. Moreover, Hegel's theory would make the noumenal synonymous with what science can discover as opposed to Kant's view of it being unknowable.

critics and the failure to understand it has been part of a great regression in psychoanalytic thought across many schools.

I will be releasing a series of articles that will tackle Freud's idea of primary narcissism, beginning with this one. In explicating what his Kantian view entails, I will show how many criticisms of Freud's work misinterpret his positions. This misinterpretation goes hand and hand with ideology which I see, in part, as a desire to import findings from unrelated disciplines into psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis has its own clinical approach and generates data from it. When theorists seek to appeal to other disciplines it often goes beyond this data and constitutes an appeal to authority. For example, it is very common to hear that Freud's drive theory is outdated and based upon a Newtonian mechanistic model. The appeal is to how physics has moved on since Newton to relativity and quantum advancements and therefore Freud's approach must be wrong. However, it is forgotten that Newton's formula can still be used to calculate some instances of gravity and, in parallel, some drive behavior is very simple and mechanistic. For example, I get hungry, I eat food, and then my hunger goes down or I feel inferiority, strive to get more money, success, or prestige, and with my sense of triumph in an achievement my inferiority tension goes down. Moreover, Freud's theory has a place for the confluence of multiple drives and superego functions in a single act and claiming his theory to be mechanistic in every motivation is very uncharitable and simplistic on another level.

In this article, I begin with Freud's opening thoughts on narcissism: that there can be a move from actively pursuing a romantic object to a state in which one just fantasizes about one. This is the sense of narcissism as "developmental recession" as opposed to the narcissistic defense which is "the libidinal complement of egoism" or the commonplace understanding of narcissism as excessive self-love (Freud 1917a, pp. 222–223). I will explicate developmental recession as the move from the oedipal to the pre-oedipal in which the former is defined as the stage in which one is driven to pursue a single object for sexual or love (aim-inhibited sexuality) gratification. In contrast to the full Oedipal object drive, Freud defines the pre-oedipal in relation to earlier component drives and I will use the term *component objects* to denote what these drives seek. Moreover, I will show that Freud doesn't merely define these objects as fantasy objects and will offer a phenomenological account of how to

conceive of external pre-oedipal objects. I will argue that Freud's model is best understood by two ideas: the earlier the object, the greater the magnitude of idealization and the earlier the object, the simpler the representation of it. The Oedipus complex, in regards to a developing ego, qua system perceptual-consciousness, is defined as achieving the most complex view of an object².

I will use the term four-dimensional to encompass the idea that the complex representation of the object also includes a sense of it over time. We form a representation of the object, but also of ourselves, in which we can come to appreciate how someone has grown, changed, or potentially become as shadow of their former selves. The pre-oedipal will be discussed as seeing an object that becomes three, two, and at its earliest form, one-dimensional. Ultimately, this earliest level will be compared to the earliest parental-substitutes, God and the Devil, who represent both the greatest magnitude of power/authority/idealization as well as the most one dimensional view of objects being pure goodness/light or pure evil/darkness. I will also bring the oedipal ego drives of power/work into the discussion. They similarly have the most complex cognition for their work object and competitiveness regarding one's reputation. The magnitude of the importance of one's work project or ambition for power increases in relation to the growing idealization in earlier stages.

I will use Jessica Benjamin's intersubjective approach as an example of ideology. As stated, she has sought to import recognition theory from the academy and she does not engage with Freud's Kantianism to understand it as a foundation to psychoanalysis. I will argue that she returns to a naïve empiricism of imagining that there is an "other who is truly perceived as outside, distinct from our mental field of operations" (1990, p. 35). This lays a foundation in which she makes the neat division of dealing with a "real" external object in contrast to an "intrapsychic" object which makes our interactions with others a relation to fantasy. However, this effaces two important distinctions that Freud makes. First, the binary between interacting with others based upon "death

²This isn't to say that a child forms her most complex view of people at the age of three to seven. The position is that she gets her most complicated hardware at that Oedipal stage and that life experience will allow her to develop this to varying degrees later on. Gaining wisdom in life is making more complicated software on this initial hardware.

drive" repetition-compulsions and interacting with them under Eros or pleasure is obscured. Two, his model of love that is based, in part, on putting the object into the ego ideal/superego, which comes from primary identification with the parents, is ignored. Ultimately, love will always reference a previous object in some way, even when it goes with loving an object whose individuality we are able to glimpse.

Lastly, I will finish off this article by turning to defensive narcissism and its complement, echoism, in order to give an example of what an intrapsychic version of love actually looks like. While narcissism deals with power issues and the defense of superiority to not feel inferiority, echoism deals with issues of belonging and the defense of seclusion to not feel exclusion. This exclusion is the loss of the object's love—in work life, love life, or friendship—whether from its death, departure, or from its hate, anger, or lack of approval (Freud, 1923a, 1926, Berliner, 1942, 1948). Seclusion signifies the idea of no longer feeling this exclusion by becoming empty, estranged in dissociative phenomena, withdrawn, lost, lonely, preoccupied with one's difference from others, one's brokenness or one's badness, or generally *outside* of life in identification with the dead object (Freud, 1917b, Reich, 1990, Horney, 1939, Eigen, 1996, Pederson, 2015a, 2018, 2020a)3. In the defenses of narcissism and echoism our search for love isn't based upon finding a parental-substitute, but includes the idea of finding a part of ourselves in the object.

Ι

In introducing primary narcissism, Freud (1914) begins with discussing hysterical and obsessional neurotics who do not have any romantic relations nor show an interest in acquiring them. He points out that this is only in their external life and that in their internal life they still have objects in fantasy; they have "substituted for real objects imaginary ones from [their] memory... and on the other hand, [t]he[y] ha[ve] renounced the initiation of motor activities for the attainment of [their] aims in connection with those [external] objects" (p. 74). In other words, some people get their hearts broken or feel they have been betrayed by their lovers, and shut down, put up walls, and no longer actively seek

³I also give examples of how it's not just one's own exclusion but witnessing the exclusion a loved one suffers can lead to seclusion as well (Pederson, 2018, 2020a, 2020b).

a romantic partner. They may rationalize how there are not any good men or women out there or have thoughts about being undesirable themselves. Either way, their libido has regressed after an ego injury and is preoccupied with the internal life of imagination. Some of these patients may turn to daydreaming about someone new coming into their life, some may masturbate to the reminiscence of past loves, or they may simply satisfy this drive vicariously through a family member, friend, or through movies, books, or some entertainment.

The object of fantasy is an example of an object related to a component drive, and it needs to be contrasted with the Oedipal stage drives. Freud (1925a) writes that his

increasing experience showed more and more plainly that the Oedipus complex was the nucleus of the neurosis. It was at once the climax of infantile sexual life and the point of junction from which all of its later developments proceeded... In the Oedipus complex the libido was seen to be attached to the image of the parental figures. (pp. 55-56)

For Freud, the Oedipal stage is the creation of the first object towards which one is driven to have sexual intercourse. The parents are its first object, but there are two important qualifications to this. First, although the parents are the first objects, literal sexual desire does not stay attached to them, it is *depersonalized* from them, and we go on to form an object drive that is "directed towards a sexual aim attached to some extraneous sexual object" (Freud, 1905, p. 197; 1917a, pp. 328-329)⁴. Second, along with a drive for sexual intercourse, Freud (1923b) also

⁴In this "anaclitic-object choice" it is possible that new objects might resemble the parents as the prototype, but in my clinical experience this is rare, in any substantial way, unless the patient has borderline personality disorder. In this disorder, it is very common to find very prominent references to the parents. For example, the borderline individual's romantic object may be much older and of the generation of his parents and the romantic object is often literally compared to the individual's parent in physical attributes, common interests, and in literal name. What's more important for most patients, as Freud (1920) expresses in his idea of the repetition-compulsion, is that the parental prototype depersonalizes and that any traumatic situations, with someone in the drive-relation, is repeated. For example, someone can be cheated on in a high school romance, and then continue to unconsciously be attracted to objects who will treat one the same in relationships after.

pairs this stage with what he calls "aim-inhibited sexuality" in the form of "the affectionate relations between parents and children, which were originally fully sexual, feelings of friendship, and the emotional ties in marriage" (p. 258; 1911; 1914; 1921; 1930). I have discussed sexual vs. aim-inhibited love as following the active-egoistic vs. passive-altruistic pole distinction in Freud's concept of psychic bisexuality in which the active pole concerns the principle of power and the passive revolves around the principle of belonging (Pederson, 2015a, 2018, 2020a)⁵.

Freud doesn't use the term "whole object" to describe the Oedipal object, but instead describes this object as "the unification of the various [component] objects of the separate [component] instincts and their replacement by a single object." (1917a, pp. 328–9). I take this to mean that whether in love or in sexual lust for an object, the ego now has the cognitive capacity to be capable of being preoccupied with the subjectivity of the object. Freud (1915a) discusses how the "total ego" is required for love to be used appropriately:

Thus we become aware that the attitudes of love and hate cannot be made use of for the relations of *instincts* to their objects, but are reserved for the relations of the *total ego* to objects... Thus the word 'to love' moves further and further into the sphere of the pure pleasure-relation of the ego to the object and finally becomes fixed to sexual objects in the narrower sense and to those which satisfy the needs

⁵In short, this binary can be understood as the active group being more *compet*itive people who want to achieve success, wealth, or fame and those who have more concern for their craft and drives for mastery. In other words, to be the best or to do things the best way expresses this competitiveness. In defensive narcissism, they identify as being the best or believe their ways of doing things are the best or with being obstructive and blocking someone's striving. The passive group is more *cooperative* and they are driven to be in harmony or oneness with others and take on the desires of others or they seek to help others and supply what they are missing. To have others be in harmony generally and to help a boss or leader be in harmony with his objectives or others expresses how someone can be cooperative. In defensive echoism, they identify with the absence or death of this harmony or with the weakened and failed leader or they become the good and loving figure they wanted the parental-substitute to be. However, I have also argued for a distinction of active-altruism and passive-egoism in which the former can show moral perfectionism instead of sympathy and helpfulness and the latter have an anxious perfectionism instead of a strong self-reliance and willpower (Pederson, 2015a, 2018, 2020a).

of sublimated sexual instincts... The fact that we are not in the habit of saying of a single sexual instinct that it loves its object, but regard the relation of the ego to its sexual object as the most appropriate case in which to employ the word 'love'—this fact teaches us that the word can only begin to be applied in this relation after there has been a synthesis of all the component instincts of sexuality under the primacy of the genitals... (pp. 137–138)

The "total ego" formed at the Oedipal stage gives rise to the cognitive complexity and syntheses needed to love or hate someone. The developing ego forms increasingly complex representations while simultaneously forming longer periods of psychic time in which it can hold these representations. Freud (1921) writes that "[a] path leads from identification by way of imitation to empathy, that is, to the comprehension of the mechanism by means of which we are enabled to take up any attitude at all towards another mental life" (p. 110fn). The affectionate current of sexuality, that forms the principle of belonging allows for a sympathetic or imitative sense of the feelings of others. The ability to form full empathy—to think through what an experience might be like for another over time—enters at the oedipal stage. This culmination allows for the object to be comprehended as a mixture of different drives, defenses, inhibitions, and guirks or what Freud calls and individual's economics of libido (Freud, 1930; Pederson, 2015a, 2018). Moreover, it would also include the perceptions of such traits and how they might have changed in an individual or how they are enacted differently around other people. All this can be held in mind—we can understand others as manifesting patterns of personality or character disorders and also understand how they weren't always like this and see them getting better⁶.

The idea of different personality types is visible in cultural objects like the Zodiac, in polytheistic elaborations on different types of gods, and there are many models of personality available in psychology. Some analysts fundamentally distrust personality typologies, but even they can appreciate that an actor, for example, might be able to draw upon a close relation's 'sensibility' in life and use this 'impression' of them to bring life

⁶I hope it goes without saying, but to have an impression of someone is not to know the total person. We accumulate several impressions and can see some constellations in the night sky but knowing someone totally is an impossibility. However, neither is it deep to acknowledge this.

to a role they are playing. Similarly, a comedian could go beyond copying a person in an imitation to generating new phrases that the object would say that feel right, even though the person has never used the phrases. Moreover, some patients have a sense for how they haven't been themselves or have been a shadow of their former self for a long time. More than a depressed patient observing that she doesn't get pleasure from previous interests, some individuals show a strong sense for how they felt and thought differently in their past. Some can even place the change to certain events and let their analyst know that they haven't been the same since a bad break up or after some humiliation. They intuitively know the importance of such events in bringing about pathological defenses without having any psychoanalytic knowledge.

This kind of empathy, which gives one a sense for different types of people and/or one's relation to one's self in the past is not universal. There are certainly many high-functioning patients who don't show a good sense of themselves over time nor a sense of the vast differences in psychological types. However, if Eros is associated with the passive-belonging pole, then it's at least possible to say that the Eristic, active-power pole of the binary can be associated with sexual desire for a single object which can be idealized and lusted after so that other objects don't tantalize or beckon one. The sexual oedipal object of the active pole is best understood as the single object that preoccupies one and that one attempts to possess even with reduced appreciation for its individuality.

Now, Freud doesn't have systematic work on empathy in his oeuvre. Instead, he has general ideas on sexuality and aggression combining through psychosexual development and suggestive comments. Freud does not offer us a fully completed system in which he accounts for

⁷To be clear, I think that there's empathy that comes into the active pole and don't want to solely associate it with the passive pole. An empathy that concerns game theory and imaginatively evaluating the self-interest of others is apparent but it is very different than having many different working psychological types.

⁸Freud (1917a) holds that some sensual, as opposed to affectionate, sexuality comes into the passive-altruistic pole in romantic love but that it is also aim-in-hibited to play a part in non-romantic love of parents, friends, and other intimates (p. 418; Freud, 1912, Pederson, 2020a). If we similarly consider that affectionate sexuality intermixes into the active-egoistic pole, then we can allow for the notion that the idealization of a sexual object could move beyond idealization of power traits (i.e. the object isn't prized solely for its beauty or for its potency).

everything; he only has unsystematized models. This was part of his criticism of Jung, that his former protégé's ideas might very well be wisdom but that they aren't scientific. Freud's approach was to identify agencies and structures in the mind by studying them in psychopathology: "split and broken structures.... [reveal] more about internal, psychical reality and can reveal a number of things to us that would otherwise be inaccessible to us. (Freud, 1917a, p. 58). This brings me to the difficulty I have in understanding the need for a breakaway from Freud's basic models as found in American psychoanalysis. Freud is often treated like he has a completed system or that he reduces everything to sex, auto-erotic bodily zones, or some element with which he can be caricatured. At the same time, this is done so that different names can be given to existing ideas and contemporary schools can fetishize their concepts as something new.

I would like to use an early article on intersubjectivity by Jessica Benjamin (1990) as an example of both caricaturing Freud and making an appeal to outside authority. In it she seeks to lay out the division between Freud's approach and her own, and begins by criticizing the psychoanalytic term *object* in favor of "the other who is truly perceived as outside, distinct from our mental field of operations" (ibid., p. 35). The problem with this view is that it essentially ejects the psyche out of psychoanalysis and lays the foundation for misunderstanding Freud's positions on objects. I take this as an example of ideology in that Benjamin explicitly reports that she is importing Habermas' concept of recognition from philosophy (p. 35). To be clear, there is no problem with a reference to philosophy in psychoanalytic theory, but it should have some clinical grounding, an argument from psychopathology, that justifies it.

In Freud's model, any object we perceive must have a "mental operation" associated with it. In previous work (Pederson 2015a, 2018), I have argued for the importance of recognizing Freud's Kantian position that psychical representatives, menmic traces, or representations are needed so that the psyche can perceive both external and internal reality. The central argument for this—once again an argument from psychopatholgy—is that we need to account for the phenomenon of hallucination. For someone to see something that is not there shows that the psychical representative of an external object is separate from the object. Otherwise, there is a naïve empiricism that we simply see, hear, etc. the external object and it directly causes our perception. In such an account,

a hallucination would be linked to a chemical imbalance or some physicalist notion of neurons firing wrongly. However, Freud adds another layer to this with reference to the fact that we all hallucinate every night in dreaming. In dreams, we experience other people and the environment as if they were real and can have powerful emotional reactions to them and this is without an external object causing them.

To be clear, neither Freud nor Kant hold that real world might not exist and 'it all might be in our heads.' This is the idea of Berkeley and idealist philosophers before Kant, while Kant only argues for the need for phenomenal or transcendental idealism in which our minds need a representation of reality in order to give our conscious attention to objects or their features. Just as Kant (1999) includes a "refutation of idealism" that concerns pre-transcendental idealism, Freud (1911a, 1925b) holds that the reality principle comes in and our psychical representatives become connected to external objects. The ego can no longer hallucinate gratification except in the reduced form of daydreams. Thus, the vast majority of us do not have to question whether we are delusional and, for example,

⁹Auerbach (private communication) expresses skepticism about this position from an evolutionary standpoint. As I've expressed to him, the infant comes into the world with a hardwired instinct for the breast and the infant acts on this impulse, as from other id instincts, with no involvement of the ego being necessary. Freud's position is not that the early ego becomes entirely in control of the infant and its agenda of self-preservation. Rather the id is still in control and the reality-testing of the ego at this stage is explicitly spelled out by Freud (1925b) as being sure of the presence of the object: "The first and immediate aim, therefore, of reality-testing is, not to find an object in real perception which corresponds to the one presented, but to refind such an object, to convince oneself that it is still there" (pp. 237-238). The infant refinds its representation as it's still going about life through id instinct. If it both hallucinated and was somehow fully responsible for its self-preservation agenda (i.e. testing every breast it hallucinated until it could find one that it could correlate with a full belly) then Auerbach would be right that it's an absurd position. Although, there are also babies who won't feed and for who the ego has gotten in the way of the id, all else being equal, the infant is still more id than ego. It will seek out the breast from id instinct without all of evolution hanging upon the ego's consciousness. The ego only has to verify the breast that is before it, again and again, as it unconsciously seeks to feed through the id—that the breast is really present and feels differently than its hallucinated counterpart. Beyond Freud's position, I am very open to the idea that this confirmation will involve being able to see this through the mother's eyes in some way.

whether the dog or coffee cup we see in the room before us is real or not. There is always a "mental representation" of the object and without it, the object could not be perceived nor could it be remembered once it was gone. Benjamin's "other... distinct from our mental field of operations" is not possible and can only be conceived of through naïve empiricism.

In her early 'Outline,' Benjamin (1990) goes on to contrast her intersubjective view as "carrying on a relationship with an other who is objectively perceived as existing outside the self an entity in his or her own right" with the "intrapsychic" model she attributes to Freud (p. 41). In the latter, she regards the intrapsychic as relating to fantasy and making the object something that is used for repeating past relationships instead of seeing the object as "a subject." This is truly a strange position to take on Freud's work. It amounts to attributing to him the position that all interpsychic connection is through the repetition-compulsion or death drive—as if Freud did not contrast relating through Eros with relating through the death drive. He explicitly writes of Eros bringing us together in "ever larger unities" with objects and he sees it as "hold[ing] all living things together" (Freud, 1920). It is a caricature of his drive model to say that a drive could not seek novelty or new experiences, or that there could not be a drive that would find pleasure in getting to know someone better. Freud (1915a) observes that "[n]o objection can be made to anyone's employing the concept of an instinct of play or of destruction or of gregariousness, when the subject-matter demands it and the limitations of psychological analysis allow of it. (p. 124) However, Freud's work does not seek to classify every different type of drive, that would be the purview of a more general psychology. Freud is interested in drives that play a role in psychopathology and his research into them pulls in the opposite direction of trying to derive more specialized drives from more basic groups in order to understand basic conflicts in the mind.

Once Freud's Kantian position is appreciated, it provides an analogy for Oedipal level engagement with the object. Freud (1911b, 1925a, 1938) holds that the infant first has the chance to form a representation of external reality through the breast. This makes the breast the prototypical object of the function of forming other representations. Once the reality principle links the infant's hallucinated representation of the breast to the external breast, the infant forms the ability to make representations of other objects and see them as different and distinct from the breast. This

relation between the prototypical object and a specific cognitive function holds true for every stage of development. Although the parents might be the first objects whose individuality we glimpse in the Oedipal stage, this cognitive function goes beyond them so that we can also see others in this way. With the intrapsychic model that Benjamin attributes to Freud, the external world would only be populated by breasts and the mental apparatus wouldn't form a psychic representative of anything new.

Lastly, Benjamin (1990) only cherry picks some of Freud's early remarks on the child's omnipotence and hate of the external world to further strawman his position (p. 39). She misses that Freud's ideas on hate only reference the active ego drive relation to the object and that Freud (1912, 1914, 1917a, 1920) certainly mentions affectionate relations to the parents before this current develops into the sensual one. Moreover, Freud (1923a) very much focusses on "the lengthy duration in man of his childhood helplessness and dependence" (p. 35; 1926; 1927; 1930; 1933). The issue is not at all one of the omnipotent infant having to come to see others as subjects but the reverse for Freud in his late period. Although, he initially held that "the infantile ego, finds itself possessed of every perfection that is of value," he changes this with the formal introduction of structural theory (Freud, 1914, p. 94). From this point on, perfection is first perceived in the parental objects and the child strives after perfection, in the ego ideal, after renouncing the relation to the parents ("'Look, you can love me too—I am so like the object'") (Freud, 1923a, p. 30; 1933, pp. 64-65). What is primary for the late Freud is the authority and idealization of the parents the become linked to parental-substitutes through the superego (1921, 1923a, 1924, 1930).

The superego, which generates parental-substitutes, conscience, and the ego ideal is where Benjamin's imported idea of recognition comes into contact with classical theory¹⁰. First, Freud holds that love "can be

¹⁰There are many writers that would seek to separate the ego ideal from the superego or conscience from the superego, but this misses the beautiful simplicity of Freud's formulation. Whether it is judging oneself as morally or ethically bad in shame or guilt, or looking at oneself as motivationally or personally bad in self-criticism (ex."I am ugly, not strong enough, weird," etc.) the ego is being observed/measured from an internal or external ideal/authority. "We have allotted it [the superego] the functions of self-observation, of conscience and of the [ego] ideal" (Freud, 1933,p. 66).

completely summarized in the formula: The object has been put in the place of the ego ideal" (p. 113). The ego ideal also has "a double kind of tie" that links us to authority figures (1921, p. 130). Later, Freud subsumes it under the concept of the superego, and continues to hold that "parents, and their personal significance for the super-ego recedes into the background," and "[t]o the imagos they leave behind there are then linked the influences of teachers and authorities..." (Freud, 1924, p. 168). Bosses, teachers, mentors, and those we look up to in love, friendship, or in some ideal way belong to the class of parental-substitutes. Second, Freud (1926) also notes that "[j]ust as the father has become depersonalized in the shape of the super-ego so has the fear of castration at his hands become transformed into an undefined social or moral anxiety" (p. 128). Castration anxiety, which is stretched across every stage of development to birth anxiety, can exist in the triangular relations with a parental-substitute, but it also concerns our reputation for being seen as a good person by others (i.e. shame): "later the parents are replaced by an indefinite number of fellow-men" (Freud 1914, p. 102; 1926, p. 139, 1930, pp. 124–125)11. I have argued that the object of the ego drives is best conceived of as similarly "being seen as good" in terms of having a reputation for one's talent, attractiveness, being interesting, being helpful, or one of the other ego ideals we may possess (Pederson, 2015a, 2018, 2020a)12. Even in early work, Freud (1911b) discusses "the libido becom[ing] collaterally reinforced owing to some disappointment over a woman, or is directly dammed up owing to a mishap in social relations with other men—both of these being instances of 'frustration'" (p. 62). Then, with the introduction of narcissism, he holds that "loss of love and failure" are capable of causing "injury to self-regard," with self-regard comprising self-esteem, self-respect, etc. in the measurement of ourselves in relation to our ego ideal or the return of regard from a love object (Freud, 1920, p. 20; 1914, pp. 98-100; 1930, pp. 83-84; Sandler,

¹¹Following the active and passive distinction, Freud (1926) notes active castration anxiety and loss of love as a passive relation.

 $^{^{12}}$ "...sleep is a state in which *all object-cathexes*, libidinal as well as egoistic, are given up and withdrawn into the ego" (Freud 1917, p. 417, emphasis mine).

1960, Lewis, 1971)¹³. Thus, whether it's from a parental-substitute or from the community in the form of one's reputation, the superego, in its ego ideal aspect, often involves esteem from others influencing our own self-regard. The superego also functions in other important ways and importing recognition theory from Habermas has only obscured the arguments from psychopathology that Freud has made for it.

Understanding of the importance that we give to parental-substitutes and the community, it is closer to Freud's model to say one's ego is the subject (in its meaning of being ruled by a monarchy, as has been the

¹³Freud (1917a) explicitly holds that these ego injuries, along with fantasy, can be a cause of trauma and fixation:

Neurosis could then be equated with a traumatic illness and would come about owing to inability to deal with an experience whose affective colouring was excessively powerful. And this indeed was actually the first formula in which (in 1893 and 1895) Breuer and I accounted theoretically for our new observations. A case like that of the first of the two patients in my last lecture—the young married woman separated from her husband—fits in very well with this view. She had not got over the failure of her marriage and remained attached to that trauma. (p.275)

Freud sees that "there is no need to abandon the traumatic line of approach as being erroneous" but that this "formula is not sufficiently comprehensive" and that fantasy is another line (ibid., pp. 275-276). Freud (1917b) continues this traumatic line when he writes of a traumatic loss of love leading to melancholia. In later writings, he expands upon this to say that all character can be captured by the formula: "object-cathexis has been replaced by an identification" (Freud, 1923a, p. 28). Object-cathexes of parental-substitutes are open to aggravation and shocks because they are entry points to affect our self-regard:

Each of the mental differentiations [from the superego] that we have become acquainted with represents a fresh aggravation of the difficulties of mental functioning, increases its instability, and may become the starting-point for its breakdown, that is, for the onset of a disease... we know that the stability of this new acquisition is exposed to constant shocks. (pp. 130–131)

The superego allows for both interpsychic (being abandoned, being betrayed, being humiliated, being treated unfairly, etc.) and intrapsychic (breaking promises, regret, treating others unfairly, etc.) inputs from both motivational ideals and moral ideals. Of course, Freud (1917a) also mentions PTSD trauma in "the war neuroses" and situations involving self-preservation, as well as broader sexual situations in feeling loved or protected in the world. (Freud, 1923a, pp. 86–87)

case for the majority of history). Those who have graduated from Ivy league institutions or who are members of prestigious organizations are regarded by many people as being the most intelligent. Reputable news agencies are regarded as giving us the truth about the stories they tell. Judges and elected officials are often trusted to be making the right decisions on our behalf. In Freud's thought, those with more superego are "pre-eminently conservative vehicles of civilization" and believe in the goodness of authorities and the traditions that they pass on (Freud 1931, p. 218, 1933, p. 67; Pederson, 2018, 2020a). Freud's ideas on the superego do not go with the notion of raising the object to the dignity of a subject, but instead point to reducing how much one is a subject oneself to the authority or idealization of objects. If such an imperative could be derived from psychoanalytic ideas, as in The Future on an Illusion (1927), the goal would be to raise oneself above infantile dependence on thought leaders and to take on knowledge based upon what one's own experience. "Each individual is a component part of numerous groups, he is bound by ties of identification in... numerous group minds," Freud (1921) writes, "and he can also raise himself above them to the extent of having a scrap of independence and originality" (p. 129).

Of course one can never fully overcome being a subject, but individuals have varying amounts of self-conscious individuation in post-oedipal development, which is one of the most important ideas in Hegel's philosophy¹⁴.

¹⁴What is missing from both the intersubjective and Freudian accounts is the Hegelian idea of the developing of self-consciousness from stoic, to skeptical, to unhappy consciousness that is illustrative of the knowledge and wisdom needed to be able to perceive the object in more comprehensive ways (Hegel, 1977; Jung, 1944, Pederson 2015a). People are not equally intelligent, good at sports, graceful at dance, and they are certainly not equally wise. With intersubjectivity leaving individuation out of this discussion it becomes a quasi-mystical doctrine of souls in which every individual has an unchanging essence. It universalizes the situation of the impossibility of witnessing the other's otherness when it is apparent that individuals seek advice and guidance from others who are seen to be, or possess a reputation of being, wiser. The concept of individuation raises the notion that we must overcome deference to authority/fashion/tradition on multiple levels to access both what is unique in our voice and to ensure that we can secure it a venue in a competitive world. To access the subjectivity of others requires that our own subjectivity is developed. In the Freudian model this can be formulated: where superego was there shall ego be.

In sum, we saw above that the Oedipus complex represents the advance in ego cognition to the point of being able to love an object for its singularity. It is built upon a Kantian foundation in which even the most basic perceptions of an object require psychic representatives. Although the parents are the prototypical relation that forms the imago it becomes depersonalized from the specific caregiver in two ways. First, at the oedipal stage, the ego's ability to use empathy to understand the parents' singularity goes beyond the parents to other objects. Second, the object is still placed in the superego to become a parental-substitute and receive idealization or authority even if the individual is not engaging with it in a repetition-compulsion. Freud has a binary of coming together with others for pleasure in the concept of Eros vs. repetition-compulsions in which traumas or ego injuries are repeated with objects. It is not inconsistent with his model to fall in love with an object in which part of the attraction is based upon the singularity of the beloved when coming together under Eros or the pleasure-principle. However, there can be regression from the Oedipal stage to earlier pre-oedipal stages so that one is no longer seeking a singular object and this is what I'll turn to in the next section.

 \mathbf{II}

... In the Oedipus complex the libido was seen to be attached to the image of the parental figures. But earlier there was a period in which there were no such objects. (Freud, 1925a, pp. 55–56)

Freud's formulation is that there are "no *such* objects" before the oedipal stage, but this does not mean that there are no objects. Earlier component drives and their partial or component objects must be defined in contrast to the oedipal or single object. With them, the object is not being appreciated as a singularity or in four-dimensionality and the "nature and importance of the sexual object recedes into the background" (Freud, 1905, p. 149). For example, someone who has regressed from searching for a new romantic partner to daydreaming can imagine a "prince charming" coming into her life but this prince is often a fairly generic or two-dimensional character.

The component drives do not solely deal with the internal object of a daydream, but also have external objects. Freud (1917a) writes that

A child's sexual life is indeed made up entirely of the activities of a number of component instincts which seek, independently of one another, to obtain pleasure, in part from the subject's own body and in part already from an external object.... The instincts for looking and for gaining knowledge [the scopophilic and epistemophillic instincts] are powerfully at work... A few of the components of the sexual instinct, then, have an object from the first and hold fast to it—for instance, the instinct for mastery (sadism) and the scopophilic and epistemophilic instincts. (pp. 316–328)

Here Freud mentions that component drives may have their object as part of the individual's own body (i.e. auto-erotic and narcissistic stage) but before the Oedipal stage there are still relations to an external object. Classically, the oral and anal stages are used to designate the earlier component drive relations to the *component object* but Freud was aware that referring to the objects of preoedipal stages by their associated bodily zone was not enough. Freud (1913) writes of a "gap in our hypothesis" and that "the developmental disposition to a neurosis is only complete if the phase of the development of the ego at which fixation occurs is taken into account as well as that of the libido" (p. 324). Although the work of developmental psychologists must be integrated with any psychoanalytic position on ego development, it is still possible to stay with Freud's work to offer a sketch in what could be called a phenomenological account.

A phenomenological account would begin with comparing individuals who can experience sexual lust or love for a single object with those who show more plasticity with their objects. Again, it is important to understand that a component object is not just an internal object of fantasy but can also be external. Thus, if we take the above mentioned scopophillic drive in an object drive manifestation, it could be satisfied in a peeping Tom who has an external object that he watches in the window. Clinical experience will show that the peeping Tom may have several different women he watches and that they share two-dimensional characteristics in common with a past romantic object. Similarly, a voyeur may enjoy watching his romantic partner have sex with someone else and take vicarious enjoyment in her being "fucked" or "sexually dominated" by a man who is viewed as more virile or potent. The voyeur may have an ad on a website and solicit several different "bulls," or dominant men, to have intercourse with his partner. Unconsciously, a traumatic oedipal

triangle that became traumatic was experienced and becomes expressed through his sexual desire at an earlier component stage in which the person in the role of "the father" is seen in a two-dimensional way. "The bull" is seen a physically more dominant, having a bigger penis, and capable of satisfying the woman much better¹⁵.

This brings to mind an important distinction to introduce between regressing from the single object and introverting libido from it. Although Freud (1914) uses it differently in some other passages, his definitive statement is that "the path from introversion to regression—is to be linked to a damming-up of object-libido" (p. 84). In other words, regressed libido returns to earlier stages and is stuck there while introverted libido can return or extrovert afterwards. If, in the second example of the preceding paragraph, the man is still capable of having sex with his own wife, and his getting turned on or having an erection is not dependent upon voyeurism, then the object drive only becomes introverted to the earlier stage and then extroverts back. In contrast, the peeping Tom who is regressed will not show a real interest in looking for a romantic partner. It is possible that he may have a girlfriend or wife but, in such cases, they often do not have any sex. In cases in which they

¹⁵Freud (1920) references the idea of mastery in some repetitions, and I believe it's important to acknowledge that turning trauma into a game (as with fort-da) or in one's sexual life is meant to master one's feelings from the ego injury. It is safer to play the game and bring about one's trauma in a way that one controls than when it shows up in a repetition-compulsion and blindsides one again. For example, believing oneself to have a loving partner and finding that she cheats on you as has happened in relationships in the past will hurt more than encouraging one's romantic partner to invite in another woman in a "three-some." However, in my clinical experience there is still a lot of pain and jealousy in this "controlled" version. Analysts who bring up the notion that every repetition-compulsion has an aim of ultimate mastery in which the patient wants to relive the ego injury with an object who will be different than the original are making a metaphysical speculation. The force of Freud's notion of the death drive comes from the idea that there is a mechanical, inhuman, or demonic repetition of the feelings around the ego injury in "the return of the repressed." Freud (1920) conceptualizes these id drives/feelings in a timeless unconscious and that they, like hungry ghosts, unconsciously want to influence our desire so as to lead us to the same situations and feelings and become alive again within us. There is no discernable teleology in the return of the repressed and claiming that there is amounts to a metaphysical conjecture about the unconscious.

do, some subtlety must be exercised in examining what kind of sex it is. For example, the Peeping Tom might be fantasizing about his scopophillic objects and essentially be using his partner to masturbate in.

The scopophillic object is one of many component objects and I want to be clear that an individual can have sex with such an object himself. The main qualification of the oedipal stage is the singularity (even if the empathy for contemplating it isn't well developed in an individual). However, many people show a two-dimensional quality to their sexual desire and can have something for redheads, be into Asians or a certain race, and put such basic identity markers into the forefront. With certain patients, I have seen three-dimensional repetitions in which a person who is seen as good or innocent comes to be "corrupted" and it is desired that she desires her own defilement or desire sex or pleasure removed from love or modesty. The repetition includes this change in the object, but once it occurs interest is lost in the object. What is clear in the regressions or introversions to earlier stages is that the desirability or the idealization of the sex object increases. The man who desires redheads, for example, sees them as offering a better sexual experience or as something more valuable to possess.

Returning to love, an inverse relation appears as the child develops through the psychosexual stages: the more developed his perceptions of the object are, the less idealized it becomes. Freud (1915a) is very clear that "[p]reliminary stages of love emerge as provisional sexual aims while the sexual instincts are passing through their complicated development" before the oedipal stage (p. 138). Additionally, Freud (1905, 1938) also has passages in which he refers to "a child sucking at its mother's breast has become the prototype of every relation of love" and the breast as "the first and strongest love-object" (p. 222; p. 139). This idea of the object being more idealized in earlier development is apparent in Freud's conception of the superego. When he discusses parental-substitutes in a series, their power or authority increases in magnitude, Freud (1924) writes:

The course of child-hood development leads to an ever-increasing detachment from parents, and their personal significance for the super-ego recedes into the background. To the imagos they leave behind there are then linked the influences of teachers and authorities,

self-chosen models and publicly recognized heroes, whose figures need no longer be introjected by an ego which has become more resistant. The last figure in the series that began with the parents is the dark power of Destiny... Providence... or... God and Nature... (p. 168)

Simply, in the stages of psychosexual development the child creates a placeholder for the power, perfection, and authority of others from its caregivers (Pederson, 2015a, 2018, 2020a)¹⁶. This placeholder is the parental imago that is formed in primary identification and, as Freud (1933) writes, "the super-ego... has been determined by the earliest parental imagos" (p. 64). Externally, the superego and its ego ideal will take on content from one's culture at different levels. There is the authority in our parents, teachers, and bosses in our community and this deepens to the authority of people of higher classes who have more wealth or influence, to people who are national figures in different professions, politics, the arts, (etc.). Authority can then deepen to being a world-historical individual who will be in history books to representations of individuals with magical powers, to God or some ultimate authority.

In the cultural past of the West—though still present in tiny subcultures there are people who cultivate the transference to early superego objects. Cult leaders and kings of the past have received transference in which they are taken to be the embodiment or avatar of God. What such individuals reveal is that an early component object must remain aloof and remove themselves from personal interactions. By having throne rooms, pageantry, and ceremony around them, they appear only in glimpses to their subjects and their subjects can imagine that they are much more than they are. Their followers can imagine that this embodiment of God loves them back, but it is not human and involving mutual vulnerability. The grandiose and narcissistic humans who often assume such roles love themselves and are not capable of love for others. Without the total oedipal ego, earlier idealizations may be more intense, but they are three, and in the deepest level, one-dimensional. The other person, becomes "one's world" or one's God, and like cultural representations of God, they don't have personal things to discuss or say. They exist to speak about the state of the world, about the importance of the other world (heaven

¹⁶This view of their perfection is not the only form, and there are many different types of perfection that an individual can be interested in (physical or intellectual potency, attractiveness or good taste, moral perfectionism, etc.).

or hell), or their presence alone is supposed to represent their message. They seek to embody the idea of being all good or all powerful (God) or all bad and powerful (the Devil).

There are two important caveats for the idea of God and the Devil. A common one dimensional representation of God is "the light," a basic representation of a sense of warmth, connection, or goodness. A representation of God as light may arise in relation to patients' echoistic defenses of feeling themselves to be in a void, cold, and all alone. No qualities or identity is ascribed to this light except this basic goodness. However, more complicated relations, from more advanced stages, can be played out with the representation of God. The second is that He, just like other superego figures, is implicitly a part of many intrapsychic defenses that can be accessed (Pederson, 2020). I'd like to share a vignette, from my practice, on how God might be implicit in a construction and then show how this intrapsychic issue can be returned to its interpsychic origin.

Client brings up how he's felt down, stressed by his finances, and how sometimes he thinks that he's changing and doing better but sometimes not. This back and forth theme grows and I encourage him to develop the idea that he and his life situation aren't improving. He then gets into ideas that he's been "fucked from birth" and since addiction is in his family: his DNA is "messed up;" he "didn't have good role models;" and "life feels unfair." This is a moderate change from a previous theme of client feeling "unlucky," "damaged and disadvantaged," and "alienated and alone." This session, client's self-pitying and (life) envy of others who get to be normal while he's left out, sounds like it is at a deeper level. I know client is an atheist, so I ask him to humor me and tell him that I want him to pretend that there is a God and to imagine that client's soul was in heaven with all the other souls and that God chose to put his soul in his messed up body and messed up family. Client responds to my proposition by saying that he used to tell people that "if God is real, I don't like Him." Client looks off, repeats the scenario of souls in heaven under his breath, and then begins to describe it as God "playing fuckin games," God being "an asshole... [and] running some fucked up experiment." Client elaborates that God giving some people harder lives than others in which "some will grow stronger" but "some will cripple themselves" is "fucked up." Client then gets into how God is supposed to be "all knowing and powerful" and therefore "He doesn't need to experiment because he's not going to learn something He doesn't know." Client infers that He therefore must be "sadistic" and "playing sadistic games... like a kid burning ants with a magnifying glass and ripping their legs off for his own amusement and pleasure." Client adds that he feels like he "had a lot of potential to do a lot more [in life]" and that "feel[s] like [he] already wasted [his] life." He then brings up the sentiment that he has to "work so hard to get to square one when others start at a way better place," again.

I ask him to read these thoughts on God as Ego & Object statements and ask him to see who this feels right with from his past (i.e. "you are a fucking asshole, you are sadistic, etc.). Client tells me that a girlfriend from high school comes up. She has come up before and he expresses some surprise about her coming up again. Client then tells me about how "she'd make observation s about other people and ask [client] why [he] can't be like that" or point out "a guy who is really attractive." Client expresses the feeling that he "wasn't her type" and that "she maybe thought she could mold and change [him]." Client makes the comparison of this behavior to God and her being sadistic in it. I ask him to focus on the memory of her and to see where he reacts in his body. After focusing, he tells me that he feels it "a lot in [his] chest and heart" but that it's also a "tingling and burning feeling" in his neck and ears." He tells me that in the latter place it feels like he's "intensely embarrassed." Client then seems to begin processing and talks about how "maybe she was young and clueless" but at the time he saw her as "an evil creature." I point out that maybe from his current wisdom and experience he can be more charitable but that it's important to stay with the view of her from his younger days. Client agrees and tells me that "she was a bitch" and "a hateful person..."

My patient here is in identification with the death imago in which he feels self-pitying, an outsider who is different than others, and envies their life of being normal while he is not (Pederson, 2020)¹⁷. The material he produced was around his origins and being born to the family and

¹⁷I have written about the paternal death imago as partial death, meaning that the individual is in life but feels broken, impaired, missing something, (etc.) vs. the maternal death imago in which he one is fully outside of life (in a black hole or void, in another dimension, not a normal human, etc.) (Pederson, 2018, 2020a).

having bad DNA but of course other patients blame society, the city they are in, or other authorities for their woes as well. Hearing this level of authority, I introduced a proposition to have client focus on its relevant figurehead, God, in order to access the interpsychic relation in order to use it to associate to the ego injury. God as sadistic and cruel experimenter is more than a one-dimensional representation of Him but as my patient accessed his feelings with his ex girlfriend as "an evil creature" and "hateful person" there is some sense of the one dimensionality that could be attributed to the all bad Devil that he begins to access from it.

Many schools that eschew the idea of the developing ego lose sight of this 4-dimensional or what I will call "human" love. It's clear that there is a tension between love deepening to earlier levels of increased idealization that, by definition, cannot house the complexity of representation, and the Oedipal stage push for perceiving the individual's economics of libido. The earlier introversions can be seen in how the lover can become enamored with how the beloved smells, delight in an idiosyncratic gesture, or want to get lost in their eyes. The push for knowing the object and idealization that makes the object appear as more perfect, and possessing every virtue are the tensions that animate love in the Freudian model of mind. However, in the next section we will see that there is also the idea that this "anaclitic" view of love is contrasted with a "narcissistic" view of love in which the beloved comes to represent a part of our own personality that has been given up.

Ш

Before turning to more of the vicissitudes of love, it is needful to mention that the ego drives have another relation to the authority housed by the superego. Freud pairs the object drive of sex/love with the ego drive of aggression/competition (Pederson, 2015a, 2020a). The will to power or the "ego interest" of the competitive ego drives can experience the same vicissitudes of introverting or regressing from the object of possessing a reputation of excellence or mastery in one's field or in terms of overall success in life (Freud, 1914)¹⁸. Freud (1917a) notes this process in how

¹⁸These are egoistic expressions of the ego drive, which concern work and public life and has an object in one's reputation, as opposed to one's love and private life in the object drives. However, there are also altruistic expressions of the ego drive (Pederson, 2015a, 2018, 2020a).

the artist "turns away from reality and transfers all his [ego] interest, and his libido too, to the wishful constructions of his life of phantasy" (p. 376). It is not just love, sex, or affection that can be the subject of daydreams, but also imagining oneself as a famous singer being adored by a crowd, imagining oneself to be the boss at a job and how one would treat one's subordinates, or imagining oneself to be the president or a YouTube celebrity. Externally, just as one can regress from seeking a singular romantic object, someone can regress from seeking the singular definition of success in their family, community, or societal ideals. For example, their ego interest, or will to power, can regress to gambling or stealing to make themselves rich or they can choose some giant project for a unified theory of the humanities which will never be completed. The multifaceted ideals of success become more flattened and simple. The envy of colleagues who are publishing in journals is stuffed down by ideas that one is working on issues that are so much more important or the short-term windfall of money is used to shore up the idea that one isn't a consistent and reliable provider to others. However, in parallel to the object drives, these examples can also be points of introversion which can be returned to total object competition and not be solely regressive.

An artist is an example of introversion when she seeks to bring her work out to the public and open herself to judgment and competition with others. But, she can also be part of a regression in which she lives more in her fantasy life and through her characters, than in attempts to possess what she desires in her real life¹⁹. Additionally, an artist's internal life is also subject to regression in which she loses the interest in taking on new forms; she might be producing works which resemble her earlier ones and which lack inspiration. Just as many people use movies, video games, TV shows, novels, and other forms of entertainment for their own internal life, the artist can stand in this relation to her own work and her

¹⁹Of course there is also extraversion of these desires too. Not everyone who is egoistic shows over-arching ambition and the desire to "rule the world" in their character or motivational patterns. Early stage competitive impulses can be shifted to, and lived out in, a national level, a state or regional level, and a local community level. This takes into account the post-oedipal development of (secondary) social narcissism (Pederson 2015a, 2018, 2020a).

internal life can become derivative of its already existing forms²⁰.

Although the ego drives are undertheorized and are much more interesting, for this last part of the section I will return to the object drives because Freud has much more material on them. We know that the Oedipal stage represents the nucleus of neurosis from which "we are bound to fall ill if...we are unable to love," but it is important to note two other forms of the libido withdrawing from it (Freud, 1914). One was already mentioned in the contrast between the love of the pleasure-principle and love in the repetition-compulsion. While the former seeks the possibility of an open-ended growth with someone, the repetition-compulsion seeks the pain or ego injury which was formerly experienced and repressed. For example, love objects who cheat on one, who are emotionally unavailable, etc. are selected unconsciously and for some individuals, their relationship history decisively shows that short term relationships ending in pain are much more powerful than any pleasure-principle love. For most people, it is common to have both pleasure and pain being sought and as they go through analysis and work through the repetitions, they come to see whether they are joined more in the one or other to their partners.

The repetition compulsion desire for pain can go even further when the romantic partner does not just represent a parental-substitute but comes to represent a pole of one's personality. One of Freud's uses of narcissistic-object choice is in how, for example, someone functioning on the passive pole (belonging) can seek their own active pole (power) in the love object and

will love what he once was and no longer is, or else what possesses the excellences which he never had at all. The formula parallel to the one there stated runs thus: what possesses the excellence which the ego lacks for making it an ideal, is loved. This expedient is of special

²⁰The individual may identify with the motivational system and desire of the characters (Pederson, 2018). For example, those who are competitive and want power can enjoy the triumphs of the hero, those who are motivated more by love will enjoy a romance. The individual may also enjoy the semiotics of the film. Those who feel like outsiders will find belonging in cult films or a film may have the reputation of being a classic and someone might enjoy it as part of an image of sophistication. Ideals of being an outsider may not be valorized, and ideals of being normal may see an individual consume popular entertainment to fit in.

importance for the neurotic, who, on account of his excessive object-cathexes, is impoverished in his ego and is incapable of fulfilling his ego ideal. He then seeks a way back to narcissism from his prodigal expenditure of libido upon objects, by choosing a sexual ideal after the narcissistic type which possesses the excellences to which he cannot attain. (Freud, 1914, p. 101)

Freud also goes on to mention the "crippling dependence" on the romantic object when it represents one's active-power-narcissistic pole (Freud, 1921, pp 114–115, 125). I have written on this "altruistic transposition of egoism" which makes "the object become supremely powerful" under the heading of echoism from the myth of Narcissus and Echo (Freud, 1917a, p. 418, Pederson, 2011, 2015a, 2018, 2020a)²¹. In such romantic relationships, the echoist needs to be with the love object instead of wanting to be with them. So long as it is the need to refind a part of one-self in the object, the narcissistic beloved senses that the echoist really can't leave and any problems they might begin to have with the relationship are ignored. It's also possible that this is played out with friends or bosses, who similarly have the power in the relationship and don't acknowledge the echoist's desires or feelings.

This need for the other is also played out in narcissists, and often without the veneer of love. Michael Balint (1960) raises this issue in what he sees as a problem with Freud's view of narcissism. He maintains that Freud depicts the narcissist as "independent... self-contained, or self-sufficient" and does not see that they are as much in need of objects as the echoist above (p. 27). Balint regards the narcissist as "easily hurt and offended" and "hardly ever able to exist alone" (*ibid.*). I agree with Balint that Freud, at times, writes about narcissism as if it means that one has no need for an object, one is self-sufficient, etc., but he also has remarks that place these statements in context. For example, Freud (1937) acknowledges that a man can be wholly dependent upon a woman while he won't allow himself to be passive with any males (p. 252fn). He acknowledges the narcissism of minor differences in which one can't bear to see others who are too similar to oneself because they potentially might be held in higher esteem and take one's spotlight (Freud, 1930). Most

²¹Dean Davis (2005) was the first to use the term echoism as the complement to narcissism.

generally, Freud (1914) places an increase in the self-love of narcissism next to a decrease in the ability to love others, but he does not say that this increase in self-regard means that the narcissist does not have any ego requirements that he seeks in his objects. Lastly, in one of his final statements, Freud (1931) indicates that it is the individual who has the most developed superego who shows more of an "internal instead of an external dependence [and] develop[s] a high degree of self-reliance" and he contrasts this "obsessional type" with the "narcissistic type" that has a less developed superego and would therefore show more external dependence (p. 218). I don't believe it is incompatible with Freud's thoughts on narcissism to say that the narcissist needs mirroring or someone to reflect back his self-love²².

Balint (1960) raises the idea that narcissists must "live together with their split-off doublets," like Don Quixote and Sancho Panza, and that without "the partner['s]... help and ministration the glamorous and seemingly independent narcissistic partner would perish miserably" (p. 27). In other words, Balint, who cites Rank (1924) and Deutsch (1937) for the idea of the doublet, essentially holds that the narcissist must find his passive pole in an individual no less than Freud sees that passive individual must find her active pole in the object. However, where Freud could be accused of not highlighting the weaknesses in the narcissistic defense, Balint does the same for the echoistic one. He ignores Freud's writing on the altruistic partners of the narcissist, and says that the "unglamorous and unnarcissistic partner, who is capable of object love, is the one who is really independent from the hazards of everyday life and can cope with them (p. 27). Balint doesn't highlight their problems with saying no, "people-pleasing," their problems with taking the leadership role, with being center of attention, and knowing what their own desires are, etc. (Pederson, 2011, 2015a, 2020a). The echoist is blocked in being able to show aggression and being assertive on behalf of himself but often looks more functional when they are acting on behalf of the narcissist, children, or friends.

In previous work, I have similarly come to thoughts about putting one's passive belonging pole in objects (Pederson, 2015b, 2016, 2018, 2020a).

²²In *Psychoanalysis and Hidden Narrative in Film* (2018) I discuss the narcissistic defense in relation to the maternal (grandiose), combined parent, and paternal (compulsive) phase which define the defense in three different ways.

As a more concise, structural formulation, I would say that just as the echoist enjoys his own power and perfection in the narcissistic object, the narcissist enjoys his own belonging and death in the echoistic object. The narcissist doesn't cultivate relations with others who won't increase his power transactionally (i.e. those who don't give him ties to important people, admiration, or grant him "narcissistic supplies"). He doesn't care about just belonging and fitting in 23 . By projecting death into the object, I mean the status of symbolic death in being an outsider, in feeling weird, "too much," "out of touch," low class, (etc.)24. Or, alternately, I equate it with the psychic death of the echoist in which parts, or the whole of his personality or body are outside of life, which sees him depersonalized, empty, feeling lost, unable to properly access cognitive functions, or lacking preferences or desires of his own^{25, 26}. To put his feelings of "not belonging" or loneliness into others creates an inverse tendency of the narcissist in wanting to give the impression of "exclusivity" in being of higher class, important, and an insider. Depending on the phase of his narcissism, he may feel grandiosely perfect and have illusions to being regarded as important by others, or he may be perfectionistic and absorbed into his work, hobbies, or interests and this may be what takes

²³Of course, one must qualify almost every statement in psychological matters, but the exception doesn't disprove the general rule. I should point out that in my work with addiction, I have seen echoists who are fixated on hate and can't let go of how someone has wronged them even though it is like drinking a poison and not right for their constitution. Similarly, I have seen narcissistic individuals who are being crushed by loneliness.

²⁴These feelings can also relate to secondary, social narcissism and concern one's family or other group identities. One can feel like one belongs to a weird or low class family, religious group, race, etc. instead of one individually feeling this way. The same applies to my later remarks about the narcissist and how one could feel one's family, country, race, etc. is the best.

²⁵Depending on the phase of the narcissistic defense, the narcissist can also put spontaneity, feeling, empathy, and other traits associated with belonging into the object (Pederson, 2020a). However, certain narcissists definitely retain these traits and use them to manipulate or attract others.

²⁶As I've acknowledged in my previous work (Pederson 2015a, 2020a), the phenomena of echoism already existed under the heading of masochism in classical psychoanalysis.

the place of him connecting with others and taking part in the social life that isn't mediated by work. He will be aloof or contemptuous with what he sees as common people unless they have something he wants. In his psychic perfection, the narcissist can feel he is in "a class all his own" and require exclusive control in romantic relations or friendships (if he has any)²⁷.

I would like to give a clinical example of this dynamic with someone who is compulsive-narcissistic. Instead of a grandiose idealization of self, the compulsive individual idealizes himself and his work so that he does things in the best way, his way is the right way, and this can get to patterns of micro-managing others (Pederson, 2018, 2020a). This investment in work takes away from the investment in loving and the value of simple belonging and spending time with family. As much as another type of narcissist talks about himself and makes others feel alone by not asking about them, this type can be a workaholic and give the impression of being more adult and contemptuous of things that aren't doing what is important, and similarly make the object feel aloneness.

²⁷In a conference paper she shared, Susan Kavaler-Adler (2019) raises the idea that Trump, as a narcissist, projects his "undeveloped and psychologically deprived child within him.... [and that] he projects this dissociated "inadequate" self, in order to avoid consciousness of his "loser," as opposed to "winner" Image Self." I think her formulation misses the mark and that the binary of winner and loser is an expression of the power pole and superiority and inferiority dynamics. Such active-pole dynamics would be the expression of Trump in identification with the superior grandiose parental imago and projectively identifying with making someone feel inferiority for failing to achieve success. To the extent that being a loser or low class matters, it is not because the echoist wants to be as successful winner and has failed, but that being so means that you are an outsider and not accepted or truly seen by the person from whom you want love. The altruist-echoist wants to belong and be part of, and the rejection of this is different than the egoist-narcissist who wants to be successful or seen as powerful or having the potential to be, and not as weak. To be precise, I outline a maternal, phallic maternal, paternal, and sibling phase of both perfection and death and every phase will have a different quality in what can be put into the object (Pederson, 2018, 2020a). Additionally, there are also variations of active-altruism and active-echoism, as well as passive-egoism and passive-narcissism that add much more variability to this as well (Pederson, 2015a, 2018, 2020a)

Client is separated from his wife and has begun to get past representing her as all bad in order to talk about their issues while they were still together. This session, Client talks about how she wanted to be with him all the time and how he worked 80 hours a week and didn't always want to go shopping with her. I ask him to tell me what the experience of shopping with her was like and he says that "she'd get frustrated when she couldn't find what she wanted, or they didn't have [something] in her size." I ask what their dynamic was like and he tells me that she'd often ask him to step out of the store and that "[his] body language isn't the greatest" and that "people ask why [he's] pissed off" all the time. He denies feeling bored or put out by shopping with her although the contempt was clearly in his face and tone as he talked about her frustration. He tells me that he sees his wife as having reacted to his body language, or just being frustrated herself when she'd send him away.

I ask him to give me his best guess about what she might have be thinking about him, even though it might be wrongly reading his intentions. He says that she'd think, "you're irritated, you don't want to be here... I'm making you miserable, dragging you through this... I'm sorry, I'm sorry... I should just do this alone" I ask client to say these things about someone from his past and see if he's ever felt this way about someone himself. I read him the ego and object statements a few times but no one comes up, and I don't see any non-verbals to indicate that he's holding anything back. However, Client then tangentially moves on to talk about an ex-girlfriend from high school who had recently contacted him. He tells me about their conversation, how she's currently doing, and then how they had dated. Client reports that it ended because a friend's relative had "lied," said that client told him that he had "fucked her," and that she believed him. He reports that the friend's relative had wanted to date her, but she wouldn't let him. I ask him how much the break up bothered him and he gets into how they "hung out all the time," as he had expressed with his wife.

I try to make a parallel between the relation between this girlfriend and his wife. Client at first dismisses a comparison and I explain to him that people have many parts of their personality and many ways in which they connect with others. He's able to slowly build parallels of him "going with the flow" with the girlfriend, as he did with going

along with things that his wife wanted to do. He's also able to identify both her and his wife as "bubbly, free-spirited, open and loving... spontaneous...a joking around and having fun personality." This is the first positive thing that he has said about his wife but he says that she was only like this at the beginning of their marriage. I ask Client to stay with the girlfriend and to talk about how she must have thought about client after she was told the lie. Client says that she would think, "why would he say that, that never happened," and she would have felt "hurt and angry." I ask him if there was ever a time when he identified as being "bubbly, free-spirited..." and he quickly assents and tells me that he used to be like that when he was young. I ask him to think about himself that way and to say his ex girlfriend's thoughts about the situation with him about someone from his past (i.e. why would you say that, that never happened, etc.). He tells me that his best friend comes up and recounts how his friend didn't want him to get married and told him "[he was] too young to get married," and "thinking with his dick." He tells me that his friend was "mad and upset" and client felt "hurt and angry." He said that he and his best friend "hung out all the time... like brothers" and weren't "as close as before" after he client "got accused" by him.

I ask client to focus on this memory and tell me how strong of a reaction he has? He tells me that it's about 7/10. It's early on in the therapy and, up to this point, all his depth work has been around anger and aggressive feelings and so I ask him if he feels like we can go into these more vulnerable feelings or not? He agrees to it and I ask him to think about his friend accusing him and see where his focus goes in the memory and in his body. After focusing, he tells me that the point when his friend had called him "a fucking idiot" was central and that client felt "if you don't respect [what I want] fuck you." Client tells me that he feels anger in his hands and I tell him to go back into the memory and to express this however it wants to come out of his hands (i.e. slap him, hit him, strangle him, etc.) and privately say whatever words go with it. After focusing, client tells me that he "popped him in the face" after yelling at him. I ask him for his friend's reaction and he first tells me that his friend "stared at [him]... like what did you do." He then adds that his friend "was shocked." I ask him to picture this shocked face and to see if his body has any reactions to it. During focusing, he tells me that his chest and back "are sinking." I tell him to stay with it and let it fully develop. After, he tells me that he "feel[s] [he] let go... and feel[s] better," but I can tell he's thinking about something else too. I ask him how it felt to lose his best friend and, tangentially, he quickly gets into anger with his wife and tells me how what she's doing is "irritating the living shit out of [him]." I can tell that he is not yet ready to get into his vulnerable feelings and aloneness and we have months more sessions of aggression before he is first able to cry and get into his hurt and soften his compulsive workaholism.

My patient was able to identify with the "bubbly, free-spirited, open..." part of his ex wife and ex girlfriend. This part of him was tied to the experience of seeing someone else as irritated, miserable, etc. with him and this experience goes along with feelings of aloneness and feeling unwelcome to be oneself. My patient compulsively worked and often gave his ex the sense that he was put out by having to do mundane things with her. My patient was too adult, too serious, and righteous at times and there wasn't a place for sharing humor and spontaneity. He had shut down or dissociated this part of him when his best friend became angry with him and they had a falling out²⁸.

I would like to make one further note on these phenomena: not every echoist puts up with an abusive partner and the classical sadist and masochist relationship requires that the echoist's own identification with the sadist in order for her to stay (Pederson, 2018, 2020a, 2020b). In parallel, not every narcissist is cruel and delights in breaking another person, in bullying weaker people, or is unable to stand the sight of affection, joy, or aliveness in others²⁹. In sadistic cruelty, he must be identified with the longing for nothingness (or complete merger with the object) or the state of destruction or brokenness that can appear in the masochism of

²⁸The echoistic and narcissistic defenses often appear to require that one suppresses the opposite pole. However, one can have dissociated identity in which the opposite pole returns into one's functioning and I have also had the impression that the non-universal, combined parent phase might escape this general suppression.

²⁹Certainly, in being defensive, the narcissist will bully, dominate, and try to remain in power but the active seeking of a weak individual to bully or the sadist seeking to break someone is different.

the echoist (Pederson, 2020a). While I disagree with Freud (1920, 1924) on primary masochism, and see clinical evidence that masochistic id experiences were originally anger for an object that couldn't be expressed, his formulation of sadism being derived from masochism holds true in this formulation (Pederson, 2020a). The sense of self-destruction that one is left with is directed outward into the object. In Kleinian terms, the sadist projectively identifies with the object in whom one brings about this state, while one identifies with the greatness and terribleness of the parent or parental-substitute who had originally broken one.

In previous work (Pederson, 2018, 2020b) I have shared examples of echoistic-masochism in romantic relationships. Here I would like to share an example of narcissistic-sadism, albeit in the fantasies of a depressed man who essentially references the poles of power and belonging and their dynamic relation. Along with putting loneliness into the object the added dimension of wanting to break her and how he himself is broken is brought into view:

Client was a married man whose wife left him. Client became depressed and suicidal afterwards, with hearing that his separated wife had begun dating someone new. Client has had a couple of months of therapy, his depression has begun to decrease, and instead of his standard suicidal ideation, "sadistic" fantasies are now preoccupying his mind. This session client enters into the fantasies which begin with killing his ex's boyfriend. He tells me that he wants to make her feel pain and that he'd then go to her parents' house, kill them, and be waiting for her to arrive there. Client goes on to describe "violent sex" and that he'd rape her. Although, he has variants in which she enjoys this and then her crying and resisting. With the latter, he describes that he'd punch her and she'd stop resisting. Client tells me that he doesn't kill her after and that "to make her live in pain is the goal... live with the fact that she caused what happened [by divorcing client]... it's her fault that her parents died." I ask client to picture the aftermath of this and how she would be living with this. Client tells me that he imagines her "going through what [he's] going through... [with] each day [being] a struggle... living hour by hour... but it's almost worse for her." Client adds that he pictures her "in a studio apartment, a square room" and that "she's curled up in a ball all alone... worn out, tired...a broken person." I ask him if there's anything else in the room? Client

tells me that "around her is a light" but there's "deepening shadows further in the room [in the corners]." I ask him for his reaction to this picture and he tells me that he thinks of "revenge and karma... she know feels how [he] feel[s] and she got equal treatment in a way."

I ask client how right it feels to picture himself in the room instead of her and if we can use this image to get into his brokenness? Client agrees and asks me if I have seen the movie 'The Hobbit' and tells me about a scene of Gandolf the wizard fighting a shadow. He tells me that when he pictures himself there that it feels like "the shadows are coming in to take [him] over." I ask him if he has a sense or what will happen if they do? After focusing, he tells me that he'd "die and become heartless... doing what [he's] daydreamed about wouldn't be hard" and he adds that "if [he] let the caring part of [him] die... all that matters is revenge" and that "the reason [he is] depressed is that the caring part of [him] cares." I ask client if he can superimpose the image of his ex curled into a ball and whether it feels right to imagine his body taking this posture? After focusing, he affirms that it does and we begin to work on his brokenness...

My patient loved his wife and where he saw her as absent or dead as a good, loving parental-substitute he identified with this in his depression. Then there is a further sense, in his fantasy, of letting himself "die" or dissociate from his passive pole to seek revenge and projectively identify with his own "broken" state by sadistically killing her parents and new boyfriend to make her alone and feel responsible for bringing this about. He had a "see, look at what you made me do by leaving me" attitude arise. There are questions here about how much the aggrieved sadist is revenging himself upon objects vs. how much he may just enjoy the obscene pleasure of cruelty with people who are otherwise innocent. In the latter formulation, he may be identified with what he sees as the inherent wickedness of life or the idea that there are no innocents in the world. However, such an investigation is beyond the scope of this essay.

Conclusion

Appreciation of the Oedipal stage in terms of ego development and the complexity of the representation of the object has always been in the background of Freud's thought. While intersubjectivists, like Benjamin, have sought to give prominence to the idea of the "real external other,"

they have done so with an unnecessary denigration of classical psychoanalysis. Freud's models of mind not only implicitly contain their ideas but, as Mills (2005) points out, the American schools have been unable to formulate their own models with any sophistication. Instead of a serious study of Freud's Kantianism, we have the return to a naïve realism or a postmodern epistemology—both of which fail to shed any light on psychopathology. Such ideological imports lean on the authority of academic discourse instead of deriving their authority from the data of over-functioning, under-functioning, or missing parts of the mind. These imports, along with renaming psychoanalytic terms, resemble an exercise in corporate branding more than the progression of the science of the mind.

Ideology doesn't only belong to new American schools. Historically, I can appreciate how they emerged as a reaction to an ego psychology that had already bastardized classical psychoanalysis and adapted Freud's work to appear as a completed system. However, while we can certainly attribute ideology to an authoritarian school that views its brand of psychoanalysis as "the one true way," theoretical pluralism is equally problematic. The latter enshrines the position that "there is no way" but only different lenses to apply from the different schools. Neither of these starting points contribute to progress in psychoanalytic knowledge, since its blasphemy for the former to submit itself to formal research agendas and the latter is unable to give scientific research any higher status than one lens among others. Although, the latter approach could be of value if it the institute had diverse practitioners who were going to teach the techniques that went with the theory.

The question of what to do about ideology in psychoanalysis is analogous to the question of what to do with ideology in our current politics. Donald Trump came to power with slogans such as 'drain the swamp,' but any knowledgeable person knows that his tax cuts and policies only muddied it further; they didn't actually help the 'forgotten American' he claimed to be fighting for. We are in the beginning of Biden's presidency, but we can similarly see that not much will be done for 'the people.' Biden didn't win the presidency based upon a strong policy agenda. He opposed 'Medicare for all,' raising the minimum wage, and policies that would directly benefit the working class. Voting for Biden was a not-Trump vote and part of the culture war between right and left.

In this culture war, politics do not address the problems of the majority of Americans who live paycheck to paycheck and continue to make less and less money while the wealthy get a bigger piece of the pie. Instead of addressing this straightforward issue, Americans are offered ideology. If an American is stuck in a low paying job or loses it, the political right might, for example, seek to blame illegal immigrants for driving wages down instead of observing how CEO salaries are up. In contrast, the political left does not seek to deal with the issue of CEOs making 320 times more than a typical worker in their company, but will instead be concerned with why the CEO is not a woman, not black, or showing diversity. This devolves to paranoid thinking on both sides in which the outgroup on the political right is demonized and the ingroup on the political left is demonized (i.e. Cis White people have to confront their unconscious racism/bigotry and search for their inner evil).

The issue of political rhetoricians getting into power and not helping the majority of people to have a better existence was already observed at the beginnings of Western Civilization in the works of Plato. He has the conclusion that that those individuals who want to get into positions of power are never the people who deserve them. Famously, his answer in The Republic is to have philosopher-kings. I do not want to offer up a complete renegotiation of the social contract or prescribe a revolution. Instead, let's observe that Trump's rhetoric indicates that he was elected as a political outsider (i.e. non-establishment) and that the majority of the political right believe he won his second term. What can unite both the political right and left is a system that has much more transparency so that election results can be accepted by both parties and that motivations of individual politicians aren't suspect. This could come from having a political system that does not have corporations paying for campaigns, lobbying for legislation, and which approaches politics in the media with more fact checking and less editorialization. Psychoanalysis similarly needs this transparency.

Psychoanalysis is in a unique place in the humanities in that its practitioners aren't philosophers or speculators judging human phenomena from afar. We have symptoms to resolve and character disorders to work through which give us access to concrete data. This data should be what's used to criticize the theory of another—not slogans and strawmen. Denigrating classical psychoanalysis will only lead to reinventing

the wheel, if it isn't simply part of a narcissistic posturing of the American schools to be providing something wholly new and original. As with political change, psychoanalysis will only change when the majority of its members demand transparency. Who has not been to a "scientific meeting" at an institute only to see the speaker give an earful of jargon or appeal to an outside authority in academia? There must be a demand for clinical work to be center stage. New concepts should follow a change in praxis or clinical technique that shows that the undoing of psychopathology as its starting point.

Ideology reigns so long as people want to be subjects and champion a thought leader instead of thinking for themselves. However, simply asking people to think more for themselves is not an option. As analysts, we know that people stop growing and feeling the pleasure of learning in work or love due to ego injuries and their resulting regressions or defenses. I would suggest that transparency begins in psychoanalysis when its adherents take the attitude that 'the Emperor has no clothes,' instead of feeling inferiority, inadequacy, or guilt about not understanding an instructor or speaker. This could be expressed in asking a would-be thought leader to clarify what he or she means in common language, asking for clinical examples to illustrate a point, and asking for scholar-ship/quotations when the position of another school is criticized.

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Arnold Richards to Sandra Buechler

Pr. Beuchler's wise contribution reminds me that Larry Friedman referred to theory as the analyst's security blanket. I think ideology has a similar role. But the important point she makes is that analysts have to acknowledge that they have values. The patient certainly assumes that they do. The challenge is to not impose these values on the patient. The model of analytic neutrality, an absolute non-self-disclosure, can certainly be carried too far. The danger which she and other contributors refer to is of analysis becoming a ritual cult. Candidates are particularly at risk to overvalue the categories "analyst" and "analysis." Jack Arlow tried to demystify these concepts by referring to analysis as a conversation, and Charles Brenner wrote that analysis is not defined by frequency or furniture.



James Tyler Carpenter to Sandra Buechler

Sandra Buechler, Ph.D.: Like the welcoming hug of a good friend, Sandra Buechler's reflections on Arnie Richard's thoughts on the role of ideology in psychoanalytic science and practice, are simultaneously authentic, complex, and pass undeniably beyond language-thought as truth and emotion often do. Spoken in the language of a deeply human clinician and narrator, Dr. Buechler urges the reader to do what experience, pain, and wonder have taught us leads on where the sidewalk ends: Embrace ideology as a flickering light in the darkness, a value-laden friend with all that comes with such relationships, and finally one idea among and as such subject to synergies and limits by its very nature. Rather than explain her to the reader, one finds her reflections are both convergently familiar, and like a good meal, a pleasurable experience and a take home from this moveable feast.



The Truth Could Set Psychoanalysis Free: A Response to "Psychoanalysis in Crisis: The Danger of Ideology" by Arnold Richards, M.D.

Sandra Buechler

According to my dictionary, an ideology is "The body of ideas reflecting the social needs and aspirations of an individual, group, class, or culture." In response to Dr. Richards' thought-provoking paper, I provide three ways we might understand our *temptation* to embrace an ideology. Briefly:

- 1. Psychoanalysts, as clinicians, are confronted every session with some of life's most baffling, and most painful conundrums. Regardless of how we define our roles, it can be tempting to adhere to a set of certainties about how to proceed. The daunting clinical task might, itself, incline us toward longing for unquestionable verities.
- 2. In order to distinguish itself from a religion, or cult, psychoanalysis has traditionally "thrown out the baby with the bathwater," so to speak. We have tried to deny having personal and professional values that profoundly affect how we work. While many in the field have cast aside some of the requirements of "neutrality" and "abstinence," the inescapable role of values in treatment is still underplayed. As lived out in psychoanalytic institutes, this denial creates problematic situations, most especially for candidates. One outcome is that analysts' values, forced underground, may seek an acceptable expression, in the form of an ideology.
- 3. Psychoanalysis does not exist in a vacuum. It is practiced in cultures which, themselves, provide support for ideologies that equate maintaining standards with maintaining "purity," in some sense. Put another way, regardless of widespread current efforts to assert the value of diversity, strong exclusionary trends still exist inside and outside the field of psychoanalysis. In the wider society and in the psychoanalytic world, it is not uncommon to encounter

stringent gates for admittance, which function to keep some people out, giving a special status to insiders.

Impossible Profession?

While I do not agree with Janet Malcolm's (1980) characterization of our field as impossible, I do think it presents enormous challenges. No matter how our analytic education taught us to define the analyst's role, it surely includes hearing about many of life's trials and tribulations. Some of the most painful forms of suffering will appear in our offices, at unpredictable moments. Elsewhere (2019, chapter five) I have written about the analyst's task as including sufficient conviction in our therapeutic stance, sufficient humility, sufficient awareness of our inevitable subjectivity, and sufficient curiosity to recognize the unexpected. Given the enormous challenges we face every hour, is it any wonder we yearn for certainty about our favorite theories and methodologies, even if (or, perhaps, especially if) those certainties turn into elitist "clubs" that exclude colleagues who think and practice differently?

Put another way, the temptation to latch onto an ideology can be understood as a wish to escape the insecurity of living within the bounds of "negative capability." Briefly, this is a concept (Keats, 1959) that lauds being capable of living with uncertainties, mysteries, and doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason. Reaching, irritably or not, for an ideology might be an attempt to escape from the anxiety of constant exposure to fathomless mysteries. Which of us, feeling lost and unmoored, would not yearn for a reliable compass? But, then, to really trust my compass, wouldn't it be natural to believe that my compass is better than yours?

Clinical Values

In 1999 I published a paper entitled "Searching for a Passionate Neutrality." I described a two- session consultation I had recently conducted. Briefly, the patient's therapist initiated the consultation, out of concern that, after many years of treatment, the patient's severe eating disorder had not improved. Upon meeting the patient for the first time, I had a strong reaction.

Everything about her announced her reluctance to leave childhood behind. Her thin, insubstantial body, her waiflike stare and stubborn pout made this young woman seem early adolescent. With little emotion she described more than a decade of internal warfare over eating enough to live. The struggle with her eating disorder had already taken her life, in that there was room for little else. I found myself immediately, deeply concerned. Every fiber of me wanted to wrestle with the self-destructive forces in her. I wanted the vibrant young woman I saw as her potential to emerge.

(1999, p. 213)

Years later, reviewing this paper for its reproduction in a book (2017) I reflected on its part in my development as an analyst. It was the start of a process of studying the place of neutrality in my clinical approach. I knew that whatever stance I took, it would have to incorporate the legacy of Erich Fromm, whose writing had made a lasting impression. Fromm's thinking also influenced me through his work with many of my analytic supervisors and training analyst, during my candidacy at the William Alanson White Institute, from 1979-1983. From Fromm I took the belief that promoting the patient's (and my own) full self-realization was part of my role as an analyst. How could I avoid imposing my own values, and respect the patient's right to an uncluttered, neutral space, but still foster (in Fromm's 1973 language) "biophilic," or life loving forces against "necrophilic," or death-oriented pulls?

In my first book (2004) I concluded that analysts inevitably express our values through our focus in a session. I did not suggest that we abandon the concept of neutrality, but, rather, that we hold it in a tension with these values. They include curiosity, integrity, and the ability to bear suffering (more about this below). I suggest that these values play a role in treatment regardless of the practitioner's theoretical orientation. Our focus, that is, what we hear, respond to (silently or out loud) remember, link with other impressions, and so on, is partially shaped by these values, often on a less than conscious level. I believe that they operate, however committed we may be to adherence to neutrality. There is no way to focus on everything that goes on in a session. Focus is determined by our beliefs about what is meaningful, problematic, amenable to treatment, and so on. Our only choice is whether we recognize the values that play a role in guiding our participation in sessions. I am suggesting that facing the role of values in directing our focus could ultimately free

psychoanalysis. I think it is a key aspect to its returning to its place as a vibrant, exciting field of study and treatment methodology.

Put another way, one of the greatest dangers facing psychoanalysis is an unwillingness or inability to face the values that are inherent in the psychoanalytic process, regardless of its theoretical orientation. Denial of these values contributes to the field's stultification. Psychoanalysis has always had a reluctance to come to grips with this issue. It has been afraid it will be dismissed by the public as a religion, or cult. It has worried about its standing among other professions if it admits that there are values embedded in any psychoanalytic enterprise. With good reason it has been concerned that, in the hands of a self-indulgent practitioner, it could become a method that abuses its privileged access to the minds and hearts of patients. These dangers, and others described below, are serious and worthy of our attention. But I would say that even more perilous is the position of a psychoanalysis that denies its own values, crippling its therapeutic potential, putting its candidates in the position of having to hide some of their motivations, forfeiting the possibility of inspiring clinicians and prospective patients who might otherwise be interested in psychoanalysis.

I would distinguish between areas where the analyst should refrain from expressing value judgments, where possible, from areas where expressing value judgments is inevitable (and, possibly, preferable). I do not know whether someone should live in Westchester, As H.S. Sullivan might say, that is not within my "purview." But I do know that feeling compelled to wash one's hands two hundred times a day is problematic. If a patient described this behavior, I would tend to focus on it. I would prioritize this material, in the sense that I would be likely to respond to it (silently or out loud) and remember it. My mind would recall theories that might help me understand it. I would probably try to remember other times the patient has mentioned this pattern, and what preceded and followed these observations. I might go back to the patient's history and any dreams, as well as countertransferential responses that might shed light on the compulsion. My theoretical bent would play a role in where my mind went, but I do not think any analyst would be uninterested in the compulsion. Our focus, in a session, is an inevitable function of what we judge as relevant, meaningful, worthy of therapeutic attention. We may not even be consciously aware of this judgement. But, I suggest, we make these evaluative assessments every hour we practice, and, even, when we read about psychoanalytic treatments.

While many practitioners have quietly admitted that Anna Freud's (1936) "evenly hovering attention" is an impossible requirement, I suggest there has been no clear replacement for it, even as an ideal. Each of us (consciously, unconsciously) distributes our attention in a session in conformity with our values, that is, what we prioritize, what we understand as a therapeutic goal, as problematic, as contributing to "therapeutic action," as within our "purview" in H.S. Sullivan's vocabulary. When my patient tells me he beat his daughter, my subsequent attention is not evenly hovering. It is slanted toward what my training taught me to believe relevant to the *problem* he is presenting. I am aware that I am on a slippery slope when I label anything as problematic. I am also aware that, while evenly hovering attention is impossible, it should not be entirely dismissed as an ideal. How can I know whether my patient's next association is, or is not "relevant" to the "problem"? I can not, of course, so it would be best if my attention could hover evenly enough to register the association, along with everything else he says, without any "irritable" reaching for explanation (see "negative capability" above). Like so much else in analytic life (and life in general, I would say) we must accept "evenly hovering" as an ideal we can not reach, an ideal that might actually distract us from registering the values that are guiding our focus, and, nevertheless, an ideal we should never entirely dismiss. Comfort with the contradictory-yet-true is one of the central requirements of an analytic life, from my perspective.

All too frequently this puts the candidate in training in a problematic triangle. Pulls from the supervisor demand value free attention on the patient's material. Pressures from the patient demand attention to problems, as the patient understands them. In supervision some candidates "omit" describing their unevenly hovering moments in sessions. Elsewhere (2008, 2012) I have written about the probable costs to the candidate's sense of integrity.

But here, I am adding that I think these experiences in training can heighten the yearning for an ideology that dictates a set of priorities that are acceptable to an "establishment," while also allowing us to meet patients' legitimate needs. Here is where I think what is often communicated in training is unfortunate. The candidate may glean, from what the supervisor and others express, that there is a fork in the road. They either are, or are not, capable of truly analytic practice. It is implied that the analytic "way" is deeper, more profound, more intellectually challenging. It requires a capacity to withstand pressure from patients without cowardly acquiescence. It privileges long term over short term gains, showing the strength of the ability to delay gratification. It is more evolved, capable of persevering, and enduring a long, arduous process. It shows the candidate has been well analyzed. Anything other than the "analytic way" is inferior in every sense.

Faced with this "choice," and having already committed to the training, who wouldn't want to be seen as "analytic"? Those who have been branded (however gently it might be conveyed) "not analytic" are faced with a conundrum. To protest, in any way, is often seen as *proof of one's defensiveness*. It can be very tempting to "hop aboard," adopt an ideology, and find safety, approval, a sense of belonging, a professional home. How do we tend to protect our new home? As I will suggest below, by shoring up its boundaries, by keeping out non-believers.

In 2004 (Clinical Values: Emotions That Guide Psychoanalytic Treatment) I suggested that the values embedded in analytic activity include curiosity, kindness, hope, courage, integrity, emotional balance, and the capacity to bear suffering. There I offered this as a set of values that I think are essential to any analytic process. You may believe in a different set, which would be fine, from my perspective. What is not fine is the denial of having values that help shape our focus, minute to minute, not just when we face patients, or read about treatment, but, even, when we listen at conferences, read each other's books, and talk to colleagues. It is the denial of this inevitable element in psychoanalysis that is problematic, and the acknowledgment of them that can set psychoanalysis free. Since these values play roles in any treatment, regardless of its theoretical orientation they could play a role in a more inclusive vision of a future for psychoanalysis.

Jargon as Elitism: Mystifying As A Method of Exclusion

"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less."

(Lewis Carroll, 1976)

In what feels like a lifetime ago, I helped a genetics department develop a curriculum for training genetics counselors. Although my contribution was strictly confined to the "counseling" aspect, I thought I should know something about genetics for this task, so I sat in on an introductory course. It was a marvel of clarity. Our instructor, a taciturn, shy man, made the most complicated concepts crystal clear. He knew his subject so thoroughly that he was able to communicate its essence in relatively simple, concise terms. He was dedicated to helping us understand these concepts, adept at making points, uninterested in scoring points or showing off his erudition. I learned something about genetics, but much more about education (from the root "to educe, or lead forth").

Personally, I am less worried about jargon's difficulty than I am about the message its use can convey implicitly. I think it encourages compartmentalization. Put another way, it does not encourage linking one's life experience with analytic concepts. Similarly, it inhibits cross fertilization with other fields of study. I like to bring Emily Dickinson with me when I go to a psychoanalytic lecture. I feel lost without her.

I think jargon also subtly communicates that there is a "club" that only admits its members. My genetics professor crossed over to my language, to gradually bring me to greater understanding of his. He did not require me to cross over first. Implicitly, this told me that he really wanted me to "get it," and he would do all he could to help. His intimate knowledge of his field, his evident alive curiosity about its concepts, his sheer effort, were contagious. I got much more than I bargained for.

Of course, the appeal of belonging to a privileged club is not new, and not confined to psychoanalysts. Psychoanalysts live in a culture that, itself, tends toward binaries of "us" and "them," with the home team linked to positive attributes. If the price of belonging to an exalted enclave includes fealty to an ideology, throughout history many have been willing to pay it. Opening any newspaper can tell us that elitist hierarchies still exist and exert a powerful influence in the wider culture.

Ultimately, psychoanalysis tries to comprehend human experience. So did Shakespeare, Dickinson, Dostoevsky, and countless other writers, philosophers, portrait painters, and so on. Jargon, a token of exclusivity, obfuscates potentially fruitful thinking, and bars us from building bridges with fields other than our own. Bridges connect ideas, giving them an evolving life. The resulting hybrids become both old and new, familiar and exciting. A psychoanalysis that freed itself from stultified ideology, denial of its values, and mystifying jargon could attract curious minds.

I believe there are prospective candidates hovering at our field's threshold. They wonder if studying psychoanalysis will make their own life experience richer, and if their desire to help others will be honored. They wonder if thinking "outside the box" will be respected, even cherished. Will it?

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James Tyler Carpenter to Sandra Cohen

Sandra Cohen, Ph.D.: For me, Dr. Cohen's thoughts, sparks on psychoanalysis and ideology that speak directly to our shared communal desires and fantasies for connection and psyche, ...are a borderline manifesto to walk on the wild side (with affective neuroscience). If that sounds like an incongruous combination and slippage of formal thought, it is also a pastiche of a close reading of Freud, good technique, and well-grounded in references that once were heretical (as psychoanalysis has historically been). References that the reader is now familiar with; and, which instantiate us in our self-others from which we take off into the future we create with our clients and colleagues. Her understandings of how our craft and art is seen by our wider community have the truth of cinematic narrative, and stone-cold poll findings.



Response to Arnold Richards, M.D. Paper Psychoanalysis in Crisis: The Danger of Ideology

How Does Ideology End & The Art of Creating A Life Begin?

Sandra Cohen

At its worst, it usurps freedom of thought—a freedom which should be a major goal of any psychoanalysis—to be oneself, whoever that is, buried inside. Most people come to psychotherapy, at first, to relieve symptoms. But whether they know it or not, they're really in search of help creating a life that is their *own*, one they haven't been allowed, can't for various reasons allow themselves, and don't know how to find. This takes space for imaginings—untethered to any ideology, those internally inflicted or (we hope) not imposed by an analyst. Creating an authentic life often requires a psychoanalytic journey. Yet, this isn't so frequently sought out in our 21st Century world. Why not?

In his important paper, Psychoanalysis in Crisis: The Danger of Ideology, Dr. Arnold Richards raises these essential questions: Why are we so deeply distrusted in the lay community? We have to be able to explain ourselves in ways that make sense to other people and to ourselves, but we can't seem to do it What is stopping us? "What is psychoanalysis, that we seem to be so powerless to halt its decline?" (Richards, p. 390). These are critical questions and, although they are hard to answer, I'd like to take the opportunity to explore two possible unconscious cultural forces acting against us. The first is in the general zeitgeist and the second, a fantasy about psychoanalysis itself.

The first: we live in a culture of narcissism. There is increasingly a determination to be "independent" spirits (witness the response to the pandemic). And, this narcissism means anti-need, anti-dependency, and

The page numbers in this article are from Richards, A. (2015). Psychoanalysis in Crisis: The Danger of Ideology. *Psychoanalytic Review*, 102(3):389-405.

anti-feeling. The question is, are we faced with a cultural superego not unlike Fairbairn's anti-libidinal instinct (1952) or Bion's (1962) ego-destructive superego—one that is not only against attachments but also deep exploration and psychic truth? Instead, there is a focus on superficial quick fixes and "self-help." This superego coopts the mind and forces a perverse ideology that people cling to as a savior but, in its projective identification, creates terror of being controlled.

The second: a fear-based fantasy about psychoanalysis. This fantasy leads us to the fact that "a once fascinated public distrusts psychoanalysis as unscientific, authoritarian, deluded, reactionary, trite, arrogant, sexist, and/or passe (uneducated)" (Richards, p. 390). This myth neatly links up to my first hypothesis and is another massive projection of the said-cultural superego onto psychoanalysis. There are many myths about psychoanalysis that proliferate in our contemporary world. But this one, in particular, is an urgent one we must address and combat to survive. One that, as Dr. Richards points out, psychoanalysis has contributed to in our "theory wars" and APsaA battles. This authoritarian and arrogant myth views psychoanalysis as an unbending ideology.

"Isn't it a process," the lay person might think, "that imposes predetermined ideas on my behaviors and fantasies, insists that I follow rules like lying down on a couch or swallowing my analyst's interpretations whole (as in 'the analyst is always right')? After all, they say I don't know my own unconscious. If I don't, aren't I the prisoner of my analysis until my analyst says I'm done? And, I have to come 4–5 days a week? Am I really that sick? Besides, the analyst just sits there silently taking notes (that's what the cartoons say) and won't give me any advice. Why go for years if I have to come up with the answers by myself anyway?" This all contributes to the "dangers" of dependency.

Is this antagonism towards what is assumed-to-be psychoanalysis predominantly a function of a trend towards individualism that has increasingly come into the open? Are we, as a culture, less consciously willing to be "boxed into" any (seemingly rigid) structure not of our personal making? Or is it something more, something I've seen in those patients already living with inflexible ideologies in their minds (aware of it or not)?

Prisons of Superego Ideologies in the Mind

Many patients come to us with perverse internal ideologies that have unconsciously taken over their lives—imposed by primitive fears; catastrophic anxieties about being wrong or hurting others; guilt about wanting to be separate; anger and hostility that's in combat with any perceived interference with thinking for themselves. It's our job to find the nature and roots of these ideologies and release our analysands from them, while showing them that psychoanalysis isn't about imposing more. They're already prisoners of the psychic bullies they live with in their heads. How do we understand these bullies who think they know best—constantly intimidating, exploiting, rejecting, humiliating them for reasonable needs, rooted in (often unmet) infantile longings?

Rosenfeld (1971) said it well when discussing his discovery of an internal gang of bullies that act against and shut down any real need. Some of our patients have been failed and traumatized, with their deprivations turned to envy, creating "omnipotent destructive parts of the self ... directed against ... any libidinal part of the self which experiences need for an object and the desire to depend on it" (Rosenfeld, 1971, p. 173). Bion's (1962) ego-destructive superego asserts a moral superiority over the child-self's needs. Fairbairn (1952) called this kind of super-ego, the anti-libidinal ego (as well as an internal saboteur.) O'Shaunessey (2015) says that these tyrannical internal figures, imposing hard and fast mind-control, are born out of "the earliest dissociations ... inflicted and suffered in childhood" (p. 176). Here we see the death instinct operating in real time which, Segal (1993) shows us, is a defense against the pain of frustrated need. "The death instinct, then, aims at not perceiving, not feeling ..." (Segal, 1993, p. 58).

Our patients (and potential ones) are often ruled by such defensive organizations. If they leave these safety shelters, turn to us in need—their fear is that we either fail them or impose a different kind of control. At least *their* bullies, *their* gangs, are their own; though too easily mistaken for friends, posing like they do, as protectors. Yet, as Michael Eigen (2007, p. 21) says: "Attempts to outlaw or ban the psyche—by science, spirit, laughter, or shouting—delays the work that has to be done. Work unknown. We cannot bully the psyche out of existence." But this is where we are. Our patient's inner bullies try to do it. Our pop-psychology,

quick-fix, culture does their best, too. And, we see our country's collective psyche in terrible upheaval. No, the psyche won't be ignored.

Dr. Richards asks and I wish I had an answer: how do we get people to listen to us (even to each other)? How do we break through the polarizations and divisiveness in psychoanalysis, psychology, politics (half the country lacks empathy for others in the midst of a dangerous pandemic)? Here in the *International Journal of Controversial Discussions*, we listen to each other. It's a start. "My way is right" is antithetical to healing. Creating schisms doesn't help anyone. Honoring the imaginings of a single psyche does.

Imaginings & The Art of Psychoanalysis

Inner life is a particular form of art, usually fashioned out of pain. Each person's unhappiness is different and varies from any others. If we can move beyond ideologies, including a temptation to interpret through the lens of theory (oedipal, libidinal, superego, or the like), we can find that story, *that* person's story, playing out on the canvas of the transference. It is uniquely special to follow each patient's narrative, their fantasies and dreams, distinctive use of words, linking these to early history. Creating a language together for the effects of that history, what our patients have "made of it" in symptoms and the compulsion to repeat, is a poetry of understanding and change.

As Dr. Richards says, this "searching quality" (p. 391) is one of the things that defines psychoanalysis and is *an act of imagination* (p. 394). Can we search to modify our theories about how the mind works, collaborating with our patients in the ways that they correct us in understanding what, why, and how they suffer? This is how we help them get free of the ideologies they believe they must adhere to (under many different psychic threats). To do this, we must be curious, open, with a capacity to change course in every session—to follow our patients. If we are stuck in ideologies ourselves, we can't.

I think it is not the unscientific that turns the lay public, our potential patients, away from psychoanalysis. It's the fear of having another ideology imposed on them, being "indoctrinated" into psychoanalysis as a religion, having to fit into our views. As Dr. Richards wisely says (p. 403): "If we want to be careful, responsible, and responsive analysts, we must

turn a skeptical eye upon our own ideas as well as those of others." Our patients need space to be as creative as we do, in our own personal and artful protests against the oligarchies of theory. They must be able to dissent, use their voices, not merely go along with interpretations. Again, as Dr. Richards says, we cannot demand agreement to our versions of psychoanalytic givens. There are none.

An openness to creating every psychoanalytic relationship anew, knowing our relationship with, and understanding of, every patient must be different because they are different, is where ideological dogma ends and the art of helping our patients create their own life begins. "The artist's ... inner perception that his internal world is shattered ... leads to the necessity ... to recreate something that is felt to be a whole new world ... a world of its own." (Segal, 1991, p. 86). The same is true for our patients.

Perhaps this is the "art" we participate in, in a psychoanalytic process. What's important, I think, is finding the threads of unconscious phantasy (Segal, 1973), the early activity of a baby's mind—only understandable in connection to details of a personal history. In this sense, part of psychoanalysis as art, is the fostering of a container for imagining and remembering "backwards." Because, as Dr. Richards elaborates: "there is more to transference and transference neurosis than fantasy. There is also history and narrative. There is psychic reality and reality reality. And, of course, narrative truth and historical truth … what is objective and what is subjective" (p. 396).

To follow these Ariadne threads, our psychoanalytic art frees our patients from the prison of ideologies (in the mind or the world); prisons that restrict, deter, punish, and prevent *imagining*. Maybe the artistic function psychoanalysis serves in this liberation, is to honor the dreaming of a *real independent* Self forward—keeping that newly forming Self safe, and not alone, on the journey. "Psychoanalysis is less a medicine than an act of creation, an incessant shaping, re-texturing, fine-tuning of affective attitudes" (Eigen, 2007, p. 12). Attention to imaginings is a link to feelings. Feelings bring us to our Self.

Beyond Ideology—Above All Else—Feeling Matters

Michael Eigen (2007) beat me to it. I wish I'd thought of the title for a book, *Feeling Matters*. I've been thinking about it for a long time, working

with patients living in the numb hiding places of childhood trauma. Dr. Richards says it too (p. 392): "Affect is at play as much as reason. Exact science is neutral. Psychoanalysis is not." Psychoanalysis creates a container for feelings that frighten. We have to find and hold those feelings. "In therapy one risks what is too much for another, too much for oneself. One risks what no one can take or may ever be able to take. *That* enters the room and is shared, whether or not anyone can take it" (Eigen, 2007, p. 140). Because of this, feelings attached to traumatic memories are dead. Unearthing them *safely* is vital for healing.

As Dr. Richards says in describing psychoanalysis: "its tool is the *relationship* between two human beings" (p. 392). One we, as psychoanalysts can offer, if we've freed our own feelings from their prisons of theory, ideology, neutrality, or thinking we know what is "right." The child-still-living in our adult patients needs its place in the psychic arms of an analyst who is present, capable of participating and entering into their pain; letting them know that it's not too much to ask. We have to stand it, the feelings and the terror.

How else can we help our patients leave the confines of their own trauma-laden ideologies, those which come in many forms, the like of: "it's dangerous to feel, feelings will take me over and I'll be all alone." "Run away, close the door, it's better to stay in my hiding place." "If I need someone, I will destroy them." "If I feel for anyone at all, I will be crushed." In Freud's discovery of the death instinct, we know more than any other psychological discipline how hard it is to change and what we all have against it.

So, let's free our work from the trap of impersonal words. Let's withstand our own pulls to turn away, hide within theory, create so-called neutrality—which is better known as emotional distance. No relationship can be made without feeling. Let's move into those darkest places, connect where our patients are suffering, become a gentle guide out of their misguided fear-induced ideologies, and let them know they're not alone. If this is our work (and it is), maybe someday soon the lay public will find a way to hear us.

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Arnold Richards to Jon Mills

on Mills' paper, with the other papers in this issue, make the enterprise of the IJCD very worthwhile. He is pessimistic where pessimism is warranted, for example, about the future of analytic training in the United States and the economic constraints on psychoanalytic practice. And he is optimistic where optimism is justified: the future of psychoanalysis in academia and the availability of psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic training in other countries and regions, including Latin America. Psychoanalytic treatment and training have benefited from governmental support in Germany, although treatment support has recently decreased from four to three times a week. I concur with his advocacy for pro bono psychoanalytic training and there is the model of the free clinics which were encouraged by Freud in Vienna and then in other countries of Europe as well. Freud proposed that every analyst provide one free analysis, and if time didn't allow them to do that, that they contribute the funds for one analysis, which is what Freud did. Mills and I are in total agreement about the problem of oligarchy and authoritarianism in analytic organizations and in analytic training. Much has been accomplished by the efforts of some in the American Psychoanalytic Association but more needs to be done. Our next assignment is to find some way of replacing the training analyst system with personal analysis. The training analyst system corrodes psychoanalytic institutes and the psychoanalysis of the candidates themselves. Many have written about that this, including Zvi Lothane, Otio Kernberg, Howard Shevrin and others in this issue. Is this an issue that we should be optimistic or pessimistic about? No one in power gives up power willingly, which may make the problem insurmountable.



Crisis and Ideology In Psychoanalysis

Jon Mills

Arnold Richards is well known for his nuanced reflections on the institutional history of psychoanalysis, organizational power games, and the politics of exclusion (see Richards, 2017). He is worried. So am I. We are in crisis on many fronts: from dubious public perception to antagonism from empirical science, mainstream academe, exclusion from university and hospital training environments, interference by regulators, corporate managerialism, insurance denials, private industry privileging profit over quality care, and our own narcissistic hubris of superiority over competing mental health disciplines only shoots us further in the foot. We are losing our credibility: unwilling to compromise or play the game, engage in dialogue with allied professionals, encourage and support research, and engage in outreach to the greater public only marginalizes us more. What makes matters worse is that we are internally divided over our own discipline (Eagle, 2003; Mills, 2017; Summers, 2008). We can't even agree upon a common definition or come to a consensus on what constitutes psychoanalysis (Mills, 2012), let alone with precision and clarity, which only adds to the problem. Dogged by social, political, and financial pressures to conform to conventional medicalized expectations of measurable outcomes, marketplace demands for economic utility, expediency, and efficiency, and the loss of autonomy and control we once enjoyed in providing treatment based upon our own professional sensibilities and training is further eroding our profession (Eisold, 2007).

As we anticipate our impending demise (Bornstein, 2001), Richards chides the oligarchs, demigods, and religious cult proselytizers who christen the baptized with holy water only to alienate the rest of the uninitiated who fears drinking the Kool-Aid. Hegemony, elitism, and pretension of the supervising and training analyst caste system only distances psychoanalysis further from the mainstream. Straddling a precarious and ill-defined fence between science and the humanities (Dauphin, 2008), aversion to empirical research or proof (Ratner, 2018)—let alone

demonstration, not to mention seeing its value—is political suicide. Despite recent attempts at progress and innovation (Axelrod, Naso, & Rosenberg, 2018; Govrin & Mills, 2019), psychoanalysis appears to be fizzling out, at least in classical practice. But there may to be some hope if it modifies its image, scope, and outreach, which I will turn to shortly. Where it holds its ground is as an intellectual contribution to offering a rigorous study of mind, human nature, social relations, and philosophy of culture motivated by unconscious psychological dynamics.

On Ideology

Whereas I have been concerned with the ideologies of science (Mills, 2015), Richards (2015) has focused his attention on the ideologies of the profession. As it has been argued from sociology to the Frankfurt School, every social collective is conditioned on a substrate of ideologies, particularly psychoanalysis, or Freud would have had no need to assemble a Secret Committee to safeguard his "new science" and keep undesirables out. As Barnaby Barratt (2013) has noted, "there is no stepping out of some sort of ideological web" (p. 170). Certain "ideals" permeate the psychoanalytic canon like any other social configuration with recalcitrant fantasies that color the way things "ought to be" regardless of the validity of their premises:

Ideology consists of a relatively fluid set of representations that constitute social subjectivity, together with a core of communal practices that condition the unconscious libidinal investments of subjects in their political community. These libidinal investments are structured by unconscious *social fantasy* and ballast the subject's political allegiances with a kernel of *enjoyment*, which determines a relatively fixed loyalty to the institutional rituals of the political community. (Boucher, 2014, p. 128)

In other words, ideologies are necessary illusions based on collective identifications that allow for social cohesion only on the condition that certain unconscious fantasies may be entertained and enjoyed. Over much of his career, Slavoj Žižek (1989) has focused on various aspects of ideology that interpellate the subject through reinforced modes of institutionalization. Here we may extend this to the institution of psychoanalysis—it's snootiness, dogma, protectionism, and reinforced loyalty—as gatekeeper to the holy grail of truth guarded by oligarchy. As

a result, the old guard is dying off without replacements in the ranks, while the youth resist authority, are suspicious of wisdom dispensers, distrust guild mentality, and are vociferously critical of traditions that demand conformity while silencing critique.

We Have an Image Problem

Richards points out that psychoanalysis once enjoyed esteem among the public and intelligentsia alike. Now it has lost respect and earned mistrust. What happened? It hasn't kept up very well with the times. Given the exclusionary history governing the educational and organizational life of psychoanalysis (Bergmann, 2004; Eisold, 2018; Kernberg, 2016), including excommunicating heretics and dissidents, tribal dysrecognition, infighting among rival factions and groups, the frequency and furniture wars, and the need to control training and restrict who gets accepted into the club, hence leading to the lawsuit against the American and International Psychoanalytic Associations—how do we present a unified front when we are far from unified or inclusive? The hierarchy separating medical psychiatry from psychology, which still exists, is bad enough, where psychologists are seen as tawdry lowbread citizens, let alone the inferior social worker or psychotherapist, or even worse, the lowly mental health counselor pissant, for we can't even find common ground to unite as a profession due to these differences despite mutually shared identifications. When micro-aggressions are inflicted on a perceived inferior class, they will leave, unless their transference needs for inclusion remain masochistically intact. What should we expect the public to think when one professional body is hostile toward another ally? It does not bode well for a collective shared vision of the value and status of psychoanalysis when professions devalue alterity, camps bash each other simply because they belong to a different theoretical orientation, school, or come from an alternative type of education or training, where comparative discourse is pooh-poohed, and otherness is expected to take its proper place in the back of the bus.

We have not properly educated the public and professional groups on the value of psychoanalytic thought—in the consulting room and the academy; nor have we highlighted the fact that psychoanalysis has gone through many iterations, historical developments, and evolutions since the time of Freud. This is evident by the fact that the public and other disciplines alike, academic or otherwise, do not even know what contemporary psychoanalytic theory and praxis is about. Psychoanalysis is no longer confined to five days on the couch, penis envy, and the anal stage. Despite the fact that different emendations and redirecting shifts in perspective and emphasis have saturated the psychoanalytic domain, including incorporating psychodynamic thinking into psychotherapy training and praxis, the masses largely remain ignorant of our conceptual and technical advances that have utilitarian significance in today's societies. We need to do a better job at public education and outreach, politicking among the various stakeholders, lobbying the insurance sector, serving on health policy advisory boards, providing legislative consultation, and shaping the parameters and attitudes toward mental healthcare delivery and choice of interventions. Richards asks, what is stopping us? Laziness and arrogance, I suggest, among other things. The mindset is: "I'm better than you; I can't be bothered with your nonsense." Individual practitioners are too insular and worried about their solitary affairs, hence unwilling to step outside of their bubble, while academic appointments have all but disappeared in the US. Analysts and scholars seem content on publishing in their own venues and periodicals—not in multidisciplinary journals, teaching at independent Institutes and training programs—not universities, and preaching to the choir.

Given the evidence-based movement, why would the discipline chose not to engage in dialogue rather than step out almost entirely from framing the debates, politics, and policy issues involved? It has failed to participate in key strategy initiatives with major stakeholders—insurance companies, private industry, public healthcare, university departments of psychology and psychiatry—who make decisions on our behalf, and who have almost entirely cut us out of the discussion because we have refused to sit at the table, listen, talk to others, and educate. Regulators, policy analysts, insurance panels, actuaries and underwriters concerned about premiums, public healthcare administrators, and governmental bodies that determine legislation would all profit from input by psychoanalytic organizations lobbying for our profession. If psychoanalysis continues to be estranged from the politics of mental health, then it's digging its own grave. We need to reverse our public perception and rehabilitate our image problem.

Pragmatic Concerns over Inclusion and Expanding the Scope of Psychoanalysis

Third-party payers can affect the legitimacy of psychoanalytic practice in significant ways: they demand evidence, a credible treatment plan, treatment monitoring and outcome measures, disclosure about the type of therapy conducted and its frequency, and require intrusive data, such as the demand for clinical notes and records in order to fund the treatment (Mills, 2014, 2020b). When psychoanalysts identify the type of treatment being delivered, they run the risk that their patients may not have access to their workplace or extended health benefits, or their claims may be denied when submitting receipts for reimbursement. Of course practitioners have ways of getting around such impositions, but it is more like playing a game rather than being open and honest about what we do. Medical doctors can say they practice medicine or psychiatry, psychologists practice clinical psychology, social workers conduct clinical social work and so on, where they can skirt the issue of what kind of therapy they practice or treatment they provide; or when pushed on the issue by a third-party funder they simply claim they practice psychotherapy or an eclectic approach tailored to the unique needs of each client, or avoid answering the question so treatment approval or funds are not thwarted. But this is not entirely genuine and produces discomfort when confronting insurance adjusters who demand to know if you are practicing "evidence-based" interventions that are "scientific" out of the list of "approved" services they consult on their guidance charts or in their data bases

It does not help matters when other professional researchers and academics publish opinions that conclude psychoanalysis is pseudoscience and ineffectual, if not quackery, which insurance adjusters cite to justify claims denials. What makes matters worse is when the various institutional organizations that speak for the profession do not correct such misperceptions and biases coming from other competing fields of opinion, such as empirical psychology in academic or clinical departments who weaponized data for political purposes in order to boost their own credibility, especially when there is plenty of empirical support for psychoanalytic interventions (see Seitler, 2018) that are ignored or dismissed. All this shows is a lack of advocacy about the value and validity of psychoanalytic paradigms.

In addition to the need to demonstrate public relevance, collaborate with other body politics, engage in psychotherapy integration discussions and research, policy consultancy with vast stakeholders, and educate the layman and corporate culture alike on how psychoanalytic treatment actually works, the discipline is failing to attract early career professionals. This is partly due to its staunch criteria that does not want to compromise on what psychoanalytic training means to those (mostly old men) coming from a classical tradition that requires a minimum of three hourly sessions a week, which is already watered-down from the gold standard of five. The main issue here is the cost, at least in America.

We must face the facts about economic realities. Only the opulent can afford classical psychoanalysis. No one else can afford it or would desire to budget for it, unless they are those in training to become psychoanalysts, which is a prerequisite. In fact, it may not be inappropriate to surmise that the vast majority of those in formal psychoanalysis are those in training, and at great expense. By the time a doctoral level graduate has accumulated substantial debt to earn a terminal degree, which is often over \$150,000 in loans in the US, the additional fees to cover postdoctoral education make the whole prospect of psychoanalytic training prohibitive. In other countries that offer subsidized education to its citizens and have a lower scale of economy, this imposition is much less prohibitive. In fact, the "psy culture" in South America is surprising affordable to the degree that most citizens enter into therapy—from taxi drivers to CEOs—because the fees are affordable and the culture is psychologically minded. Psychoanalytic therapists may charge as little as \$25 a session in Argentina and Brazil, €40 in parts of Europe, such as Belgium, and £50 in the UK, whereas in Mexico the fee can be as little as \$4 USD. The disparities are obscene in comparison to US conventions where some analysts charge as much as \$500 a session, such as in Manhattan. The only equivalent to this affordability in the United States are low fee training clinics, and those in private practice training to become psychoanalysts who are so desperate for formal control cases that they will see people for as little as \$20 a session just so they can bank their clinical time for supervision hours. From the standpoint of feasibility, for both patients and practitioners, there is no longer an expectation or illusion of initiating or cultivating a traditional psychoanalytic practice in North America. It's a dead dream. Those who still practice from a classical framework are few and far between.

Given that psychoanalytic candidacy is withering on the vine, an argument can be made that an ethical alternative to suicide prevention is to make psychoanalytic training pro bono, introduce substantially reduced fees, or subsidize tuition and supervision as a way of preserving the discipline. Analysts identified with providing psychoanalytic education and instruction may be said to have an ethical obligation to the future of the profession rather than holding onto power in institutional governance where a portion of their income comes from charging candidates through a prolonged cash grab. A modest proposal is to at least make training and supervision affordable.

The majority of psychoanalytic practitioners in the US today are not graduating from formal psychoanalytic Institutes simply because they cannot afford it, nor can they afford to take off time from work. Instead they are receiving training in psychoanalytic psychotherapy, and yet they often feel like second-class citizens looked down upon by the conceited establishment. The likelihood that psychoanalytic psychotherapists will eventually become "feeders" for formal psychoanalytic training is also a fantasy because of the costs and time commitment involved; not to mention the rigid formal requirements for a personal analysis that is selected or approved by the Institute matched with one of their society or faculty members, hence being subjected to the colonization and commodification of the training and supervising analyst system, which is antiquated, exploitive, and incestuous. It is for these reasons that many contemporary Institutes are modifying their requirements around training. And almost every Institute, traditional or otherwise, has already expanded their training curriculums to include a program in psychoanalytic psychotherapy, and even in some cases, a theoretical and/or research track that is entirely academic, which does not require treating control cases and being supervised. This shift toward training in psychotherapy is likely to be the lifeline of formal institutional existence in the future for the simple reason that traditional training is petering out. The field needs to prepare for this shift in focus, identity, and interest whether we like it or not. Here psychoanalysis is destined to become a psychotherapy for the people (Aron & Starr, 2013).

In addition to a lack of attracting psychoanalytic candidates is the issue of failing to address and attract candidates of diversity. Whereas in many parts of the world where ethnic difference and multiculturalism

are represented, such as in Latin America, India, and Asian communities, North America has a significantly low representation among visible minorities practicing psychoanalysis, especially black professionals. In fact, the International Association for Analytical Psychology (IAAP) has only 4 African American Jungian analysts worldwide out of a membership of over 3500 (Samuels, 2018). While attempts are being made to become more inclusive, address diversity and social justice issues, and recruit people of color and marginalized groups, such as LGBTQ, or more recently, LGBTQQIP2SAA (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, questioning, queer, intersex, pansexual, two-spirit (2S), androgynous and asexual) populations, even introducing transgender psychoanalysis (Gherovici, 2017; Gozlan, 2015, 2018), our discipline needs to catch up with the times.

Psychoanalysis as Artful Science

Like others before him (Chessick, 2007; Slochower, 1964; Strenger, 1997), Richards further examines how psychoanalysis is both science and art. Indeed, it may be more of an art than science in the traditional sense of the word, for psychoanalysis is artful, generative and productive, has its own aesthetic models of ritual and spontaneity, and is generally a creative meaning-making enterprise. The artistry or techne (τέχνη) of our craft is equally supple and shrewd, and as with episteme (έπιστήμη), they produce their own unique forms of science or knowledge. Even in art there are many applied techniques following a discernable and teachable method on discourse, which flows from theoretical concepts that inform technics, including experimental methodologies. But regardless of the fluidity among techne, science, and knowledge, insurers do not fund art.

Although the scientific status of psychoanalysis has been critiqued and defended at length by both insiders and external critics alike, the debate tends to beg the question on what we mean by science (Mills, 2015). I shall forego an extended discussion here, given it has been done ad nauseam and I have already addressed it elsewhere (Mills, 2007, 2019, pp. 16–19), but for the sake of brevity it may be important to remind ourselves that it was Dilthey (1883) who proposed the distinction between the human sciences based upon investigating and understanding the motivations and meanings inherent to the experiential subject versus that of

the natural sciences, which is concerned with the impersonal forces and organizations of physical nature. Whereas the *Geisteswissenschaften* focus on the science of mental processes and social systems within a class of human events, the *Naturwissenschaften* focus on the domain of the natural world. Therefore, the bifurcation that is often forged between the human and natural sciences takes as its premise that nature and human experience are mutually exclusive categories. However, the distinction lies in the methodology and discourse each discipline employs. What was crucial for Dilthey in positing distinctions between the natural and human sciences is the pivotal concept of "lived experience" (*Erlebnis*), the irreducibility of subjectivity that prereflectively (unconsciously) encounters the immediate presence of reality, that which is present "to me" as an internal sense, not as a given external object or datum of consciousness, but as an immediate internal mediacy. Here the subject-object distinction is obscured, if not sutured: Psyche is the lifeworld (*Lebenswelt*).

Because Psyche is the object of psychoanalytic investigation, it can never be examined independent of the lived experience of subjects. To pretend that subjectivity exists independent of mind and hermeneutically informed interpretations of descriptions and explanations of observed events, like the discipline of physics, is to beg the question of ontology and epistemology to boot. But regardless of which approach we adopt, we cannot evade making ontological assertions. To say that a hermeneutic, semiotic, or scientific paradigm describes or explains a phenomenon, even if mired in uncertainty and impasse, is to evoke a referent that it is still *about* something. The mode of discourse does not displace the signified object(s) in question. We cannot elude the question of truth and realism no matter what discourse we adopt. In other words, metaphysics always has a way of coming back to bite us in the ass.

In an attempt to broach a common ground, let me suggest that the scientist, theoretician, and practitioner are all engaged in modes of investigation: they differ only in methodology. Let us call this common ground a theory of discourse. Just as there are different discourses on method, there are also different methods of discourse. But regardless of these differences, they share a common Logos ($\Lambda \acute{o} \gamma o \varsigma$), namely, a rational ground. Theoretical engagement and the empirical method both employ their own modes of discourse as logos in an effort to let something be seen, whether in appearance or reality, as phenomenal description or

demonstrated fact, with the stipulation that some discourses are more persuasive than others.

This brings us to ask, Does logos as discourse have to meet the challenge of science? At face value, yes, but with stipulations. Science attempts to explain while discourse may serve many functions science cannot. But this all depends upon what we mean by science, hence to know (< Lat. scientia, from scire, to understand). In the social sciences—psychoanalysis for instance, to offer a theory that explains psychological conditions and states of mind within social collectives, discourse attempts to present the complexity of intrapsychic, intersubjective, and communal arrangements within a given culture, an unconscious manifestation of the need to make the unconscious conscious. For psychoanalysis, discourse reveals in disguised forms all of humanity's desires, conflicts, defences, emotions, traits, dispositions, longings, and complexes that expose the personal and collective plight of humankind. Here logos—as word, as paradigmatic model—has psychological significance for masses and functions in psychic economy unconsciously. In this way, discourse as functionalism serves the overdetermined systems of meaning in society, and provides regulation to constant change, such that there is order, purpose, and structure to socio-cultural networks via the narrative. A narrative in turn provides meaning, which is at once open to interpretation, even when attempts at explanation fail. Yet the notion of explanation is itself controversial.

An *explanandum* describes a phenomenon to be explained, not the phenomenon itself, while an *explanans* seeks to adduce an answer or explanation to account for the phenomenon—its reason(s), purpose, origins, and so forth. While the *explicandum* is that which gets explicated, the *explicans* is that which gives the explication. Although an explanation attempts to account for the coming into being of a phenomenon, it is more than that. It always implies, if not literally evokes, the question of *causality* by attempting to explain the ground or preconditions that bring something about, such as certain antecedent events or the necessary conditions (not sufficient ones) that are temporally and materially a priori. Richards (2015) seems to agree. But everything is overdetermined: a science that only looks at material-efficient causation is bankrupt and collapses into ontological reduction. The most we can say is that there are correlations to observation and the phenomenon being

observed, which still ushers in the problem of description and explanation; hence science can be no better than myth (Mills, 2020a), as they both rely upon a narrative or discourse to justify their premises and conclusions. So contrary to predicate or propositional logic, which is merely concerned with the meaning of words or expressions and their formal systemic relations and operations, or statements that make something comprehensible, an *explanans* is much more far-reaching—it is about ontology.

On the one hand, an interpretation is an attempt to describe a phenomenon, on the other, an explanation attempts to offer more, that is, how and why a phenomenon occurs. But so does an interpretation—each are about explication. So how does an interpretation differ from an explanation? When applied to the question of discourse, scientific or otherwise, I argue that both interpretive and explanatory models are equally making ontological claims, even if they are tarrying in epistemic uncertainty when it comes to the question of causality. Recall that for the ancients, a cause $(\alpha\iota\tau i\alpha)$ was the reason or explanation for something happening, which is always overdetermined.

If psychoanalytic theory or science—hence empirical research—is a declarative attempt to make phenomena comprehensible, then we must contend that it is offering an explanation of phenomena, even if contestable, or it would not have any currency to grant meaning to the human mind. Whether it is true or false is another issue, one we should adjourn for this discussion. In the end, modes of discourse offer narratives that signify, describe, and explain phenomena. But why should we grant the narrative—the "story"—the status of offering a theory of causality? Why should we assume an explanans has anymore epistemological weight or verity to phenomenal description—to the explanandum? Does not an explanation have multiple threads, multiple significations, hence an overdetermination and surplus of meaning and value, not to mention causal-semiotic strands of deferral to an infinite chain of associations and signifiers? This logically implies that no single explanation is ever complete or unequivocally valid, rather only a partial attempt at conceptualizing and describing phenomena. This applies to scientific methodologies and conclusions as well as psychoanalytic theoria and praxis.

We have turf wars against academics and empirical researchers in our

field levelled by clinicians (Blass & Carmeli, 2007; Hoffman, 2009) that further debilitate our efforts at scientific legitimacy. This is not helpful, not to mention retrograde politics. In fact, clinical psychoanalysis has everything to gain by endearing itself to scientific verification and empirical replication. Let us not forget that the whole field of modern psychiatry was founded on psychoanalytic inquiry. Diagnostic categories and taxonomies such as anxiety, depression, trauma, OCD, conversion disorders, and character pathology are amplifications of Freud's original contributions to the burgeoning field of modern science. If psychoanalysis is to yield any acceptance, it must conform to the parameters of evidence that is expected in our contemporary scientific world in order to stay in the game.

On Oligarchy

Richards (2015) is particularly keen to flush out and expose the systemically entrenched oligarchy that dominates traditional institutional life, particularly honing in on the educational, training, and certification protocols established by the Board of Professional Standards (BoPS) of the American Psychoanalytic Association (APsaA). Here he perspicaciously paints a picture of an insular good ole boys club of MDs whose central authority keeps the door locked to the manor as if it were a secret Masonic sect where only a few initiates are allowed entry. One cannot help but see clearly the hegemony behind such practices and the ideology that fortifies them, but to their own detriment. By insulating itself from alterity for a homogeneous body politic, it cuts itself off from other discourses and perspectives, (theoretical, empirical, or otherwise), that can contribute to its sophistication and robustness. As a result, fascinated with its own customary paradigms and conservativism versus competing viewpoints that are questioning of or disenchanted with the status quo (Govrin, 2016), the hegemon keeps itself segregated from building a larger community based on its emotional prejudices, negative transference to otherness, and countertransference to others' theoretical orientations that differ from one's own, thereby extricating itself from criticism and in having to justify itself and its organizational structure to outsiders. As long as there is this type of institutional myopia, power differentials, and inflexibility over its governance, principles, practices, and educational policies, it will gradually shrivel until it virtually becomes extinct.

New generations do not want to be confined by patriarchy nor subjected to thought control, as they are more independent thinkers, disobedient to authority, and driven by personal agency, ethical convictions, democracy, and social justice over past cohorts who merely wanted their parents approval and be allowed in the house. Given the wide range of alternative psychoanalytic training venues now available to all mental health professionals that are less onerous (and expensive) than the APsaA requirements, the old oligarchy is destined to find itself one day sitting in the club parlor bar drinking alone.

Coda

Years ago I wrote a rejoinder to Robert Bornstein on his prediction of the impending death of psychoanalysis (see Bornstein, 2001; Mills, 2002). As it turns out, when it comes to clinical treatment, he is right—we are on life support; but not so in the academy, particularly in the humanities. My prediction is that psychoanalysis in North America will continue to live on in education, training, and service delivery mainly through psychotherapeutic interventions while classical psychoanalysis will become invisible, if not obsolete, mainly due to prohibitions in cost and time, which is the direct result of our capitalist climate. In other parts of the world where scales of economy are much less based in disparities and profane divisions of wealth, power, and capital, psychoanalysis will continue to maintain a visible presence in intellectual circles and in helping the masses.

In academe, psychoanalysis is likely to continue to have a say, if not simply because it is an alternative voice of depth to superficial chatter that ignores complex relations between self and society in favor of reductive models that ignore the ontology of the unconscious. Psychoanalysis continues to have a prominent presence in philosophy, literature, cultural and religious studies, the visual arts, film, and media, history of ideas, aesthetics, and in the human, hermeneutic, and semiotic sciences. Due to its theoretical complexity grounded in unconscious dynamics that affect motivational systems and conflicts individuals, groups, and larger social collectives harbor, it is likely to command an authority over less urbane theories of human nature that are embarrassingly simplistic, naïve, and based in biological reduction, even if mainstream paradigms continue to dominate the contemporary scene.

Psychoanalytic training and education needs to take its lead from liberal academe that does not encourage orthodoxy, blind identification or conformity with the establishment, need to quell or eliminate dissent, nor suppress critical thinking, skepticism, and open critique. Instead it should foster critical inquiry and engage in ongoing dialogue and debate with its various stakeholders—trainees, future students, allied professionals and other related disciplines, governing bodies, corporate culture, public advocacy, collaborative policy consultancy, and political lobbying initiatives that educate social collectives on the value and benefit of psychoanalytic thought.

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James Tyler Carpenter to Merle Molofsky

To read Merle's "What me worry response" (and ponder her important psyche soma references), training experience, and somatic focus, response to Arnie's paper on the vicissitudes of ideology-training and Sigmund Freud's art and science, is to elicit a desire to hug her, complement and underline the importance of keeping alive the robust nature of lay narrative practice and training, but also pay attention to the soma of the psyche, and the onrushing importance of cognitive-affective neuroscience for all practitioners. As practice becomes an important component of an effective and economic healthcare for all, across gender, intersectional, cultural, and behavioral-health and major mental illness treatment in an era of deinstitutionalizing racism and healthcare disparities in an increasingly diverse clientele where sensitivity and sophistication to co-created and culturally informed familiarity with experience is critical to informed care.

Merle's paper: Lay training analysis and integration is @ the nexus of brain-mind science, which was originally one of the major reasons why Freud had to go with a primarily narrative method, that was limited in scope and science with respect to cognitive-affective neuroscience and narrative methodologies.

I would add that what is also important is the way in which psychiatry and mental health in general has been balkanized in ways alien to Freud and good training in general by merchandizing (what Les Havens called the healthcare market place), brief therapies getting hijacked by insurance and interdisciplinary competition and need to contain costs, the narrative-lay approach has been important to keeping psychoanalysis viable, but also applicable across modalities, parameters of technique and technology and consistent with common factors relationship value. As time goes on, therapist-client fit and process, and fit between mixed therapies will. assume more importance.



Response To Arnold Richards' Article, "Psychoanalysis in Crisis: The Danger of Ideology"

Whose Psychoanalysis? What Crisis?

Merle Molofsky, LP

didn't know there was a crisis. I didn't know that there was a risk of psychoanalysts privileging ideology over theory. Yet, when I read Arnold Richards' article, I recognized anew that there are different psychoanalytic worlds. I have read many other articles by Dr. Richards, for whom I have great respect, and several of his articles have given me a window into a psychoanalytic world to which I have no access. Dr. Richards has long been a champion of diversity in psychoanalysis. He recognizes the dangers of "territory-grabbing," "turf-claiming," that excludes all except the "initiated" and "anointed." Indeed, we should have standards. But —whose standards?

I began attending the Symposia in New York City quite a while ago, which Dr. Richards chaired until 2021, exhilarated by the intention of the Symposia to include psychoanalysts from every training institute, every "orientation". And I was overjoyed by the honor of being invited to participate in the 2015 Symposium, "Brain, Mind & Body", to speak on "Mind". Again, I was honored when Dr. Richards invited me to join the Editorial Board of the online journal he founded, *The International Journal for Controversial Discussions* (IJCD), and to contribute articles, and responses to articles, in the journal. It was a sign of his belief that the many varieties of psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic education were welcome under one umbrella.

I earned my place under the umbrella of psychoanalysis when I attended, and graduated from, the Training Institute of NPAP. NPAP, the National Psychological Association for Psychoanalysis, was founded in 1948, when people, mainly psychologists, gathered together for tutorials led by Theodor Reik.

Reik, who had trained with Sigmund Freud in Europe, had fled the Nazis, and emigrated to the United States in 1938. At the time, the American

Psychoanalytic Association (APsaA) allowed Reik to teach, but not to practice, as he was not a physician, he was "only" a psychologist and psychoanalyst of high repute, with notable publications, eventually publishing *Listening with the Third Ear* in 1948. Since APsaA did not accept psychologists as candidates studying psychoanalysis, those who had gathered around Reik formed NPAP. The Training Institute of NPAP is the oldest, largest "non-medical" institute in both American continents, and accepts candidates who have a graduate degree in any discipline, not only "mental health".

Now that I have identified what "flavor" of psychoanalyst I am, and how appreciative I am of Dr. Richards' decades-long dedication to inclusiveness, I will further address the depths of his article, through the lens of my experience in psychoanalysis, compared to his lens of his experience in psychoanalysis.

He immediately defines the scope of his article by saying, "As psychoanalysis limps through the first quarter of the twenty-first century, it is struggling, without much success, to define itself to an increasingly uncomprehending, and sometimes hostile, world."

Does psychoanalysis need to be defended?

That uncomprehending and sometimes hostile world that psychoanalysts with medical credentials, or other "mental health" credentials, encounter, has not had the same kind of impact on someone with my credentials. My credentials are that I am a graduate of a psychoanalytic institute chartered by the State of New York to train candidates in psychoanalysis, completing my education in 1988, and, since New York State began issuing licenses in 2006, I am a licensed psychoanalyst, using the alphabet soup credential of LP. In the 18 years between my graduation and obtaining my license, I had to negotiate the insurance industry's recognition of which forms of "mental health treatment" they would reimburse. Psychoanalysis as a stand-alone discipline was deemed insufficient by many insurance companies. To work with analysands who wanted to use their insurance, but couldn't use it with me, I had to modify my fees, sometimes even accepting fees equal to what their co-pay would have been.

Eventually, even with my shiny new license in psychoanalysis, I still had

to negotiate with insurance companies that refused my credentials, one company even telling me that I held an "inferior" license. Fortunately, the National Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis (NAAP) has people on board who occasionally take on these challenges for their membership.

Dr. Richards re-visits a topic that has long been a subject of discussion in psychoanalytic circles, and which was the topic for Issue One of the IJCD, is psychoanalysis a science or an art. In discussing the scientific aspect of psychoanalysis, Dr. Richards addresses "the forces of medicine and money who maintain that psychoanalysis is not scientific enough to be taken seriously." He answers these "forces," first emphasizing that Freud spoke of psychoanalysis as an empirical science from a pragmatic perspective, setting an example of staying close to the empirical facts, "ready to correct or modify his theories." Thus, from the beginning of his article, Dr. Richards defends psychoanalysis from detractors. Apparently, these detractors seem to be very vocal, dissuading people from entering into psychoanalysis.

My lens here is quite different. Since I am not a scientist, not a medical practitioner, I am not concerned with the nay-sayers that attack psychoanalysis as not sufficiently scientific. People who are referred to me may not know the differences among many forms of psychotherapy, nor the differences among various practitioners, with various credentials. Actually, my referrals come from colleagues with credentials similar to mine, and, from my analysands. Nonetheless, I enjoyed Dr. Richards's answers to the nay-sayers.

Dr. Richards ultra-credibly, and eloquently, points out that psychoanalysis is its own science, different from others, including those he identifies as "so-called human sciences," stressing that the subject of psychoanalysis is the "intangible unconscious," and its instrument is "relationship between two human beings", unique dyads. Verifiable? Quantifiable? Measurable? Provable? I have read several research papers from the psychoanalytic literature that try to establish psychoanalysis as a verifiable science, some using statistics as proof. Yet the issue does not matter to me. I have no axe to grind.... If indeed psychoanalysis can be defined as a science by some, since it matters to some, then so be it. It also can be defined as an art....

In Dr. Richards' consideration of whether psychoanalysis is an art, he cites Loewald as describing psychoanalytic technique as an art, because transference and transference neurosis can be viewed as drama. I remember being quite taken reading two books by Joyce McDougall, *Theaters of the Mind*, and *Theaters of the Body*. Yes, I do experience the "theater" of the psychoanalytic dyad, the transference/countertransference matrix, psychoanalysis as an art form, an art form informed by study, by theory, by knowledge, by experience.

What I deeply respect in Dr. Richards' work is his freedom from "authority," and his recognition that art and science are closely related, yet different facets of the activity of the human mind. When I read his discussion of transference and transference neurosis as fantasy, and also as history and narrative, delineating "psychic reality" and "reality reality", narrative truth and historic truth, I thought of childhood play as practice for adult life, where fantasy interacts with reality. As I considered the role of memory, I thought of going-on-being, of constant flux, of Heraclitus saying that no man ever steps into the same river twice, for it is not the same river and he is not the same man.

As psychoanalytic process involves narrative, initial memories, re-told memories, variations on a theme, deviations from the theme, and as there is narrator and listener, narrator and echoing other narrator, two subjectivities, new possibilities begin to emerge as old, re-hashed narratives and echoes, narratives and interpretations, are revisited. We all step again and again into a new/old river.

A river-theme that we encounter with Dr. Richards' guidance is ideology. He points out the tension between tradition and innovation, received wisdom and new revelations. This is profoundly true, and is true in other disciplines as well. If we allow ourselves to value the tension, we can enjoy the process. If we allow ourselves to gather what is beneficial, what we need, from all possibilities, old and new, if "what was old is new again" as we discover again and again, if what is new is obviously and necessarily derived from what is old, then we can keep discovering the river. The river can be a river of knowledge....

Mark Solms delivered a keynote address at the April 17, 2021 Symposium, in which he emphasized relationships between memory,

consciousness, innate instincts, drives and emotions, and beginning with his concept of the conscious id, in a sense liberating the id from the confines of the unconscious. He drew heavily on Freud, exploring how new awarenesses are formed, how consciousness arises rather than memory traces, in a sense using the authority of the founder of psychoanalysis. As I listened, I recognized that I think of Mark Solms as an eminent authority in the field of neuropsychoanalysis, and realized that he was drawing on a 2013 article of his that I once had read, "The Conscious Id." In his last paragraph he says, "Still I will end with a whimper rather than a bang. Neuroscience is no more the final court of appeal for psychoanalysis than psychoanalysis is for neuroscience. The final court of appeal for psychoanalysts is the *clinical* situation."

His conclusion provides the reader with the opportunity to find freedom from authority.

Mark J. Blechner offers a similar opportunity to find freedom from authority, in his 2018 groundbreaking book, *The Mindbrain and Dreams*. In Part III, he offers a chapter title, "How neuropsychoanalysis and clinical psychoanalysis can learn from each other." The title of Part III, "Dreams, knowledge, emotion, and the mindbrain," introduces the possibility that we can affirm a neurobiological substratum of a continuity, an overlapping, of rationality and irrationality. In that expansive substratum, "the specifics of bizarre dream experiences may help identify the different components of perceptual processing" (p. 241). In a sense, we learn that our mindbrain knows what we don't know. Is there an authority? Do we possess our own inner authority, do we need to do so? Is there something within us that provides a sense of inner authority, making us able to relate to external authority?

In his concluding paragraph, with the heading **Dreams and the substrate of thought**, Blechner speaks of fluidity. His book closes with this sentence: "By being formulated in extralinguistic terms, some dreams allow us to transform mental concepts without the constraints of language, leading to creative and generative thinking" (pp. 303–304). Perhaps language itself seems to be a final authority, an authority that can be challenged by dream.

I dream of freedom from authority.

Can we obtain freedom from authority? Dr. Richards describes a psychoanalytic authoritarian tradition in APsaA and BoPS that I never will be privileged to encounter, since I don't have the credentials that these organizations require. He describes authoritarian power in which expulsion perpetuates itself, what seems like a winnowing out of potentially dangerous to the authority "heretical" thought. Does this limit individual thought, innovation? Sometimes dissidents defiantly leave, and something new is engendered. We must be careful. That "something new" may ossify, may become authoritarian.

Dr. Richards speaks of expulsion as the Shadow of the Founder, perpetuating authoritarian style. He points out that ideology in psychoanalysis is similar to dogma in religion, wittily comparing the "sexual unconscious" with "God" as something that must be believed in to satisfy the authorities, with "libido" as shibboleth.

I was reminded of my experience team-teaching at a branch of CUNY in the 1970's with a truly visionary innovator and intellectual, Sister Ruth Dowd, who was a founder of Harlem Preparatory School, and held two PhDs. The Supreme Court had made a landmark decision in 1973 in the case of Roe vs. Wade, and a small group of faculty members were discussing the issue of reproductive rights. Sister Ruth Dowd came down firmly on the side of women's reproductive rights. I was shocked. I said, "But you are a Roman Catholic nun. You took a vow of obedience. You just took a stance in opposition to the Church." She smiled broadly, and said, "Yes, I took a vow of obedience, and I honor it. They can tell me where to go, and what to do, but they cannot tell me what to think."

I hope that we as psychoanalysts have similar courage, and advocate for what we truly believe. Dr. Richards does. He proclaims, "Psychoanalysis is neither ideology nor theology, but rather an intellectually stimulating and emotionally rewarding endeavor—a human and humane endeavor...."

Amen.

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Introduction

James Tyler Carpenter to Joel Weinberger

By way of personal revelation, and perhaps a felt sense of guilt and a reason to recuse myself, it is necessary for me to say that Professor Weinberger is my oldest professional friend; and, a fellow traveler from a shared beginning that had a common origin in our dissertation related research based on the paradigm of an academic-clinical psychoanalyst, the late NYU Professor of Psychology Lloyd Silverman, to our current positions as clinical-empirically focused psychologists.

Like others of our generation, hatched in the cultural Donnybrooks of the 60s and 70s, through to the current chaos of dismantling yet again the often-hapless enterprise of scientific culture. We were and are intimately informed by psychoanalytic history; and, influenced but set off on the roads less taken by many others. I bequeathed my tachistoscope and best wishes to Joel, and the fruits of his labors that are briefly reviewed in his paper.

Like several of the invited authors in this volume, as well as Dr. Richards, the author of the issue's theme itself, Professor Weinberger's paper enumerates the specific ways in which psychoanalysis has both developed and fallen short of its collective vision. In short the reason is, too much focus on the narrative and not enough on integrative, programmatic science. For the reader and or beginning or mature scientist, Professor Weinberger's paper is a close to exhaustive referencing of the tributaries of paradigmatic, scientific research on unconscious processing ranging from neuroscience to cognitive perceptual psychology, under all the generative terms it is now pursued by. This paper and Professor Weinberger's comprehensive text on research on the unconscious, is not only a handy catchup for those who would like to pursue this avenue that Freud opened up, but a link to research that couldn't be done at the time Freud turned from his "Project for a Scientific Psychology", to the route of a more empirical examination of the possibilities of his patients' clinical narratives of embedded and embodied, but mysterious mental suffering.



The Crisis of Isolation Psychoanalysis Has Created

Joel Weinberger, Ph.D.

Dr. Richards says that psychoanalysis is in crisis. To support his argument, he notes that there are fewer analytic candidates and patients than there used to be, it has become more difficult to get insurance to cover the costs of psychoanalytic treatment, and the number of psychoanalytically-oriented professionals in the academy and hospitals has decreased. Perhaps most worrisome is the loss of public interest in and support of psychoanalysis. Dr. Richards discusses issues in science, art, and ideology as underlying these problems. I agree but have a bit of a different take on it. I believe that one of the main reasons, if not the main reason, that psychoanalysis is in trouble is its widespread and self-created isolation. Psychoanalysis has disconnected itself from science, other disciplines, and the public.

Psychoanalysis and Science

Psychoanalysis seems uninterested in developments in psychology and other sciences beyond the narrow confines of psychoanalytic treatment. For example, there is now a huge literature on unconscious processes (Weinberger & Stoycheva, 2020). For the most part, psychoanalytically oriented practitioners and theorists are not conversant with it. In fact, they tend to know almost nothing about it. If I use the terms implicit memory, implicit learning, automaticity, cognitive heuristics, the primacy of affect (or cognition), implicit motives, or attribution theory, it is my bet that most analysts know little to nothing about the work in these areas. Yet, there is a huge literature in each. Freud (1926) once said that psychoanalysis is the study of the unconscious. So how it is that the discipline that identifies itself with unconscious processes does not feel the need to know what others have said about it?

Another huge literature has devoted itself to trying to understand how the brain and mind work, something Freud abandoned early on because there was not enough known then. Computational neuroscience has done the most work here. There are three main approaches to this question in computational neuroscience: massive modularity (Kurzban, 2011), connectionism (McClelland & Rumerhart, 1986,—PDP), and neural reuse (Anderson, 2014). One sees nary a mention of any of these in the psychoanalytic literature. It is as though scholarly work that is not directly about treating a patient is not of interest. As though understanding how the mind and brain work normatively is not relevant to treating people who also happen to have minds and brains. Psychoanalytic theory was once a theory of the human mind which could be applied to treatment (Brenner, 1974). No more.

Even research on psychotherapy tends to be unknown as does research on psychotropic medication. Nary a word in the psychoanalytic literature on these either. I have never understood why so many have believed that the only way to study the human mind is through case studies of psychoanalytic treatment. Yet that position has been argued as both the only scientific approach for psychoanalysis (e.g., Brenner, 1982) from those who profess a belief in science and as a non-scientific way of obtaining knowledge from those who abjure the application of science to psychoanalysis (e.g., Hoffman, 1998). Do psychoanalysts in the consulting room really have a monopoly on understanding the human condition? Is treatment really a microscope or telescope and there is no other way to do it? Are scientific approaches completely hopeless? These ways of dealing with the human condition seem oddly narrow.

Here are a couple of very cursory examples of what the scientific world is up to vis a vis the unconscious. Implicit memory research has shown that the brain structures underlying explicit, conscious, memory does not really begin to develop until about age three. But implicit, unconscious, memory is present from birth. That means that people still act as though they remember something that they deny any conscious recollection of. But repression is not a factor here. There is no infantile amnesia. This is just how the brain develops. Implicit learning research has shown that people tend to unconsciously infer causality when two events co-occur. Patients clearly act as though they believe certain things while denying any knowledge of those beliefs. (This can also partly underlie implicit bias.) But this is not necessarily defensive. Life history is critically important to understanding these beliefs, as psychoanalysis has long understood. But defensive functioning may be less implicated than heretofore believed. It is normative to develop these unconscious beliefs.

And they may or may not be adaptive depending upon what events co-occurred in the person's life. Attribution theory has shown that there is a normative bias for people to understand the actions of others as due to their personality or character whereas their own behaviors seem more explicable via the situation they found themselves in. Patients, being humans, often explain their behaviors as due to the situation. Analysts, being human, are prone to see these behaviors as attributable to character. The analyst may then see the patient as defensive and/or resistant. The patient may see the analyst as unempathic and unwilling to understand the circumstances they encountered. Either may be true or neither may be. Without being knowledgeable about normative attributional bias (called correspondence bias in the literature), misunderstandings and ruptures could occur. There are many more such possibilities and possible examples (cf. Weinberger & Stoycheva, 2020). But analysts are typically ignorant of this literature and so often cannot take account of these things.

Anti-Science

Then there is the popular belief in psychoanalytic circles that science does not apply to psychoanalysis. At all. The argument is that the psychoanalytic process is too complex and individualistic to be captured by science. Science is too reductionistic to capture the richness of psychoanalytic interactions. In fact, science is a negative as it relates to psychoanalysis (Hoffman, 1998; Stern, 1997). People who hold such views seem to have bought Popper's (1963) critique of the enterprise as being inherently unscientific and made it an asset. Now, understanding a bit about normative psychological processes is not only not relevant (see above), it could not possibly be of benefit and may even be harmful. Besides, Popper has been brilliantly responded to and, to my mind, refuted by Grunbaum (1984). Grunbaum showed, through what he called the "tally argument", that psychoanalysis is very amenable to scientific scrutiny. But, he said, psychoanalysts do not tend to test and/or expand it in this way. There seems to be a lack of will to do so, with some small exceptions (e.g., Shevrin, Bond, Brakel, Hertel, & Williams 1996; Silverman & Weinberger, 1985).

Isolation from the Outside World

Science is not the only area from which psychoanalysts have isolated

themselves. The psychoanalytically inclined tend to talk to one another and to no one else (Malcolm, 1981). Part of this is historical. Analysts created institutes that are inhabited by other analysts. One needs to undergo stringent and lengthy initiation to be admitted. And then there is little contact with the outside world beyond seeing the dwindling number of patients that are treated by the members of these institutes. There are debates, often bitter between institutes. How many sessions a week constitute true analysis? Should one focus on classical issues? On objects? On the self? On relational issues? On subjectivity? Who is really an analyst? How many angels can dance on the head of a pin? There is little effort to contact the outside world. There is little effort expended to communicate these ideas to the outside world. There is no effort to explain them in ways that an intelligent lay person would understand. Instead, discussion takes place within.

Talking to echo chambers tends not to move the interests of the parties involved. The world does not care about these esoterica. But the world does care about mental health and health care. The country and the world are having important and powerful debates about these things. Cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT), the American Psychological Association (APA), the American Psychiatric Association (also APA) and government agencies are big parts of this. Psychoanalysis is not. To the public, psychoanalysis appears elitist and uninterested. It can't be bothered talking to them. They wouldn't understand anyway.

Information Available to the Public

Imagine yourself a member of the lay public. You are interested in psychotherapeutic treatment. So you Google it. Or, you look for books about it. You will find online psychotherapy that announces to you that you deserve to be happy (<a href="https://www.betterhelp.com/helpme/?utm_source=Ad-Words&utm_medium=Search_PPC_c&utm_term=psychotherapy-e&utm_content=112453039375&network=g&placement=&target=&matchtype=e&utm_campaign=2079213825&ad_type=text&adposition=&gclid=Cj0KCQjwp86EBhD7ARIsAFkgakg3IsOkXbabiVyPvk-p6DwLIGzh1_JNfriM7RHPHEglA4sk73dQeoxYaAqBEEALw_wc-B¬_found=1&gor=helpme). You will discover many references to "evidence-based" psychotherapy which sounds meaningful but is a code word for CBT. Psychoanalytic treatment also has evidence but, with few

exceptions (e.g., Shedler, 2010), you will not see that discussed. Here is a list of evidence based therapies listed right up front in Google search (Bold in original):

Evidence-based Therapies

- * Applied Behavior Analysis.
- ***** Behavior therapy.
- * Cognitive behavioral therapy.
- * Cognitive therapy.
- * Family therapy.
- * Dialectical behavior therapy.
- * Interpersonal psychotherapy.
- * Motivational Interviewing.

Psychoanalysis and psychodynamic therapy are conspicuously missing. Here is how cognitive behavior therapy is defined immediately in Google (bold in original):

"CBT is evidence-based. This means it's been clinically proven to work. CBT is continuously evolving by what is called "empirical evidence" or "evidence-based-practice", and this form of psychotherapy constantly synchronises (sic) with the latest recommendations from the research suggesting what works best."

If you go to the American Psychiatric Association website (assuming you have not been captured by the myriad of claims and sites before you see it and assuming you care about what professionals might say), you will see a superficial description of what psychotherapy is and what it can do (https://www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/psychotherapy). Then you will see a listing of types of psychotherapy. First on that list is CBT. It also has the longest description. Fifth is psychoanalysis, which is described in one sentence ("Psychoanalysis is a more intensive form of psychodynamic therapy. Sessions are typically conducted three or more times a week."). Psychodynamic psychotherapy (4th on the list)

has a bit more space and is above psychoanalysis. And this is one of the better sites for psychoanalysis. If you Google CBT, you will see only positive evaluations summarized. Only if you specifically ask for criticisms on Google, will you see anything negative and even that is mild (e.g., "Disadvantages of CBT. To benefit from CBT, you need to commit yourself to the process. ... Some critics argue that because CBT only addresses current problems and focuses on specific issues, it does not address the possible underlying causes of mental health conditions, such as an unhappy childhood."). In contrast, if you Google psychoanalysis, you will see a myriad of criticisms immediately, e.g., "The psychoanalytic approach offers no proper scientific evidence for the ideas it proposes. That is because Freud's theories do not follow the standard scientific protocol that is used in most scientific disciplines (i.e., physics, chemistry, etc.".) You have to search to get anything positive; exactly the opposite of CBT.

If you Google a diagnostic category, you get references to medication and CBT. Virtually nothing about psychoanalysis. If you watch TV and see ads about mental health and/or psychotherapy, you will see references to medication and CBT. You will see them touted as scientifically based. You will see nothing or next to nothing about psychoanalysis.

I teach an introductory psychology course. I had to search to find a text-book (Kowalski & Westen, 2010) that didn't declare psychoanalysis to be largely lacking in empirical support and I am under constant pressure to choose a more "current" text. I make a point of discussing both psychoanalytic theory and practice in my class. I also discuss psychodynamic treatment and theory. I give simple clinical examples. Late in the semester, I have class members do presentations for the class as part of their grade. Many choose to discuss psychopathology and treatment. Invariably, their presentations indicate that CBT and drugs are the way to go. Why? Because that is what they find when they look it up. If this is happening when people are explicitly presented with and are tested on psychodynamic concepts by someone who is motivated to present them fairly and positively, imagine what people without this exposure are thinking and feeling?

The Consequences of Psychoanalytic Isolation

When you do not engage in a dialogue or debate, you give over the

narrative to those who do. Psychoanalysis has largely eschewed science. Some have been actively hostile to it. So the scientific narrative belongs to others and the term "evidence based" now means cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT). That is what the media and major professional organizations communicate to the public and that is what is therefore associated with respectable, useful treatment. When you do not explain what it is that you do, there either is no narrative or the narrative becomes the property of those who will explain it for you. Those others are the media, the insurance companies, the government, and proponents of alternative forms of treatment. When all you seem to do is argue with one another, the impression is that there are no real central principles to the enterprise.

The upshot of all of this is that psychoanalysis is seen as unscientific, not based on any evidence, anachronistic, self-involved, elitist, overly long, and overly expensive. Unless you are intrinsically motivated to investigate more deeply, that is the narrative. Why would it then surprise anyone that it is in crisis? Of course it is. Moreover, much of the problem is self-inflicted or due to neglect. And the field seems to take no responsibility for this. It is the fault of others and of society. We have done nothing wrong and we need not change anything. People and society should value what we do and if they don't, that is on them. If we had a patient who displayed these characteristics, we would diagnose a character disorder.

What to Do?

So what is the treatment? First, is insight. The field needs to realize that there is a serious problem. It needs to realize that much of its problems are self-inflicted. It needs to open up to areas that are not explicitly psychoanalytic. It would be nice to see some articles that do not solely reference papers from other psychoanalytic journals. Learn what other people are doing in their efforts to understand the mind and brain. Maybe some of it is valuable. Information is not exclusive to the consulting room. If some work does not pass the smell test, OK. But know what you are rejecting and why. What is wrong with it? Be able to discuss it intelligently. Don't simply declare it to be bad. Ignorance needs to go. Dismissal of non-psychoanalytic sources of knowledge needs to go.

Psychoanalysis needs to realize that even if some of its problems are

dues to external forces, that does not justify turning a blind eye to them. Righteous indignation changes nothing. Relationally, the field needs to open up communications with the outside community. Explain what they do in language that intelligent lay people can understand. Take back the evidence narrative. What we do has plenty of evidence behind it (cf. Shedler, 2010). Case studies are also evidence. Clinical experience matters. Explain why. Take on other approaches when they attack us. Don't give up the narrative. Talk to the media. They control the societal narrative. Get on and make the case. Just as it is important to learn from others, it is important to let others know what we have. Psychoanalysis, incomplete and insulated as it is, has the best overall understanding of any model of humans out there. Why keep it to ourselves?

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Introduction by Jane Hall to the review of *The Future of Psychoanalysis: The Debate About the Training Analyst System* by Peter Zagermann

Reviewed by Alan Karbelnig

The Future of Psychoanalysis: The Debate About the Training Analyst, System by Peter Zagermann, a collection of essays about the category of training analysis, pro and con, tackles one of the oldest problems in the education of candidates. It is a debate that has been going on since its beginnings and one that should be resolved once and for all. Unfortunately, the title of 'training analyst' holds great appeal because it worn by those who seem to need a special title.

In actuality the designation involves both politics and a willingness to jump through hoops that harken back to an orthodox approach. It is also a title bestowed on some who have produced erudite books thereby making a name for themselves.

True, there are fine people who apply and who do fine work but there are many fine analysts who are not interested in hoop jumping.

In any case, this book and the entire topic have been shunned by the field by those who arrange conferences and aside from one meeting at an IPA conference in 2019, which was a disappointment to this writer, no space has been given to address the topic openly. The thinking seems to be that if we ignore it, it will go away.

The review by Alan Karbelnig and its publication in IJCC shines new light on the topic and hopefully it will attract a forum of discussants. Otherwise, as Noam Chomsky said: "The intellectual tradition [of the training analyst system in this case] is one of servility to power, and if I didn't betray it I'd be ashamed of myself."



Resuscitating the (Nearly) Dead Profession of Psychoanalysis

A Review of and Comment on Zagermann, P. (Ed.) (2018). The Future of Psychoanalysis: The Debate about the Training Analyst System

Alan Michael Karbelnig, Ph.D., ABPP

hile my wife and I enjoyed a post-millennium dinner in New York's SoHo neighborhood, our companion uttered a prescient, if disheartening, predication about our discipline. Married to a psychoanalyst, the scholar in comparative literature quipped, "We share a devotion to dying professions." Indeed, unless we immediately institute drastic reforms in training and certifying psychoanalysts, our wobbling profession will expire. It will die the same way Toynbee thought civilizations end—by committing suicide. The ever-louder voices heralding psychoanalysis' demise have become a deafening roar. Rangell (1974), long concerned with the field's future, believes psychoanalysis shares "the history of the 20th century: expansion, diffuse application, use and misuse, explosion, disaster" (p. 3). Holt (1985) writes, "the foundations of our house are tottering" (p. 305). Stepansky (2009) coins the word "fractionation" (p. xvii) and, along with Aron and Starr (2013), worries psychoanalysis' lack of coherence will bring its demise. In addition to the infighting evident in rivalries between professional associations, journals' editorial boards, and institutes, the field is increasingly attacked by better branded, mainstream treatments like cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) and psychopharmacology.

Although Zagermann's book focuses mostly on debates regarding the Training Analyst (TA) system, the title, *The Future of Psychoanalysis*, betrays its wider scope. I begin reviewing and commenting upon the book with the brief story of my own Certification and TA experience. Next, I carefully summarize, analyze, and synthesize the papers constituting Zagermann's book. I close by proposing a model for saving psychoanalysis based, in part, on the contributor's ideas. Although Zagermann's

collection of articles supposedly offered differing viewpoints on the Training Analyst (TA) system, most authors argue for its dismantling. Joining Kernberg (1986, 1996, 2000, 2014), they use phrases like "suicide prevention" and "twilight" when discussing its effect. Most suggest replacing the TA component of the tripartite model with a didactic psychoanalysis. Some wax poetically on the nature of the profession. Eizirik, for example, ends his chapter by citing a Brazilian playwright saying,

I am simply a man of the theater. I always was and always will be a man of the theater. Anyone capable of dedicating their entire life to the humanity and passion on these few meters of stage is a man of the theater. (p. 86)

We psychoanalysts also bring dedication, humanity, and passion to the theaters of our consulting rooms (Karbelnig, 2020). However, hope for our future rests not with reflective humanism but with political organization. Saving our profession requires fundamental, structural re-organization of psychoanalytic training processes. It requires development of an objective assessment of psychoanalytic competency. More on that soon but, meanwhile, and as promised, I share the story of my tortuous path to TA status. Robert Pyles, former president of the American Psychoanalytic Association (APsaA), suffered much like me. When a close friend of his asked him if preparing for Certification was neurotic, Pyles replied, "Neurotic? It was fucking suicidal" (p. 241). My tale, but one brief anecdote, symbolizes, like Pyles', the pressing need for change.

A Training Analyst Massacre

My achieving Certification by the APsaA, followed by anointment into the once-cherished TA priesthood, occurred in 2008. Regarding his similarly awful experience, Pyles cites Mark Twain's quip: Pyles cites Mark Twain's quip that the "primary difference between education and a massacre, is that a massacre is more sudden." My massacre-like experience was definitely sudden. Worse, it was a poor assessment of competency. It felt more like a fraternity hazing. One of the cases I presented to the three-person panel, in written and oral form, concerned an analysand who had a sexual encounter with her previous psychotherapist. I reported that, because I was practicing as a psychologist in California, I handed her the pamphlet titled "Professional Therapy Never Involves Sex." I described how I carefully considered the transference,

countertransference, and potential unconscious effects of presenting the document. In response, and as our two-hour in-depth discussion drew to a close, a classically trained psychoanalyst on the panel remarked, "Dr. Karbelnig, I find delivering your patient this pamphlet troubling." I scrambled to reply. In the few minutes remaining, and while tremulous from the norepinephrine flooding my central nervous system, I explained I was required to provide patients victimized by a health care provider's sexual misconduct the pamphlet. Failure to do so risked charges of criminal misconduct. The examiner remained sufficiently disturbed to fail me. Although subsequently invited to submit another set of case materials and present for yet another interview, I instead wrote a detailed, angry letter explaining what appeared to be, at least, an unjust misunderstanding if not harassment or abuse. By return mail, I received the notification of my having been Certified. My experience, combined with countless similar stories from friends, colleagues, and Pyles himself, validates his belief the TA process has a "disastrous effect on our profession" (p. 223).

The Major Themes of Zagermann's Tome

The contributors to Zagermann's book cover three central themes. They review the history of psychoanalytic training models; they critique the TA system, and; they (unwittingly) illustrate the problem with *discussion* itself. Most authors acknowledge how the Eitingon training model, introduced in Berlin in 1920, became the prototype for future psychoanalytic training programs. They agree the TA process has not significantly evolved since the reporting requirement ended. Garza-Guerrero compares and contrasts the Eitingon, French, and Uruguayan training models. Many contributors review myriad, failed efforts at reform, called for incorporation into universities, and suggested a greater emphasis on science.

All but three of the authors demand ending the TA procedure as it currently exists. Including the introduction, the book has 15 chapters. Twelve contributors emphatically recommend replacing the TA system with a didactic or personal analysis. Spoto seems ambiguous, thinking training should include a five-session-per-week analysis. De Filc, although requesting democratic reforms, shows ambivalence about TAs. Only Barros unequivocally considers the TA essential, writing,

"psychoanalytic education involves a great transformation of the candidate's emotional structure" (p. 185). The other contributors often use the same words—authoritarian, stultifying, hierarchical, cult-like, creativity-destroying, archaic, sectarian, abusive, infantilizing, anti-scientific, subjective, violent, arbitrary, secretive, competitive, dogmatic, inhibiting, and sadomasochistic—to describe the TA system's deleterious effects.

Most importantly, the articles themselves reveal the paralysis preventing psychoanalysis from maturing into an established, internationally recognized, and respected profession. Barros goes so far as to call for further examination of ideological, theoretical and philosophical bases of the TA concept. But, one wonders, when will examination prove sufficient? In isomorphic fashion, the book exposes the problem with organizing the psychoanalytic project: Unless a group of practitioners take radical, revisionist action, the field will remain plagued by well-meaning psychoanalysts who, while yearning for legitimacy, endlessly debate and deliberate. In confirmation, Bolognini advocates for adding a fourth element to the tripartite model, namely "the capacity to work together..." (p. xix). It is beyond ironic, even if accurate, for such a recommendation to require articulation.

Turning to the contributors, and beginning with Bolognini's forward, psychoanalysts surely need to be kinder and gentler but, in his view, integration into universities will not happen. The first chapter, by Berman, stresses his belief that psychoanalytic training institutions suffer the "Eitingon syndrome" (Zusman, 1988/2003, p. 353), an illness creating a hierarchical system of high priests and congregants. He cites Kernberg (1986) who writes, "idealization processes and an ambience of persecution are practically universal in psychoanalytic institutes" (p. 815). Years of intensive conflict ensued, Berman reports, as his fellow members of the Israeli Psychoanalytic Institute (IPI) addressed the TA system's inherent power differential. Infighting led to the expulsion of some candidates in the 1980s. The hierarchical rigidity began dissolving in the 1990s, although arguments lingered between the "traditionalists" and the "reformists." The IPI barely avoided the outright splits occurring within many institutes. Ultimately, democratically determined reforms created a "less rigid, less hierarchical, and less persecutory" (p. 31) environment. Berman believes achieving TA status should require only five years post-graduation.

Blum describes the workings of Ernest Jones' "secret committee," which convened after Jung's defection. Formed with Freud's consent, the group constituted "the aristocratic parents of the family romance of early psychoanalysis" (p. 37). This pattern, the Platonic ideal of repetition compulsion, replicated malignantly. Failure to achieve TA status, Blum thinks, created a caste system which "represented castration and narcissistic humiliation for the aspiring analyst" (p. 40). TAs became "special," a self-perpetuating, self-selecting group, ultimately creating an "encapsulated, entrenched, narcissistic, controlling clique" (p. 41). Blum initially anticipates the IPA and the APsaA will agree on a means for standardizing the TA system. Later, though, his capacity for testing reality is restored. He calls such potential consensus a "noble concept," a hoped-for "future reality" (p. 51), and one exemplifying why Freud considered psychoanalysis an impossible profession. Meanwhile, Blum also believes psychoanalytic institutes should automatically elevate graduates with five years of post-graduate experience to TA status.

Eisold critiques the common practice of psychoanalytic institutes empowering their education committees to evaluate candidates, approve courses, select faculty, and choose TAs in accordance with the Eitingon "gold standard." He admires Kernberg's efforts, writing "his spirit of irreverence was perhaps even more striking and a source of hope for reform" (p. 55). Like many of his fellow authors, Eisold appreciates the buzz Kernberg creates but laments the lack of any meaningful change. It is ironic, he notes, that fewer patients seek psychoanalysis while "the demand for psychotherapy is rising and the need for mental health services is increasingly recognized" (p. 62). What needs to change? Eisold, too, calls for reforming the TA system, replacing it with a personal analysis conducted by "an adequately trained analyst" (p. 81). He darkly anticipates resistance, though, writing, "change must come, if only the slow change of decline and eventual failure" (p. 68). The next paper, by Eizirik, recommends integrating elements of the Uruguayan model with Eitingon's, also concluding, like Eisold, that any well-trained society member could serve as a TA.

Like Berman, Spoto acknowledges limitations in her viewpoint because of her primary experience with the British Psychoanalytic Society (BPS). Like nearly all other contributors, she laments the "loss of power and influence" (p. 92) of psychoanalytic institutions. Similarly echoing

her colleagues' cries, Spoto critiques the "reductive tribalism of 'he is one of us' or 'she is not one of us,' or 'he/she is a real analyst'" (p. 99). Regarding the TA question, Spoto finds its status problematic. However, her position on the TA question is unclear. Regarding training programs, she writes, "for me, this includes five times a week training analysis" (p. 107).

The book's focus shifts with Garza-Guerrero's contribution. He pessimistically describes psychoanalytic education as existing somewhere between marginalization and irrelevance. He, too, thinks we need to bring psychoanalysis into the university system. Further, he writes, the field's cult-like origins require excision. The lack of systems for accreditation, certification, continuing education and re-certification threaten the discipline's future. However, with proper reforms, he believes the "ostensible syncretistic and dysfunctional activities should disappear entirely" (p. 130). He calls for creating "an international, truly facilitating and innovative committee for psychoanalytic training and research" (p. 128). He believes, as I do, that theoretical pluralism is the ultimate fate of clinical psychoanalysis. Organizational systems like the International New Groups Committee (INGC) strive to create an overarching accreditation system, he notes, but Garza-Guerrero considers them overly bureaucratic, dysfunctional, and expensive. His position on the TA system is crystal clear: "The training analyst system should be abolished" (p. 126), replaced by a didactic analysis conducted by any qualified psychoanalyst.

Next come the well-known students of psychoanalysis' unstable fault lines, Kernberg and Michels. Both men, actively involved in governance and education in psychoanalysis, suggest including more scientific training of psychoanalysts along with integration into the university system. They agree on the import of the training analysis but consider any graduate psychoanalyst qualified to provide one. They recommend psychoanalytic training focus on knowledge, technical ability, and the psychoanalytic attitude—meaning an understanding of the unconscious mind—and also incorporate modules on psychoanalytic psychotherapy. They propose establishing two new organizations.

Provocatively calling TAs a "roadblock in psychoanalytic education" (p. 161), Kirsner believes psychoanalysis' cult-like trends have led to crisis in, and decline of, psychoanalytic institutions. Such divisiveness

is problematic regardless of theoretical orientation, professional licensure, or geographical location. In reviewing the history of psychoanalytic training, Kirsner notes that short didactic analyses—considered adequate during psychoanalysis' early years—morphed into longer training analyses over the years. He critiques Fenichel, Gill, and Fleming (1980) who considered the TA, "a decisive person in the life of a candidate" (p. 25) (italics Kirsner's). Instead, he argues, TAs lead necessarily to a weakening of candidates' ego functioning and create "paranoiagenic institutions" (p. 173). Kirsner unequivocally advocates for the elimination of the TA system.

Turning away from the TA question and towards psychoanalytic education, Barros identifies critical points for reflection. He notes how IPA-approved models, Uruguayan, French, and Eitingon's, share basic tripartite structures. Their differences lie mostly in how they interrelate. Unlike many fellow contributors, Barros believes TAs define "the specificity of psychoanalytic practice and thinking in relation to other forms of psychological approaches" (p. 180). He considers a training analysis necessary to create a "great transformation of the candidate's emotional structure" (p. 185), considering it the "very condition for an individual to become an analyst" (p. 185).

Meyer psychoanalyzes the institutional enactment of the TA system itself. However, and revealing psychoanalytic scholars' urgent need for professional editors, he uses the Latin phrase, tout court—which means simply, or with no addition or amplification—at least 30 times. Tout court, Meyer critiques the "superior," "aristocratic aura" (p. 198), hierarchical, and fetish-like nature of the TA, noting it fuses the infantile determinants of transference with ones created by the TA system itself. He writes, "The training analysis is not the 'other person' of the transference; he is always the same person, sustained by the institutional function" (p. 212). The resultant Oedipal triangle cannot be resolved because it is systemically embedded. In final conclusion, and boldly stating his position on the TA situation, he writes: "Training analysis is, as such, a singular illustration of the battle of psychoanalysis against itself" (p. 215).

Next comes Pyles' amusingly titled paper, "Still Crazy after All These Years," in which he expresses unequivocal disdain for the TA system,

noting profession "can no longer afford it" (p. 223). He describes how the psychoanalysts founding the Psychoanalytic Institute of New England East (PINE) strived to avoid the TA trap. However, they ended up having the APsaA require them to adopt it. Together with Warren Procci, the APsaA president just before him, Pyles created the PPP proposal—a set of ideas for reforming the TA selection process—which was destined to "ignite another firestorm" (p. 243). The APsaA's Board of Professional Standards (BOPS) prevented any meaningful discussion of the PPP. He writes, "It seemed startingly clear once more that even the mere discussion of the TA system was incredibly threatening to the BOPS membership" (p. 243). The PPP proposal led seven members of the BOPS to file a lawsuit against the APsaA, its own parent organization. Pyles believes the BOPS leadership had been at the "forefront of APsaA's exclusionary policies for the past sixty years" (p. 245), creating "a complete stranglehold on training" (p. 245). He concludes again, "the training analyst system is a terrible one" (p. 249).

Working in the field since 1949, Wallerstein wonders whether or not organized psychoanalysis can ever create an optimal education. He calls for "a total demolition of the entire training structure" (p. 285), advocating replacing it with one emphasizing eight components including university affiliation, training in psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic psychotherapy, addressing professional affairs, treatment and research components, fundraising, and long-range strategic planning. De Filc's chapter traces historical changes and transformations in psychoanalytic training, recommending such reforms as the increased use of instructional technology and remote learning. Joining Bolognini, she also believes we psychoanalysts, a la Rodney King, need to get along better. She calls for "democratic institutions that are open to dialogue within and without them" (p. 295). On the one hand, she endorses a less rigid training system including a personal analysis. On the other hand, de Filc fails to take a clear stance on the TA question. She concludes by writing, "Only by being open-minded and receptive to the outside and to the inside—by giving all our members and candidates a voice—shall our institutions continue to be living, dynamic entities" (p. 308). Her tone, like that of many of her co-contributors, emanates kindliness, well-meaning, and care. In the final analysis, though, it represents just more talk. She offers no real, actionable proposals for change.

Zagermann deservedly renders his chapter, "theses on the heart of darkness," the final one. He considers the TA system a "pathological institutional structure" (p. 326). As long as it remains, he argues, no creativity and forward movement can occur. He, too, identifies how unresolved Oedipal themes create a two-tiered hierarchy in psychoanalytic institutes. TAs have symbolically resolved the Oedipal struggle, he notes, while non-TAs are relegated to an infantile position. Also, and most interestingly, Zagermann highlights the incestuous problem inherent in psychoanalytic training. He writes, "incest—because of the exclusion of the third—is the psychic signature of infertility, and, thus, of agenerativity and anti-generativity" (p. 320). His proposed solutions? Immediately cancel the local privilege of nomination for TA, and replace it with a system in which individual institutes promote qualified TAs who are later certified by a national organization. Like many of his co-authors, Zagermann's tone is gloomy. He laments the lack of reforms, the historical break-ups, and the "indisputable dimension of perfidy and vileness when these conflicts are in process or are being suppressed" (p. 316). Calling for a more democratic training system, he considers current training operations, overseen by TA-dominated training committees, as "a demonic power, which, once erupted, can hardly be tamed..." (p. 326).

Having critically reviewed the articles filling Zagermann's 351-page book, readers comprehend the problem with psychoanalysts' propensity to talk, ruminate, and obsess. It is an organizational hazard. We spend our professional lives reflecting, dissecting, reviewing, and discussing. With all due respect, the book itself demonstrates why efforts to create a widely-accepted, respected profession of psychoanalysis fail. Echoing how attorneys' characters stunts growth in the realm of therapeutic jurisprudence, psychoanalysts' styles cause more argument than action. Barros, for example, wants still further discussion. De Filc investigates many interesting concepts—none translatable into achievable tasks. Professions like medicine, law, and accounting created accrediting and certifying agencies with facility. Why? Their forward movement was not retarded by interminable dialogues. Their ranks include persons with the organizational and political skills most psychoanalysts lack.

Pyles' and Wallerstein's articles validate our field's failure to create a credible profession. Garza-Guerrero's call for "an international, truly facilitating and innovative committee for psychoanalytic training and

research" (p. 128) remains unanswered. Emerging from the ashes of the BOPS lawsuit, the American Association for Psychoanalytic Education (AAPE) now exists. However, only seven of the 31 institute-members of the APsaA accept its terms. Outside of the APsaA, the Accreditation Council for Psychoanalytic Education (ACPE) has also appeared. It, too, has a marginal following. Garza-Guerrero believes the International New Groups Committee (INGC) is overly bureaucratic, dysfunctional, and expensive. None of these organizations address certification. Like many cited above, and as Garza-Guerrero proclaimed, our discipline will indeed "continue to struggle with marginalization and irrelevance" (p. 133) until, at the very least, psychoanalysis establishes a legitimate international accreditation and certification agency.

Creating a Profession of Psychoanalysis

By separating the clinical from the theoretical, as George Klein (1976) did a half-century ago, creating a psychoanalytic profession becomes less complicated. A new international organization tasked with certifying psychoanalysts, and accrediting training institutions, need concern itself with clinical practice alone. Just like how physicians practicing medicine differ from those running research laboratories, clinical psychoanalysts form a category different from academic or research psychoanalysts. In truth, they already practice a distinct profession. They share expertise in a unique transformative method, generally working in more similar than dissimilar ways.

Regardless of theoretical preference, for example, psychoanalysts utilize three basic professional behaviors: framing, presence, and engagement (Karbelnig, 2014, 2018ab). They frame their psychoanalytic interpersonal relationships by establishing, maintaining, and creating environments facilitative of psychoanalytic processes. They bring their presence to patients through empathy, attention, attunement, interest, respect, curiosity, and similar behaviors. (Interpersonally or relationally oriented clinicians believe presence contributes to transformational processes). Finally, psychoanalysts engage their patients in forms of dialogue, consciously and unconsciously, verbally and nonverbally, and in other, more mysterious ways, such as through "reverie" (Bion, 1963, p. 19). Prominent among psychoanalysts' many transformation-facilitating effects, engagement processes access, disrupt, and alter unconscious or other denied or disavowed features of mental life.

To avoid entrapment in bitter controversies regarding session frequency, theoretical preference, or use of the couch, the new agency would define competency in psychoanalysis as the capacity to facilitate psychoanalytic processes whether they be once-a-month or five-times-per-week. This simple modification would instantly transform clinical psychoanalysis from an exclusive to an inclusive profession. Clinicians practicing weekly psychoanalytic psychotherapy, or those who restrict their practices to psychoanalytic sessions four- to five-session per week, gather under the same, large tent. Expanding inclusivity still further, the new psychoanalytic profession would necessarily adopt Wallerstein's (2013) idea to utilize the psychoanalytic opus a source for a "plethora of theoretical metaphors" (p. 36). Accepting the fundamental architecture of framing, presence, and engagement, and including a wide range of theoretical models for facilitating patients' self-understanding, empowers, grows, and broadens the profession of psychoanalysis. If demand to formalize differences in theory or session frequency remains, individual institutions could create additional endorsements, i.e., in Kleinian, Lacanian, or Self-Psychology psychoanalysis. These added layers of authority could, for example, mandate theoretical orientation, the use of the couch, or a certain session frequency. Meanwhile, however, the field would take a giant leap forward by creating one psychoanalytic profession.

Resuscitating Psychoanalysis

Saving psychoanalysis as a profession requires colleagues with an interest in systems, organizations, and politics to work in earnest to create an independent, non-profit, international agency tasked with credentialing psychoanalysts and accrediting training institutions. The world's major professions evolved in similar ways, establishing longstanding norms. After initially forming guilds or professional membership organizations, they outsourced accreditation and certification processes. Physicians in the United States, for example, receive a standardized training, take a national exam, and are then licensed by their individual states. The certifications they obtain in specialties are overseen by agencies different from licensing bodies. For the profession of psychoanalysis, Kernberg and Michels recommend two separate education and certification boards. However, no reason exists to complicate matters by having two agencies with closely related functions. I recommend psychoanalysts interested in creating a profession take these three basic steps:

First, invite the vast majority of practicing psychoanalysts, those who completed basic psychoanalytic training and practice clinically, to join the new organization. By passing a basic screening process, these founding members would be grandfathered in as *certified psychoanalysts*. The selection process should be liberal, drawing together psychoanalysts with diverse orientations, i.e., Freudian, Kleinian, Jungian, Intersubjective, Relational, etc. Some readers might react with horror to the proposal, worrying about degrees of experience, quality of training, or differences in theory or practice. However, broadly inviting psychoanalysts into a new organization would allow for the democratic development of certification and accreditation procedures. Unfortunately, some highly qualified psychoanalysts will refuse to join. Some marginally qualified ones will eagerly apply. However, these extremes will ultimately balance out.

Although the new organization might seek input from APsaA or IPA, the time for these membership organizations to assist in developing the profession of psychoanalysis has long passed. Historically, these organizations would have been responsible for spawning the profession. Clinical psychology, for example, arose from the ashes of WWII. An insufficient number of psychiatrists were available to treat traumatized soldiers, creating the need for additional clinicians. Early clinical psychology practitioners, simply holders of PhDs in psychology, developed into a guild later called the American Psychological Association (APA). The APA, continuing to function as a professional membership organization, ultimately spawned separate organizations for accrediting educational institutions and certifying competency. Membership functions differ from, and conflict with, accreditation and certification procedures.

Second, members would proceed to develop methodologies for assessing competency. They would need to address wide variations in training. In the United States, for example, mental health practitioners include psychiatrists, psychologists, licensed clinical social workers, marriage and family therapists, and licensed professional counselors. Comporting with the norms of other professions, the new agency might consider a post-graduation, two-part assessment of competency like this one:

1. A written exam assessing understanding of general psychoanalytic ideas such as the history of the field, the dynamic unconscious, repetition compulsion, transference, countertransference, inter-

pretation of dreams and other signs of the unconscious, defense mechanisms, and models of psychological development.

- **2.** To accommodate candidates preferring written to oral expression, a second section of the evaluation process could consist of either:
 - **a.** An oral examination of psychoanalytic case presentations or;
 - **b.** Submission of a paper describing the course of a psychoanalysis and/or a psychoanalytic psychotherapy case.

Third, and drawing on certified psychoanalysts' skill set, the organization's members would develop processes for accrediting psychoanalytic institutes. Embracing the need to move forward quickly, and mirroring the liberal grandfathering in of most psychoanalysts as certified, many psychoanalytic institutes would similarly be accredited. The new professional psychoanalytic organization—strengthened by a large cadre of certified psychoanalysts and accredited institutions—could then carefully develop a standardized methodology for psychoanalytic training. What might training programs encompass?

As most contributors to Zagermann's book agree, psychoanalysts learn best through a variant of the tripartite model, namely didactic training, supervised practice, and their own psychoanalysis. The tripartite model could remain intact, but training analyses would be replaced by didactic ones—a modification supported by the majority of Zagermann's contributors. A didactic analysis might be defined, for example, as a minimal three-session-per-week analysis conducted for at least 18 months, by any certified psychoanalyst. In terms of control cases, and consonant with Eisold's and other's ideas, training institutions might require only one psychoanalytic control case. They could allow psychoanalytic psychotherapy processes to comprise the other one or two cases. Finally, and to address concerns about some candidate's lack of education in basic mental health issues, e.g., psychoanalysts with academic backgrounds. training institutions could offer a separate group of courses comparable to a post-baccalaureate pre-medical program. These tracks would educate in the basics of psychiatric diagnoses, risk assessment (suicide, homicide, or grave disability), the utility of psychological testing, basic information about psychotropic medications, etc.

Given the grave condition of our profession, those interested in developing such a proposed professional organization need to stop reading and start acting. The goal may be easier to achieve than most think. In any event, it has now become imperative. The Red Queen from *Alice in Wonderland* illustrates a basic truth: evolve or die. The recent BOPS versus APsaA lawsuit brings the shocking dysfunction of the psychoanalytic membership organizations to new, Kafkaesque heights. For years, APsaA demonstrated exclusionary politics beginning with the only physician-requirement in the world, progressing into the exclusionary membership arrangement between APsaP and the IPA, and continuing into the 1988 lawsuit ending the medical degree requirement. Most recently, the APsaA nearly destroyed itself with the embarrassing intramural BOPS litigation bleeding more than \$1 million in legal fees. Meanwhile, no forward movement in establishing psychoanalysis as a credible profession has occurred.

Dominance hierarchies have always, and will always, exist. As the Soviet experiment revealed, it is impossible to completely eliminate social, economic, or cultural inequalities. Even the most progressive political scientists consider completely abolishing inequalities a utopian fantasy, an impossibility. Within psychoanalysis itself, even with a new organization, inequalities will persist. Some certified psychoanalysts will have busy practices; some will excel in publishing or lecturing; some will be more popular with supervisees than others. Nonetheless, this proposal for establishing an international organization for assessing competency in psychoanalysis and accrediting psychoanalytic educational institutions would eliminate the worst destructive inequities lingering within psychoanalysis. Most importantly, it would establish a real profession of psychoanalysis.

The history of "yapping dogfights" (Friedman, (2006), p. 689), the fears of marginalization, the calls for suicide prevention, and other dire predictions for psychoanalysis' future underscore the need for more professional organizing than further debate. It brings the 19th century's union organizer, Joe Hill, to mind. Years after Hill's 1925 death, Joan Baez turned a memorial poem by Alfred Hayes into the song, *I Dreamed I Saw Joe Hill Last Night*. The lyrics describe Joe Hill appearing in a dream, "alive as you and me." He preaches organization, not mourning, and cries, "takes more than guns to kill a man." It will take more than

CBT and psychotropic medications to kill psychoanalysis. Meanwhile, and for those readers with the systems, organizational, and political skills required to create a new profession, the time has come to set aside this review, open your computer, pick up your phone, get out your letterhead, and begin organizing a new psychoanalytic professional agency.

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In Praise of Robert H. Abzug's Biography of Rollo May Review of Psyche and Soul in America: The Spiritual Odyssey of Rollo May by Robert Abzug

Reviewed by Daniel Benveniste

Rollo May (Oxford University Press, 2021) is a magnificent adventure. Abzug is an outstanding scholar, and the subject of his biography is perhaps the most important American-born depth psychologist in history. As I write these words, I recall explicitly Dr. May saying it was Harry Stack Sullivan who was the most original American-born psychoanalyst. But with all due respect to Dr. May, I disagree. It was Rollo May himself.

When someone in my world dies, it seems I always learn something new about that person from others in their world. Everything Abzug reveals fits with the man I knew, but all the new details and intellectual depth in this book brought me much closer and deeper into the life and work of Rollo May, who was one of the four men whom I call my mentors. I had two semesters of case seminars in existential psychotherapy with Rollo at his home in Tiburon, California, in 1987 and 1988, as well as some additional contacts outside of seminars. Although our contact was relatively brief, the connection made a great impact on me.

Abzug leads us through May's intellectual development from his Midwestern family through his relationships with the YMCA, the ministry, art, theology, Alfred Adler, Paul Tillich, Erich Fromm, Freda Fromm-Reichman, Clara Thompson, the William Alanson White Institute, and on to becoming one of the founding figures in both existential and humanistic psychology. Abzug tells us that "Rollo's dreams of destiny found a voice" in Sam Foss's poem "The House by the Side of the Road," part of which reads:

There are pioneer souls that blaze their paths

Where highways never ran;-

But let me live by the side of the road

And be a friend to man.

The poem is so extraordinarily Rollo. As a psychologist—a non-MD—he was not permitted training in the American Psychoanalytic Association institutes. So he went to the side of the road, into the margin, and there he built a castle of his own. In addition to his foundational role in defining existential and humanistic psychologies, he played a significant role in the licensure of psychologists and as a psychological commentator on life and culture in twentieth-century North America. And as for being "a friend to man," I think this speaks to Rollo's humanism and reminds me of his studies with Alfred Adler, whom he recalled saying the goal of therapy was "to become a fellow man."

May came to psychology from theology, art, and philosophy and from these perspectives developed a refreshing approach to the subject, which he presented to the intelligentsia and popular culture in his compelling prose. His writing moved the American soul and brought psychological sophistication into public discourse through his inspiring books, magazine articles, and radio and television appearances. This naturally led to a more psychologically sophisticated North American culture interested in self-knowledge and the personal pursuit of psychotherapy.

Freud did not write much about inspiration, but, of course, he was extraordinarily inspired. Rollo May did not write much about the unconscious, but, as we learn from Abzug, he was deeply concerned with it. He actively plumbed the depths of his dreams and interpersonal conflicts through his various analyses, self-analysis, and journal writing, in which he discovered and rediscovered the roots of his personal problems in early childhood traumas. Within these traumas he found the basis for his sorrows, his conflicts with women, his competitions with men, and his loneliness. Through Abzug's telling of this odyssey, we learn of some of the darkest moments of May's life and climb with him to the heights of his professional successes, international recognition, and even the development of a warm and sustaining love later in life.

When a biographer chooses a subject to write about, a transference naturally develops that the biographer elaborates, in one way or another, through the writing. But when the subject of the biography is alive and

collaborates with the biographer, offering interviews and documentary material, another transference component becomes involved. Abzug writes, "Rollo and I developed a respectful relationship, one that at times sparked a warm encounter in which each of us learned something about ourselves and the other." Thus we can see that Rollo did not compete with Abzug but rather gave the story of his life to him in an act of love and generativity. In kind, Abzug rose to the occasion and produced a fine biography worthy of the life and work that it describes.

I highly recommend Abzug's biography of Rollo May not only for existential, humanistic, and Jungian psychologists, who will naturally be interested, but for my colleagues within the broader Freudian psychoanalytic tradition, who will find May's distinctly North American approach to psychoanalysis quite compelling.



Arnold D. Richards

his fourth issue of the IJCD revisits matters considered in the first issue of this journal: questions centering around viewing psychoanalysis as an art or a science or ideology. Some of the contributors discuss binaries and false dichotomies that do not advance the dialogue.

In regard to ideology and the danger of becoming a cult, Psychoanalysis has struggled because of its authoritarian roots. The shadow of Freud, the founder, falls over psychoanalysis organizationally, in its practice, and in its theory. Freud is notorious for having expelled those he considered heretics and forming a group of loyal supporters to defend the faith.

Organized psychoanalysis, including the American Psychoanalytical Association, has made considerable progress in becoming more inclusive; a prime example of this was its shift in position regarding nonmedical Analysis. There is also a more recent effort to achieve more diversity, to encourage individuals from underrepresented minorities to become candidates and members.

Our next major task is to replace the training analyst system with a system that allows each candidate to select their own personal analyst. The requirements for a training analyst was set up in the early 1920s by a committee chaired by Max Ettington but the requirements were actually written by Karen Horney and Richard Sterba. It is ironic indeed that when the American Psychoanalytical Association was re-organized in 1946, the Karen Horney group was excluded.

I am grateful for all the contributions to this issue including the responses to my paper.



About the Contributors

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Honorary Member of the American Psychoanalytic Association for his clinical work, his books on psychoanalytic history, his dedication to psychoanalytic education, and his writings that have brought psychoanalytic concepts and theories to professional and lay audiences on two continents in both English and Spanish.

Sandra Buechler, Ph.D., is Training and Supervising analyst and graduate, William Alanson White Institute. Clinical Values: Emotions that Guide Psychoanalytic Treatment, Analytic Press, 2004, examines hope, courage, and other values. Making a Difference in Patients' Lives: Emotional Experience in the Therapeutic Setting (Routledge, 2008) discusses therapeutic process. Still Practicing: The Heartaches and Joys of a Clinical Career, (Routledge, 2012) explores



clinicians' shame, sorrow, and resilience. *Understanding and Treating Patients in Clinical Psychoanalysis: Lessons from Literature* (Routledge, 2015) uses short stories to illuminate coping styles. *Psychoanalytic Reflections: Training and Practice* (IPBooks, 2017) examines the process of becoming and being a psychoanalyst. *Psychoanalytic Approaches to Problems in Living: Addressing Life's Challenges in Clinical Practice* (Routledge, 2019) asks how analysts can help their patients cope with life's recurrent difficulties, and *Poetic Dialogues* (in press, IPBooks) creates emotionally expressive "conversations" between poems.

James Tyler Carpenter, Ph.D., is a Clinical-Forensic Psychologist-graduate of CWRU, Long Island (MA) and St. John's (PhD) Universities, former Clinical Fellow of Harvard Medical School, in practice since 1986, he works as a Member of Metis Psychological Associates, LLC outside Boston, is a Diplomate in Clinical Psychology, and a member of



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Sandra E. Cohen, Ph.D. (https://sandracohen-phd.com/) is a Training and Supervising Analyst at the Psychoanalytic Center of California, and in private psychoanalytic practice in Beverly Hills with adults and teenagers. Her areas of specialization include early trauma, panic disorder, persistent depression, anxiety, eating disorders, creative blocks, relationship



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Jane S. Hall, CSW, FIPA, is a former President of the Contemporary Freudian Society; former Board Representative IPA; former board and member ApsaA; member AAPCSW. Activities: teach, supervise, and consult nationally and internationally on deepening psychoanalytic work and related topics via zoom and in person. Author of: *Roadblocks on the Journey*




of Psychotherapy (2004) and Deepening the Treatment in English and Mandarin (1998). Journal articles. Former editor psychoanalysis. today and TAP. Editorial board: IJCD; Internationalpsychoanalysis: book editor. A founder of the New York School for Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis, Jane created and served as the first director of the Psychotherapy Track at CFS.

Alan Karbelnig, Ph.D., is a licensed psychologist and marriage and family therapist engaged in private practice in Pasadena, CA since 1988. He has two Ph.D.s, one in Counseling Psychology from the University of Southern California and one in Psychoanalysis from the New Center for Psychoanalysis. Dr. Karbelnig served as a member of the Board of Directors of the California Psychological Association and as President



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Reading the Symptom (Routledge, 2018) introduces both new psychoanalytic techniques for working with the body and a new methodology for interpreting film and literature.

Arnold Richards, M.D., was Editor of *JAPA* from 1994 to 2003 and, prior to that, Editor of *TAP*. He is a member of the Contemporary Freudian Society and an honorary member of the Karen Horney Clinic. Dr. Richards is currently on the faculty at Tongji Medical College of Huazhong University of Science and Technology at Wuhan, China. He is planning a series of five volumes of his selected papers, the first



two of which have been published: Volume I: Psychoanalysis: Critical Conversations, Volume 2: Psychoanalysis: Perspectives on Thought Collectives, Volume 3: The Psychoanalyst at Work, Volume 4: The Peripatetic Psychoanalyst, Volume 5: The World of Psychoanalysis and Psychoanalysts. He is also writing a memoir, Unorthodox: My Life in Psychoanalysis, and he has co-edited four books. Dr. Richards is the publisher of internationalpsychoanalysis.net and ipbooks.net. He is retired from private practice in Palm Beach, Florida.

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